


วารสารวิชาการผลประโยชน์แห่งชาติ National Interest

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บทบรรณาธิการ

วารสารวิชาการผลประโยชน์แห่งชาติฉบับที่ 6 จัดทำระหว่างสถานการณ์ของการยื่นคำขาดอย่างเปิดเผยต่อสาธารณะของการไม่ละเมิด “เส้นสีแดง” ที่ประธานาธิบดีปูตินกำหนดขึ้นต่อสหรัฐอเมริกา ซึ่งเป็นการทูตแบบใหม่ที่ยังไม่เคยเกิดขึ้นหลังจากการล่มสลายของสหภาพโซเวียตเมื่อ 30 ปีก่อน

โดยรัสเซีย เสนอให้จัดการเจรจากับตะวันตกในเรื่องหลักประกันที่ชัดเจนเกี่ยวกับการขยายตัวทางตะวันออกของนาโตในเชิงเอกสารด้านกฎหมาย เพื่อรับรองความปลอดภัยของทั้งสองฝ่าย ซึ่งนาโตต้องรับประกันว่ายูเครนและจอร์เจียจะไม่เป็นสมาชิกนาโต ซึ่งถือว่าสหรัฐอเมริกาดังจะตัดสินใจหากยอมรับข้อเสนอของรัสเซีย โดยปูตินให้เวลาตัดสินใจภายใน 30 วัน (สิ้นสุด 14 มกราคม 2022) และการยอมรับข้อเสนอนี้ จะหมายถึงการสหรัฐจะสูญเสียยูเครนในฐานะเครื่องมือที่สะดวกในการสร้างแรงกดดันต่อรัสเซีย

“เส้นสีแดง” เป็นที่ดำดพ์ที่ปูตินบัญญัติขึ้นมาใหม่ทางภูมิรัฐศาสตร์ ซึ่งให้ความหมายถึงเขตอิทธิพล(อาณาเขตนอกเหนือจากอาณาเขตตามกฎหมายระหว่างประเทศรัสเซีย) ของรัฐศูนย์กลางที่สามารถสร้างสันติภาพและสงครามในเวลาเดียวกันบนฐานผลประโยชน์ของชาติตนเอง และรัฐที่มีอธิปไตยที่แท้จริง โดยวัดจากอัตราของการยิงขีปนาวุธ รัสเซียสามารถป้องกันการโจมตีจากศัตรูได้ภายในระยะเวลาที่นาที (ก่อนหน้านี้ รัสเซียใช้ระยะเวลา 10 นาที)

หากสหรัฐฯ ใช้เวลา 5 นาที ก็หมายถึง การรุกราน “เส้นสีแดง” หากรัสเซียใช้เทคโนโลยีขีปนาวุธด้วยความเร็วเหมือนเดิม รัสเซียก็จะไม่สามารถต่อรองกับสหรัฐฯ และก็จะร่วมมือกับสหรัฐฯ หรือเพิกเฉย ให้สหรัฐฯ ทำตามใจ เหมือนกรณีการโจมตียูโกสลาเวีย แต่หากรัสเซียสามารถพัฒนาความเร็วเกิน 20 มัคอย่างในปัจจุบัน รัสเซียก็สามารถโจมตีสหรัฐฯ ได้ในเวลา 5 นาทีเช่นกัน หากสหรัฐฯ ไม่ต้องการสงคราม สหรัฐฯ ต้องไม่รุกราน “เส้นสีแดง” รัฐยูเครนในฐานะรัฐชายแดน รัสเซียต้องเป็นกลางแบบฟินแลนด์หรือสวีเดน

หากสหรัฐฯ ปฏิเสธ รัสเซียจะเริ่มใช้การทหารนำการเมืองในการตอบโต้ พร้อมทั้งการจำกัดการส่งออกแหล่งพลังงานซึ่งสนับสนุนเศรษฐกิจของตะวันตกด้วย รัสเซียเริ่มขายแก๊สธรรมชาติให้จีนมากขึ้นแทนที่ตลาดแก๊ส LNG ของสหรัฐฯ ที่จำหน่ายแก่จีน ที่มีราคาแพง ดังนั้น รัสเซีย และจีน บีบให้สหรัฐฯ ออกจากตลาดเอเชีย และสร้างให้เกิดการขาดตลาดแก๊สในยุโรป ยุโรป และสหรัฐฯ จะไม่มีทางเลือกอื่นนอกจากต้องเริ่มนำเข้าแก๊ส LNG จากสหรัฐฯ ไปยังยุโรปซึ่งมีราคาที่แพงมากหากราคาน้ำมันในยุโรปสูงขึ้น ในขณะที่ราคาในจีนกลับถูกลง จะทำให้สินค้าจีนมีราคาถูก และสินค้าของยุโรปมีราคาแพงขึ้นอีก (หากเปรียบเทียบรายได้ของบริษัท Gazprom

ในช่วงเวลาเดียวกันของราคาแก๊สของ Gazprom ได้กำไรมากกว่า 40 พันล้านเหรียญสหรัฐฯ ได้สร้างความตื่นเริงให้กับการลงทุนด้านการก่อสร้างเส้นทางขนส่งใหม่ที่มีอัตราที่ขยายตัวอย่างรวดเร็วมากกว่าก่อนการระบาดของโควิด-19) สินค้าจีนชนะการแข่งขันจากผู้ผลิตตะวันตกทุกอย่างจะเลวร้ายลงมากสำหรับยุโรปช่วยลดโอกาสที่ยูเครนจะเข้าร่วมนาโตได้อย่างมากและจะส่งผลทำให้โรงงานอุตสาหกรรมในเยอรมนีปิดกิจการที่อาจทำให้เกิดการว่างงานมากกว่าเจ็ดแสนคนและสหรัฐฯจะมีปัญหาการขาดแคลนสินค้าภายในประเทศเนื่องจากปัญหาโลจิสติกส์การขนส่งระหว่างประเทศ

ดังนั้น อธิปไตยในความหมายใหม่คือการดำรงอยู่ของรัฐศูนย์กลางอย่างรัสเซียในฐานะเจ้าภาพ และมีตัวตนอย่างชัดเจนกับความหมายไปที่โซนอิทธิพลที่สหรัฐฯ ไม่สามารถสั่งการได้แต่ขึ้นกับอำนาจการต่อรองทางการทหาร (อาวุธที่มีความเร็วเหนือเสียง) และภูมิเศรษฐกิจที่ไม่ต้องเคลื่อนย้ายกำลังพลระหว่างประเทศ แต่สร้างความสูญเสียอย่างมากทั้งเศรษฐกิจ และประชาชน เป็นเรื่องใหม่ขององค์ความรู้ที่ก่อตัวขึ้นมาตั้งแต่ปี 2007จนกระทั่งกลายเป็นเทคโนโลยีการทหารชั้นนำภูมิรัฐศาสตร์ และภูมิเศรษฐกิจตามมาในปัจจุบันและกลายเป็นหลักพื้นฐานการป้องกันความปลอดภัยของประเทศแบบใหม่โดยผสมผสานกับคณิตศาสตร์เบื้องต้นด้านภูมิเศรษฐกิจกล่าวคือหลังการระบาด COVID-19 สหรัฐฯ ได้พิมพ์เงินออกมาใช้จ่ายเป็นจำนวนครึ่งหนึ่งของ GDP โลก แต่รัสเซียและจีน ไม่ต้องการที่จะยอมรับเงื่อนไขการใช้จ่ายดังกล่าว ขณะที่จีนในปี 2030 จะมีประชากรมากกว่า 300 ล้านคน กำลังซื้อของประชากรกลุ่มนี้คิดเป็น 3 ล้านล้านดอลลาร์ นี่คือเด็กก้อนใหญ่ของจริง ที่สหรัฐฯ ต้องการส่วนแบ่ง แต่ไม่มีความสามารถด้านภูมิเศรษฐกิจและการทหาร ดังนั้นการขยายตัวของนาโตเพื่อต่อรองและทำให้เกิดความไร้เสถียรภาพทางเศรษฐกิจ

สำหรับเนื้อหาอื่น ๆ ในวารสาร ได้นำเสนอบทวิเคราะห์มุมมองด้านภูมิรัฐศาสตร์เกี่ยวกับการเข้าเป็นภาคีของอิหร่านใน Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) และเพื่อตอบคำถามที่สำคัญว่าสามารถระบุผลตอบแทนที่สำคัญจาก “การบูรณาการแนวลึก” ได้หรือไม่ (รวมแง่มุมทางเศรษฐกิจและการเมืองของการเป็นสมาชิก SCO ของอิหร่าน) การแสวงหาสมาชิกภาพเต็มรูปแบบของอิหร่านใน SCO ในฐานะเป็นตัวถ่วงน้ำหนักทางภูมิรัฐศาสตร์ต่อสหรัฐอเมริกา เนื่องจากความไม่ไว้วางใจต่อ อิหร่าน และตะวันตกไม่ยอมรับอิหร่านใหม่ด้วยใจจริง ตรรกะนี้มีพื้นฐานมาจากบรรยากาศทางการเมืองที่ไม่ไว้วางใจ เติหะรานเริ่มมองหาสถานที่ในระบบสากลโดยอาศัยวาทกรรมและแนวคิดภายในประเทศที่เล็ดลอดออกมาจากแนวคิดภายในประเทศเกี่ยวกับอัตลักษณ์ของอิหร่านและด้วยเหตุนี้จึงเข้าใกล้มหาอำนาจของโลกตะวันออก การเข้าร่วม SCO อิหร่านสามารถลดผลกระทบจากการคว่ำบาตรได้จากนักวิชาการอิหร่าน

ดังที่ทราบกันดีถึงจุดมุ่งหมายของวารสารนี้ คือการสร้าง และค้นหาความรู้ใหม่ ๆ ทางวิชาการด้านภูมิรัฐศาสตร์ ภูมิเศรษฐกิจ นวัตกรรมด้านต่าง ๆ ให้แก่สังคม และเพื่อเป็นสื่อกลางในการติดตามความก้าวหน้าในแวดวงวิชาการทั้ง 3 ด้านดังกล่าว โดยเฉพาะอย่างยิ่งวารสารฯ ได้ให้ความสำคัญกับการรักษาผลประโยชน์ของชาติ และรู้เท่าทันสำหรับการปรับตัวในเงื่อนไขใหม่ของการทูตแบบใหม่หลังสิ้นสุดสงครามเย็น ดังนั้นบทความในฉบับที่ 6 ที่มีจำนวนทั้งสิ้น 6 เรื่อง จึง

เป็นบทความวิชาการ 5 เรื่อง และบทความวิจัย 1 เรื่อง โดยได้รับความร่วมมือจากนักวิชาการ อิหร่าน และยูเครน บทความที่เน้นย้ำถึง และการวิเคราะห์สถาบัน และกลไกการกำกับดูแลที่พรรคคอมมิวนิสต์จีนใช้ในปัจจุบัน (CCP) ในบริบทของการประกันความต่อเนื่องและความแพร่หลายของการปกครองของตนเองเหนือรัฐ และสังคมจีนร่วมสมัย จากแนวความคิดทางทฤษฎีของรัฐพรรคเลนินนิสต์และการจัดตั้งของจักรวรรดิ บทความได้นำเสนอหลักฐานเกี่ยวกับการรวมกันของกลไกแบบรัฐของพรรคเลนินนิสต์แบบดั้งเดิมกับรูปแบบการจัดตั้งของจักรวรรดิจะทำให้เกิดความเข้าใจความสัมพันธ์ระหว่างอำนาจต่าง ๆ ที่มีอยู่ใน CCP ในบริบทร่วมสมัยของรัฐพรรค-รัฐของจีน ซึ่งจะทำให้เกิดความเข้าใจแบบองค์รวมมากขึ้นในเรื่องนี้ และงานด้านภูมิรัฐศาสตร์ด้านการพัฒนาชนบทที่ยั่งยืนถือว่าเป็นบทความที่เป็นการสร้างองค์ความรู้ใหม่ที่ใช้แนวทางบูรณาการในการใช้เครื่องมือและมาตรการทั้งชุดของกลไกองค์กร และเศรษฐกิจของการกระจายการพัฒนาที่ยั่งยืนของพื้นที่ชนบท โดยคำนึงถึงปฏิสัมพันธ์กับหลักการของการกระจาย และการกระจายอำนาจจะให้ผลเสริมกันของการประยุกต์ใช้ตามหลักการของรัฐธรรมนูญ และความถูกต้องตามกฎหมาย ความโปร่งใส การเปิดกว้าง ความรับผิดชอบ ผลของการดำเนินการตามกลไกการกระจายความหลากหลายของการพัฒนาที่ยั่งยืนของพื้นที่ชนบทกำหนดการปรับปรุงคุณภาพชีวิตของประชากรในชนบท สร้างความมั่นใจในการแข่งขันของพื้นที่ชนบทและบรรลุความปลอดภัยด้านสิ่งแวดล้อม จะเห็นได้ว่าบทความในลักษณะนี้ค่อนข้างขาดแคลนในแวดวงวิชาการของไทยที่ “วารสารวิชาการผลประโยชน์แห่งชาติ” ได้คัดสรรนำเสนอผ่านความร่วมมือจากหลากหลายนักวิชาการผู้มีประสบการณ์

บรรณาธิการหวังเป็นอย่างยิ่งว่าวารสารของเราฉบับนี้ จะมีส่วนต่อ ยอดความคิด และนำเสนอวิธีคิดแบบใหม่ตามภูมิทัศน์ที่เปลี่ยนไป เพื่อการตั้งคำถามที่มีความชัดเจน และแหลมคมมากยิ่งขึ้น โดยผู้อ่านจะได้รับความรู้ในกระแสนการเปลี่ยนแปลง โดยเฉพาะอย่างยิ่งในสถานการณ์การทูตแบบใหม่ที่กำลังอยู่ในจุดรอยต่อของสงครามหรือสันติภาพ การสกัดยั้งหรือการเติบโต รัฐที่มีอธิปไตยหรือรัฐเดียว เพื่อให้เกิดการถกเถียงในทางวิชาการอย่างสร้างสรรค์ อันจะช่วยให้เกิดมุมมองใหม่ ๆ ในทางวิชาการต่อไป

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Organizational and economic mechanism of diversification of sustainable development of rural areas in the conditions of decentralization

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ABSTRACT

The article substantiates the organizational and economic mechanism of diversification of sustainable development of rural areas in the context of decentralization. An integrated approach to the use of the whole set of tools and measures of the organizational and economic mechanism of diversification of sustainable development of rural areas, taking into account their interaction with the principles of diversification and decentralization will provide a synergistic effect of their application. The normative-legal, institutional, organizational and economic instruments and measures of the organizational-economic mechanism of diversification of sustainable development of rural territories are singled out. The basic principles of diversification include the principles of systematicity, priority, effectiveness, partnership, software, and inclusiveness. During the implementation of the organizational and economic mechanism of diversification of sustainable development of rural areas, it is proposed to adhere to the basic principles of decentralization, such as the principles of constitutionality and legality, subsidiarity, transparency, and openness, responsibility. The results of the implementation of the mechanism of diversification of sustainable development of rural areas determine the improvement of the quality of life of the rural population, ensuring the competitiveness of rural areas and achieving environmental safety.

KEYWORDS: Sustainable development, Rural areas, Diversification, Decentralization, Organizational and economic mechanism.

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1.Introduction .Given the international standards, requirements, and European experience, as well as taking into account the internal needs of rural areas, it is necessary to introduce an organizational and economic mechanism for diversification of sustainable rural development in decentralization, which would expand employment and income of the rural population, adequate medical and educational institutions, improvement of road transport infrastructure, creation of conditions for the development of alternative directions of business and their further diversification in these territories, preservation, and improvement of natural resources. The study of rural development processes has attracted the attention of such scientists as V. Boiko, V. Borshchevskyi, V. Diiesperov, I. Zalutskyi, M. Zhurovskyi, T. Zinchuk, A. Kliuchnyk, A. Lisovyi, Yu. Lupenko, M. Malik, Yu. Matvieieva, Yu. Myroshnychenko, N. Pavlikha, O. Pavlov, Kh. Prytula, V. Slavov, A. Sukhorukov, M. Talavyria, Y. Kharazishvili, M. Khvesyk, V. Yurchyshyn and others. They to some extent reveal the methodological and practical aspects of sustainable development of rural areas. Paying tribute to the existing achievements of scientists, we note that in the context of local government reform, opportunities for rural development are expanding. Therefore, the development and implementation of an organizational and economic mechanism for the diversification of sustainable development of rural areas will help improve the social, industrial, and market infrastructure of these areas.

The purpose of the study is a scientific and methodological justification of the organizational and economic mechanism of sustainable development of rural areas in terms of decentralization. Its implementation will help improve the quality of life of the rural population, ensure the competitiveness of rural areas and achieve environmental safety. To achieve this goal, the following tasks are solved: to reveal the paradigm of sustainable development of rural areas on the basis of diversification of development of these areas, to propose a mechanism to ensure sustainable development of rural areas in a decentralized environment; assess the state of social, economic, and environmental development of rural areas in Ukraine, justify the importance of the diversification process to achieve sustainable development of these areas.

2. Proposed Techniques / Algorithms .In the process of conducting research, general scientific methods were used, including: monographic – with a theoretical justification of the subjects, the principles of diversification and decentralization, measures and tools of the mechanism of sustainable development of rural areas; graphic – to visualize the proposed organizational and economic mechanism of sustainable development of rural areas in terms of decentralization, scientific generalization – in the development of proposals for the implementation of the organizational and economic mechanism of sustainable development of rural areas in terms of decentralization.

The information base of the study was static data, scientific works of domestic and foreign authors, electronic resources presented on the Internet, the results of the author's own research, and more.

3. Results. Taking into account the consequences of decentralization and local self-government reform requires substantiation of conceptual directions of diversification of sustainable development of rural united territorial communities, implementation of the mechanism of development management of united territorial communities, development, and implementation of strategies, programs, plans for

harmonious growth and optimism, social and ecological spheres of development of the united territorial communities.

T. Zinchuk notes that “measures to ensure the diversification of the rural economy play an extremely important role for Ukraine, where there is almost no economic growth in rural areas, where the agricultural sector still predominates as the main source of income, and in regions with high unemployment, who need to develop a strategy to boost rural income growth” [1]

According to V. Borshchevskyi, I. Zalutskyi, and Yu. Prysiachniuk, the main mechanisms that ensure the implementation of the conceptual foundations of rural development in the life of rural territorial communities of the EU member states are institutional, financial, social, and informational [2].

O. Pavlov believes that when forming the mechanism of financial support of a rural territorial community, it is necessary to take into account the varieties of these communities, including: typically rural (agrarian) territories; transitional, “mixed” areas (rural-urban areas and “agricultural cities”); territories with a special mode of operation (health and recreation, mountain and border) [3].

The creation of rural, township, urban UTC and the consolidation of districts leads to the reformatting of new districts in the border, as a result of which the boundaries of the border strip are expanding. Therefore, there is a need to clearly define the width of the border strip from the state borderline in the adjacent territories of village councils [4].


We offer such directions of diversification of sustainable development of rural areas in the conditions of decentralization, as:

- diversification of agricultural production;
- diversification of non-agricultural activities;
- diversification of organizational and legal forms of management;
- diversification of sources of financing for rural development [5, 6].

We believe that in rural areas, diversification is based on the relocation of resources to new areas of agricultural and non-agricultural activities. Therefore, the expansion of the range and markets of agricultural products, organic production, cultivation of niche crops will contribute to the diversification of agricultural production on the basis of sustainable development and ensure the growth of exports, expansion of employment, and, consequently, the income of the rural population [7].

Organizational and economic mechanism of diversification of sustainable development of rural areas in the context of decentralization (Fig. 1) involves the use of special tools and measures to optimize the structure of this process, focusing on improving the quality of life of the rural population; ensuring the competitiveness of rural areas and achieving environmental safety. The development of a mechanism for diversification of sustainable development of rural areas should be carried out taking into account strategic directions and analysis of social, economic and environmental development of rural areas. The validity of the measures can be confirmed by calculations of the effectiveness of the functioning of rural united territorial communities.

Figure 1. Organizational and economic mechanism of diversification of sustainable development of rural areas in the conditions of decentralization



To participate in the process of

– To participate in the process of diversification of sustainable development of rural areas in the context of decentralization, it is advisable to involve representatives [5, 8]

– public authorities. After all, the central government is responsible for implementing regional economic development strategies that are designed to effectively use the potential of urban and rural areas, taking into account national needs. In addition, their function is to regulate relations between rural areas of the regions of Ukraine to ensure national development programs;

– local governments – deputies of local councils and employees of executive bodies. These are some of the most important actors, as they help to approve and implement most regional strategies, programs, and projects by attracting national and local finances. In addition, their functions include providing information to the company about the social, economic, and environmental opportunities for rural development;

– rural population, because they represent their own interests and are interested in the development of their own rural area;

– legal entities of various forms of ownership and individuals. The involvement of privately owned enterprises and organizations will promote the development of rural areas. With reliable information on the state of the selected rural area, favorable business environment, legal entities and individuals can diversify their agricultural and non-agricultural activities;

– public organizations that are interested, first of all, not in making a profit, but in the development of the rural community;

– other subjects. This group includes the media, local educational institutions at various levels, trade unions, ethnic and religious groups.

The organizational and economic mechanism of diversification of sustainable development of rural areas, like any other mechanism, should be based on a set of principles on which it would be appropriate to form it. Among the main principles of diversification of rural development are:

– *the principle of systematization*, which determines the need to implement the process of diversification of rural development as a single system, which includes a number of elements to achieve the goals;

– *the principle of priority*, which indicates the importance of taking into account the specialization of rural areas, which depends on a set of social, economic, natural, historical, and other factors of development of this area;

– *the principle of effectiveness* is that as a result of the implementation of diversification of rural development will improve the quality of life of the rural population, ensure the competitiveness of these areas and achieve environmental safety;

– *the principle of partnership*, which ensures cooperation between public authorities and local governments, business entities, the population in the process of diversification of rural development;

– *the principle of programmability*, which is manifested in the implementation of state regional policy on the basis of interrelated strategies, programs, projects, and rural development plans;

– *the principle of inclusiveness*, which, according to M. Plotnikova, achieves a development that covers all spheres of life of rural communities and allows to obtain tangible for every one positive changes in quality of life and well-being, which involves the development of rural economy, environment, and also a sufficient level of meeting the social needs of communities, solving problems of social security and social policy [9].

When developing and implementing this organizational and economic mechanism, the principles of decentralization should also be followed, including:

– *the principle of constitutionality and legality*, which consists in the lawful activity of all subjects of this mechanism and their observance of the Constitution and laws of Ukraine;

– *the principle of subsidiary*, according to which all issues that can be effectively addressed on the ground should be within the competence of local governments;

– *the principle of transparency and openness*, which protects the interests of the rural population by improving the efficiency of public administration. In addition, adherence to this principle is an effective means of combating corruption and contributes to an open public policy on rural development;

– *the principle of responsibility*, which is that public authorities and local governments within their powers are fully responsible for the formation and implementation of diversification of rural development.

L. Bakhchyvanzhy and O. Pavlova note that “agriculture, in addition to economic, also performs social and environmental functions, contributes to the preservation of cultural income in the countryside, affects the formation of landscapes, and therefore even at a high level of market relations in most countries Agriculture is focused not only on obtaining market results (profit, income, market share, etc.) but also on the creation of many social benefits: preservation of natural diversity, environmental protection, restoration of soil fertility, food security, etc.” [10]. Scientists divide the functions of production diversification processes in the agrar sector into three groups: social, economic, environmental, and note that “they always exist in a complex and there are causal links between them, i.e. each is both a source and result of others” [10].

In view of this, the functions of diversification of rural development, in our opinion, are *social, economic, and environmental (environmental) functions*.

The main *social functions of diversification of rural development in the context of decentralization* are: increasing the income of the rural population; reduction of unemployment in rural areas; development of social infrastructure in rural areas; creation of a system of cultural and aesthetic education of the community; consulting, training and advanced training of rural residents; providing assistance to young agricultural producers; concluding and guaranteeing compliance with employment contracts of employees with the administration of the employer; improvement of infrastructure and material base in the spheres of education and medicine [11].

Realization of *economic functions of diversification of development of rural territories in the conditions of decentralization* provides an increase in volumes of gross output; achieving food security; increase labour productivity; creating conditions for attracting investments; diversification of agricultural production and non-agricultural activities; providing state support to small and medium-sized farms; assistance to agricultural producers in increasing the added value of agricultural products through storage, processing, trade, marketing, support for the creation and development of cooperatives; improvement of production, market, road infrastructure for agricultural development [12, 13].

Ecological functions of diversification of rural development in the conditions of decentralization contribute to the maintenance of ecological balance in rural areas; achieving environmental safety; rational use, protection, and reproduction of natural resources; creation of a system of ecological and patriotic education of the community; responsibility for the state and trends in the environment on the territory of the united territorial community; the arrangement of rational agro landscapes; conservation of degraded unproductive agricultural lands, creation of cultural pastures and forest plantations on them; performance of works on prevention of erosion and landslide processes; development and implementation of agroecological programs for UTC development [11, 14].

In our opinion, it is expedient to single out *four groups of tools and measures for diversification of rural development in the conditions of decentralization*: normative-legal, organizational, institutional, and economic.

In our opinion, the implementation of diversification of rural development in the context of decentralization is possible in the presence of legal, scientific and methodological, financial, institutional, and other types of resources.

Regulatory and legal support for the diversification of rural development in decentralization is regulated by the Constitution of Ukraine, Laws of Ukraine ("On Voluntary Association of Territorial Communities", "On Cooperation of Territorial Communities", "On Principles of State Regional Policy", "On Local Self-Government in Ukraine"), Budget, Tax, Land Codes of Ukraine, resolutions, orders of the Cabinet of Ministers, decrees of the President of Ukraine, other regulations governing the powers and responsibilities of public authorities and local governments and regulate the development of rural areas in Ukraine. Despite the significant number of regulations, the imperfection of legislation is one of the main reasons hindering the development of rural areas [15, 16].

Scientific and methodological support for the diversification of rural development in the context of decentralization is based on the analysis of scientific literature, as a result of scientific and practical conferences, seminars, round tables, and in the implementation of rural development projects.

The *financial resources* of local and central authorities, private entities, financial institutions, and non-governmental organizations, as well as foreign states and international financial organizations, can be used to meet the needs of rural development. In the scientific literature, financial resources are classified according to various criteria: territorial origin, regularity of use, economic content, method of attraction. According to the method of attraction, budget, investment, credit, grant financial resources of rural areas are allocated (Table 1) [17,18].

Table 1. *Types of financial resources of rural areas by the method of attraction*

Nr	Types of financial resources	Content
1	2	3
1	Budgetary	Funds of local and state budgets, which are used to finance the needs of UTC development and do not cause debt obligations. Budget sources can be formed at the expense of both the internal resources of UTC and the resources involved from outside.
2	Investment	Resources attracted to the local economy to create new assets. The peculiarity of investments as a source of funding for local socio-economic development is that they are directed to the implementation of a particular project directly and not through the UTC budget.
3	Credit	Debt obligations on terms of maturity, payment, and return. Thus credit means can involve directly UTC council (the involved means go to the UTC budget and are distributed within its expenses), the municipal enterprises (independently receive financial resources, dispose of them, carry out service and repayment of debt), private business entities (the council can provide loan guarantees).
4	Grant	Resources provided to fund local development needs in the form of international technical assistance, grants from international donor organizations, charitable contributions, and donations. Grants can also be considered funds aimed at the development of the local economy in the framework of corporate social responsibility projects, i.e. local development initiatives supported by private sector institutions that operate in the relevant territory.

Institutional support for the diversification of rural development in the context of decentralization is a set of institutions that ensure the availability of legal, organizational, social, economic, and environmental conditions necessary for the development of rural, urban and urban UTC. Rural development requires institutional support, which includes: state bodies (ministries, departments), public organizations, regional development agencies, etc. The key task of these institutions is to mutually coordinate the implementation of state policy in the field of rural development.

By *methods of diversification by the development of rural areas in the conditions of decentralization*, we understand the ways of influence of subjects of diversification on the object of

diversification which is used for achievement of the set purposes. There are administrative (approval and compliance with laws, regulations, orders, instructions, recommendations) and economic (taxation, soft loans, financial sanctions, insurance, subventions) methods. These methods can directly affect the development of rural areas (direct impact method) or indirectly (indirect impact method). The use of these methods will help increase the level of employment in rural areas, create conditions for attracting investment, will reduce the destructive impact on the environment.

Methods and tools for diversification of the development of rural areas in the context of decentralization should be flexible and adapted to the development of specific rural areas of Ukraine. All methods and tools of this mechanism should be correlated with each other because only together they will contribute to the integrated development of rural communities.

We believe that the implementation of the organizational and economic mechanism of diversification of sustainable development of rural areas in the context of decentralization will improve the quality of life of the rural population; ensure the competitiveness of rural areas and achieve environmental safety.

4. Discussion and Conclusion. The developed organizational and economic mechanism for diversification of sustainable development of rural areas in the conditions of decentralization is based on the definition of subjects, principles, functions, their respective tools, and measures. The social functions of the implementation of this mechanism are the growth of incomes of the rural population, the reduction of unemployment in rural areas, the development of social infrastructure in rural areas; economic – increase in gross output, achieve food security, increase productivity; ecological – maintenance of ecological balance in rural areas, rational use, protection and reproduction of natural resources. It has been proven that the achievement of the set goals will generally contribute to the integrated development of rural united territorial communities.

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Iran's membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Economic, Trade and Political Affairs

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ABSTRACT

This paper aims to provide a better understanding of the Iranian accession into the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and to answer the important question of whether one can identify substantial payoffs from “deep integration” (combining economic and political aspects of Iran’s SCO membership). Iran’s pursuit of full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) seems to be reinforced by the distrust towards the global West, and its genuine Look East Policy with the prospect of allying with Russia and China. Indeed, the SCO is perceived as a geopolitical counterweight to the United States. Because of the distrust, Iran failed to get included in regional or international security architecture and the West did not embrace a new Iran wholeheartedly. This logic was grounded in a political climate of distrust, asymmetries of power and unilateral ethnocentrism which were hampering any initiative for trust-building and de-escalation. Tehran began to look for a place in the international system by relying on domestic discourses and ideas emanating from within the domestic ideas about Iran’s identity and consequently approaching superpowers of the global East. Crippling sanctions, threats of military intervention, cyber warfare, regime change and regime destabilization efforts were from Iran’s perspective the policies that were genuinely used against Iran and therefore contentious. By joining the SCO Iran can downplay the effect of sanctions.

KEYWORDS: Iran’s foreign policy, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Look east policy, Sanctions, Identity

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Introduction. After the Islamic revolution, Iran has tried to produce a discourse that surely reflects the formation of a specific worldview that is based on the Iranian post-revolution interpretation of Iran's history and national identity. What matters is that the decision-makers felt obliged to develop and make policies in a way that would not contradict the main narratives, as the narrative sets their limits for policies, relying particularly on identity's intellectuals, the legacy of the Iranian history and memories. Thus, Iran tried to show that revolutionary Iran is fundamentally different from both the West and the east, following the slogan of "neither the East nor the West". Furthermore, it was believed the Iranian people possessed a social-historical and cultural matrix of their own and an original type of spirituality and never merged with the East or West. Western opposition towards the nuclear programme was the major example and a source of threat that the West attempted to put the integrity of the land, sovereignty and the legitimacy of post-revolution Iranian modernity under full control and to deprive Iranians of their identity. From this perspective, Iran especially during the presidency of Mr Ahmadinejad believed that the country's international status and prestige could be achieved not only through military power but also through the politically influenced balance of power in its immediate neighbourhood at the first instance as well as through intangible spiritual, cultural heritage and scientific achievements and launched a new policy known as the Look East policy [1].

Iran's Look East policy, as pointed out, has a much deeper history of just China and goes back to Pahlavi's era. But very soon after the revolution, Iran distanced itself from both Russia and China and drew surprisingly closer to North Korea because it needed the security military help which no country was ready to provide, except North Korea. But Iran's eastern orientation policy started rigorously with President Ahmadinejad. Thus, the argument is here that the package of the look east policy was something much grander than just China during the recent years. It is important to look at this through a multi-sided prism which are geopolitics, geoeconomics and identity-civilization [2]. The idea is based very much on the nexus between Western and Eastern Asia, the former harbouring the main hydrocarbon producers in the world and the latter east Asian economies being the thirstiest one when it comes to energy supplies. Thus, this is very much a material underpinning of this foreign policy school, Iran's look east policy. Iran is a large and influential Middle Eastern Shia power, it sits at the pivot of where the US, Russian and Chinese interests both converge and diverge. It is at the front line of the competition between the West and the East. For Russia and China, Iran is a plausible deterrence against American misbehaviour, principally in the Middle East and West Asia. For America, Iran is a resistance power in its efforts to continue to manage the world's oil resources for the benefit of itself and its allies. Also, Iran is a balancer to the US allies in the Persian Gulf.

If Russia and China want to balance against the United States, Iran is an ideal partner in that regard, but so long as the United States is a security guarantor of this vital region, neither Russia nor China has any interest to pick a fight with the United States over Iran. The second point is the sense of victimhood. Iran carries baggage about the role of western neo-colonial powers in blunting their growth and developments. An additional element of geopolitical features is Iran's claim and strive to become an independent regional superpower [3]. Third important point is that Iran resists the United States not just for geopolitical reasons but also for ideological reasons, including the legitimacy question, independence, resistance against regime change policy and external interference. Ahmadinejad officially declared that

Iran sees the United States as an aggressive power, as a great 'Satan'. Thus, from the Iranian point of view, this policy is about the Iranian departure from its past, from being controlled by the West to shaking off these chains of foreign interference and involvement, and that plays very nicely to the Russian and China's narratives as well.

The third prism is geoeconomics and is very closely related to both above-mentioned points. In the region and the broader global south, Iran offers a useful industrial base, a creative population, large markets empowered with oil and gas resources [4]. Iran offers a particularly large market of hydrocarbons which was helpful to resist the sanctions. It has the second-largest gas deposits such as in the world, and it is endowed with a range of natural resources. Hence, geo-economically Iran is also an ideal candidate for convergence with Russia and China. Last but not least, it is the identity-civilizational dimension that links Iran with the East. His narrative plays very well at both ends of Asia, and this kind of identity relation and respect did not start just now. This really is rooted in history and we can see it within the Silk Road, and it can be traced back millennia in terms of relationships between the old Persia, China and the Russian Empires. These countries in modern times rediscovered each other, which was visibly improved during Ahmadinejad's presidency. Of course, there are ideational elements to it as well. There is the idea that first Iran is an Asian power and has as such an Asian identity and has to be part of Asia. Another underpinning idea is that there are attempts towards establishing an anti-hegemonic front against the United States and for that purpose Iran seeks powerful allies in the East in Asia, such as India, China or Russia which are contemplated allies of an anti-hegemonic block by Iran. During President Ahmadinejad, Iran proclaimed a Look to the East Policy which is a term for a geopolitical preference of Iran vis-à-vis the Eastern great powers and this policy was somehow revitalized just a few years ago, precisely at a time when Iran was greatly disappointed over the role of Europe as a kind of balancing power vis-à-vis the US sanctions and pressure. Particularly with the nuclear crisis, Iran lacked the alternative and there was a problem of disintegration of Iran from the Western world and international financial system in particular, which the Eastern partners of Iran knew well [5].

The Iranian national identity motivates its East orientation and underpins the Iranian vision of global and regional order since the relations rely on perceptions and trust. Ahmadinejad was favouring a look to the East policy, as he believed that China and Russia had a distinct reading of the international system and the distribution of power within Iran. In other words, this policy effectively underpinned that the East was 'closer' to Iran, primarily because of anti-Americanism and the fact that the East does not aim for an interference with issues such as human rights, good governance and democracy promotion when dealing with Iran, which the global West occasionally does. Ahmadinejad's 'Look East policy' towards Beijing and Moscow was significant not only because of economic and trade relations but also through the ideational affinities and shared values such as state sovereignty, limitation of the Western dominance in world affairs. Furthermore, Russian and Chinese participation in the nuclear negotiations was significant, as both were emphasising a peaceful solution to the nuclear issue, preventing further escalation of pressures on Iran. Both Russia and China abstained or vetoed many of the recent United Nations Security Council resolutions. At a diplomatic level, both Iran and China viewed the extraterritorial application of secondary sanctions by the United States as being inconsistent with the principles of non-interference and sovereignty.

The interactions: Iranian imagination of the Others, Trust and Security Dilemma

The US approach towards Iran was to use the American policy of 'maximum pressure' and rhetoric such as that of 'all options are on the table'. However, on the Iranian side of the negotiations, the resistance to the 'arrogant powers' and the pursuit of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes was key nuclear negotiation policies. Moreover, for Iranian elites, including Ahmadinejad, the past will never fade away. Based on what Ramazani (2009) says, there has always been a paradoxical combination of national pride and prestige in Iranian culture and a sense of being a victim of oppressors since the early history of Shia Islam and throughout Iran's history of invasion by several powers [6]. Iran demonstrated a reluctance to modernize strictly along Western lines. Under the Shah, Iran had a peculiar type of modernization without real modernity, a hasty form of autocratic modernization while the Shah was cleared to converge with the West. After the fall of the Shah in 1979, we saw the emergence of an Islamic Republic modelled on a distinctly non-western theoretical construct. The 1979 revolution was an effort to create some sort of alternative modernity by emphasizing Persian nationalism but also more Islamic inheritance and by consigning the Western narrative to the margins [7]. During Rafsanjani and Muhammad Khatami's presidency, Iran appeared to have somewhat transcended the developmental dilemma. Khatami's programme for change was based on the idea that Iran needed an upgrade and view of the demands for political reforms and the pressures of globalization. His political platform represented a middle ground where western-inspired reforms would be implemented within the framework of Iran's national identity and its historical and cultural experience. In other words, a civilizational upgrade was to take place in the context of Iranian and Islamic identity. Khatami rejected the homogenizing model of modernity, however, at the same time he did not subscribe to a rigid interpretation of indigenous and nativistic path of modernity and traditions, as Ahmadinejad did.

The importance of the historical experiences, both existing and imagined actions by the United States to weaken Iran, just to mention the threat of the publicly declared regime change policy by the United States, and the lack of security guarantees for Iran in a region in which Iran is surrounded by either the hostile or nuclear states, constricted Iran's historical memory and caused of security concern [8]. The Ahmadinejad administration tried to bring up the nuclear option and a central part of its deterrent doctrine was the potential deterrent capacity vis-à-vis any illegitimate exercise of power against its national sovereignty. The threats are perceived by Iran due to the nature of stationed forces in the region, including nuclear forces encircling Iran and the possibility of an attack based on any political pretext. The Iranians saw how the United States attacked Iraq for, as it turned out, no evidence and reason at all.

Against this background, the argument is that trust was perpetually absent in Iranian interactions with the world powers but also almost any kind of face-to-face interaction which could have reduced the mutual anxiety and could have created a process of the trust-building possible, to understand more accurately the interpretation of each other's signals and communications [9]. This is a critical point because one of the important obstructions to cooperation in Iran's international politics was the difficulty that often its actors who send signals believed that others will understand their signals as they intended, whereas the problem was that oftentimes the receiver of a signal did not interpret it as meant by the sender. Unfortunately, during President Ahmadinejad's presidency, no trust existed at the international level neither from Iran's perception towards the West nor from the West towards Iran. Iran reflected the

past historical memory of a bad record when it came to the Western meddling in Iranian politics and particularly the experiences of the Western support for Saddam Hussein in eight years of war, which highlighted a condition of uncertainty. This is so important because if there was enough certainty, no one would need to build trust. Second, trust at the level of the highest decision-makers would have meant the decision-makers psychological state of security which then, could have enabled actions towards others that would not be achievable in the lack of trust. From Iran's point of view, there was no escape from a struggle for power in the Middle East. The firm belief was that internationally, there was little or no room for trust, as it was widely believed that especially the military-security arena, is just too crucial for trusting [10].

Iranians were invaded and defeated by foreign enemies, and that aggression and collapses have cultured a profound feeling of victimisation. It is no surprise that Iranians frequently seek legitimacy and justice, and thus resist bullying and external force and pressure. This paper contends that the West's antagonism to the Iranian nuclear programme resulted in the perception that again the West was going to avoid and curb Iran from independent decision-making and that the West puts Iran's energy and developmental path of self-sufficiency to a halt [11]. A significant point of this research lies therefore in priori codes of distrust and victimisation. There have always been variations in the official's preferred foreign policy behaviour. My argument is that both Iran and the West might have had generally peaceful intentions. They both nonetheless failed over the past decade to understand this, resulting in both sides mistakenly ascribing harmful intentions to the other, leading to amplifying verbal diplomatic attacks and threatening of military actions against each other's interest. Put simply, Iran based on the historical memory particularly did not know well if the United States will follow the regime change policy and launch a first strike on Iran, as they were never able to see the internal minds of their US or European counterparts had no such confidence. Thus, we must see both perspectives, both the Iranian and the Western to find out and to properly understand how far the Western aggressive behaviour towards Iran and the historical record of meddling policies might have conditioned the Iranian current foreign policy and particularly Iran's Look East policy [12].

The structure in Iran foreign policy decision-making is fundamentally different from the West and is made only by a few groups of people so that there was no open discussion of Iran's nuclear policy openly. But from Ahmadinejad's perspective, if Iran backed down even one step from its undeniable rights, Iran was a victim. In his televised speech on March 13, 2006, he announced "Iran would not surrender to the West's threats and rejects their demands for giving up the Iranian nation's right to have peaceful nuclear technology" [13]. In his speech for Iran's ambassadors and head of missions abroad in 2007, President Ahmadinejad declared, "all free nations and justice-seeking people from the oppressed countries, including the Iranian nation are now collaborating to resist against the oppressive system and thought of the West, in particular, the U.S. and its allies" [14]. From the president's point of view, the pursuance of the Iranian nuclear programme indicated the revolutionary struggle against the so-called arrogance (in Persian: *estekbar*). Therefore, resisting international pressures was justified as an act of anti-arrogance (*estekbar-size*). Arrogance is an interpretation based on the Islamic identity and the word arrogance is used in the Qur'an, such as the arrogant person, arrogant government, an arrogant group, that is a reference to those 'selfish' and interest-oriented actors that interfere in the affairs of human beings and other nations to protect and expand their interests. What we witnessed, especially after the

Islamic Revolution and most visibly with President Ahmadinejad, were a growing western pressure on Iran and a process of de-westernization of Iran. Among the most important push factors for Iran, was the pressure of sanctions under which Iran suffered hugely, which have been in place since 1979 but were considerably reinforced with Iran's nuclear crisis under Ahmadinejad. In one shape or another, the sanctions weakened Iran's economy and infrastructure. Moreover, the Iranian bourgeoisie class was diminishing, while Iran was hoping for foreign investment. Threats and sanctions deprived Iran of its macroeconomic position globally.

Iran Geopolitical Imaginations: A Critical Account

The Islamic Republic of Iran after the Islamic revolution of 1979 has consistently applied multilateralism as one of the primary strategies of its foreign policy, mainly towards developing countries, and to improve South-South cooperation in highly sensitive regional environments. Nevertheless, this multilateral strategy did not arise in 1979, since the former Pahlavi rulers also utilized it – although with different themes and ideological, political and strategic thoughts. Iran, under the last Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, was one of the 29 independent states that took part in the Bandung Conference in 1955, which was the example of the South-South cooperation initiatives within developing countries [15]. Since 1964 Iran has been a member of Group of 77, made by developing nations to boost collective economic interest and intensify lobbying volume within the United Nations context. Iran is also a member of the Group of 24, a chapter of the G77 set up in 1971 to arrange positions on monetary and financial matters. Furthermore, Iran is a founding member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), created in 1969, and a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). After the Islamic Revolution, Iran kept the membership in all the organizations and groups with which the former government had acted and became a member of new ones after the Islamic Revolution, which indicated the new strategic orientation of the Iranian foreign policy. For instance, Iran united with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1979 and hosted the 16th NAM Summit in 2012.

Scholars note that a central element for the classification of a state as a regional power is the acceptance of its status by the governments with which it shares a regional system and, find the rules of the game of the international system [16]. Therefore, it is clear that a regional power is such because it can use its superior ability to influence at the regional level, although it may wish to project power also on the international level. In this sense, Iran's foreign policy goals, in general, correspond with its resources and capacities, and on occasion, it has presented a purpose to carry out political and diplomatic initiatives beyond the region. The international range of Iranian aspirations are strengthened by trying to become a nuclear science state and enter the "nuclear club," and even though crippling sanctions from the UN Security Council, the European Union, and the United States have all affected the process of the modernisation of Iran, the Iranian economy. Iran has long competed for power and influence in the Middle East, a competition characterized by territorial, ideational religious as well as geopolitical dimensions. A joint part in a large part of the literature on Iran's foreign policy analysis is the notion that the perpetual aim of Iran is to become a central actor which is not limited to the Persian Gulf, but goes far beyond it and reaches the Mediterranean region and the Caucasus as well as Central Asia.

Examinations of Iran's foreign policy neglected that the Iranian perceptions of friends and enemies, its historic distrust towards the great powers and their regional allies have mostly triggered Iranian policy actions and shaped its decisions and conditioned that Iran brings forth alternative strategies of cooperation. Iran's membership in SCO and cooperation with regional but also with extra-regional states, which means also states with whom Iran does not share borders and are geographically far to it, represent the new foreign policy strategy of Iran for more regional multilateralism which is embedded within its 'Look East policy. While Iran under Presidents Khatami, as well as Rafsanjani, appeared to be more empathic towards normalisation of relations with Europe and even the United States, Ahmadinejad put away that choice, concentrating his diplomatic efforts on the East, including China, Russia, Central Asian states, Africa and Latin America. Hitherto, the neoconservatism of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005–2013) was the logical consequence of international pressures on Iran, distrust and disintegration from most of the international economic and financial hubs [17]. The Policy of Iran to join the SCO and its aspirations for more regional multilateralism aim thus to increase regional profits and strengthen the resistance against what Iran considers 'unlawful coercion by global arrogant powers' and "imperialism". Iran, particularly under President Ahmadinejad, therefore kicked off various new postures in foreign affairs, among them the one that resulted in both oppositions and supporters inside and outside of the country and showed that Iran acts pragmatically, and less ideologically, a clear departure from the previous revolutionary slogan of neither the East nor the West.

The SCO and Iran's Foreign Policy

In the course of Ahmadinejad's two-term presidency (2005–2013), the importance of the SCO in Iran's foreign policy thinking developed. The Iranian leadership was interested in the potential of the SCO and harmonising of geostrategic interests between Russia, China and Iran, and the SCO was the medium to bring it forward [18]. Indeed, the concentration of anti-US interests in the SCO has led many observers to contend that the SCO principally helps as a geopolitical counterbalance to the United States [19]. This predominating strategic attitude was seen as a genuine benefit for Tehran. Furthermore, full membership could allow for trade and economic ties to ease the economic sanction regime. In 2010, the SCO wrote a set of regulations to let in new members, which considered a construction forbidding countries under United Nations sanctions from being qualified, automatically preventing Iran [20].

In the words of one observer, Iran's full membership has the clear potential to 'drag the SCO into the fight between Tehran and the West' [21]. This concern about the meaning of admitting Iran to the organisation was shown diplomatically by the Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev, when he spoke in favour of the draft clause which left out Iran from SCO membership [22]. In his later addresses to the SCO, Ahmadinejad reiterated 'the organization has to be able to deal with threats and should resist unlawful interventions and military actions by other states in the region' [23], and intended to appeal to Russia and China. The SCO has been a helpful mechanism in solving territorial conflicts that came about with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and promoting regional trade relations [24]. Meanwhile, Security cooperation on the 'three evils' of terrorism, separatism, and extremism has been a constant

characteristic of the SCO and contributes to a shared threat understanding among its members [25]. The annual conference in Dushanbe has officially admitted Iran as a full member of the SCO. Upon his arrival in Tajikistan, Ebrahim Raisi said that this development was both a “strategic movement” and a “diplomatic success”. He further indicated that Iran’s membership in the SCO would be to the benefit of the Iranian economy [26]. At the latest Tajikistan summit, foreign ministers of China, Russia, Pakistan, and Iran met to review the developments in Afghanistan and the ramifications of the Taliban takeover [27]. Iran shares a lengthy border with Afghanistan and thousands of refugees have poured into the country, which is already hosting many and primarily undocumented Afghan refugees. All the SCO member countries, including Iran, are concerned about Afghan instability, which are exacerbated after the Taliban takeover of power there.

On the one hand, contend that economic and political integration are substitutes and shore up their explanation for this negative relationship by stressing heterogeneous preferences and fractionalization [28]. On the other hand, Martin et al. (2012) contend that economic and political integration are complements. This strand of literature provides a sharp distinction between light and profound integration, with the last mentioned mixing economic and political integration [29]. “Economic integration, when not accompanied by political integration, can lead to less innovation and slower growth as firms respond to increased competition in the economic market by focusing more on rent-seeking activity. When economic integration is accompanied by political integration, innovation and growth will be stronger and welfare higher” [30]. There is disappointingly small literature engaging with econometric estimates of the monetary benefits from SCO membership. To be more precise, few studies answer questions such “what would be the level of per capita income in Iran had it not joined the SCO?” Making such estimations is also particularly difficult because one can hardly know how the international sanctions regime will develop against Iran. Many think, falsely, that this literature is huge because of the many first-class works on the profits from regional trade, and liberalization. Yet studies on the benefits of membership itself and literature that consider the Iranian condition are few. The fundamental point is that considering Iranian per capita GDP it is not clear if it would be considerably lower had it not joined the SCO. A further point is that it is yet unclear if the benefits from SCO membership, in this case, are more likely to be permanent than temporary.

It is clear that China and Russia predominate the SCO and each with different security priorities and the addition of India and Pakistan in 2017 with totally different positions and perceptions as well as conflicts of interests imply that the SCO functions currently more like a diplomatic forum than a united security bloc. However, the condition of distrust towards the East modifies Tehran’s relationships with the SCO and enables Tehran simply hopes to at least better address political, economic, and security issues across its borders and Eurasia. Moreover, Iran’s SCO membership underlines Tehran’s desire to build a profound and comprehensive partnership with China and Russia. Under Iran’s Look to the East foreign policy, Tehran sees SCO as its long-term partner. Large positive effects from SCO membership differ across countries and over time. Earlier this year, Iran and China ratified a 25-year strategic partnership that will perceive China invest several hundred million dollars in Iranian projects, including nuclear power, energy development, and infrastructure. Tehran has agreed to hold joint military exercises with Moscow and Beijing in late 2021 or early 2022, building on trilateral naval exercises in the Indian

Ocean and the Gulf of Oman in late 2019. Without deep economic and political integration, it will be extremely difficult to gain benefits over the long run [31].

The SCO has regular counterterrorism exercises involving member states to showcase their preparedness to react to the threat of terrorism in the region. As Alexander Pikayev found, the SCO turned to be principally interested in ‘nullifying Islamic fundamentalism’ [32]. Nevertheless, there were two other characteristics to the SCO’s counterterrorism readiness, the geostrategic assessments in Moscow and Beijing, and the domestic politics in Central Asia while this might have provided the Central Asian states extra credibility which could see the SCO’s counterterrorism agenda as a defence of their authoritarian policies. In reality, resistances in some of those countries were beaten under the guise of countering terrorism, which resulted in perceiving the SCO as contributing to the survival of authoritarianism in Central Asia [33]. Indeed, Russia and China had no interest in challenging the domestic behaviour of SCO member states and provided a judgement-free situation for regional cooperation. This approach stood in stark contrast to that of the West which puts issues such as liberalism and democracy as well as good governance on the top agenda and does not often stay quiet in the face of authoritarianism or human rights violations [34]. As a regional player, Iran is aware of the SCO’s potentials for countering the United States’ presence in its neighbourhood and Central Asia. However, what underscores Iran’s departure from the past’s slogan of the ‘Neither the East nor the West’ is the first Iranian look east policy and second, the pragmatic pursuance of alliance with Russia and China. While the SCO’s geostrategic capability looked to be in line with Iran’s anti-American mind-set, its default promotion of authoritarian governments contradicts Iran’s self-image as a Shia Islamic power and, a revisionist vis-à-vis all oppressors.

In line with its domestic policy, Iran favours self-esteem, scientific and economic self-sufficiency. So, it will not surrender to any sort of hegemony nor will it rely militarily on alliance with any country. However, security, economic, and technology cooperation now constitute a crucial part of Iran’s bilateral engagement with the East as well as with the SCO members. What account to explain closer engagement from Iran towards the East (Russia and China) and the SCO are (i) intensified strategic competition with the regional adversaries and the United States, (ii) broader hopes and efforts to get rid of the sanctions and to expand the overall trade and economic relationship with the SCO states, and (iii) regional trade and security incentives. It is simply believed that a full Iranian membership would benefit Iran, providing Tehran with some tremendous power support in its ongoing quarrel with the United States, as well as constant calls for a “polycentric world order” [35]. However, it is worth noting that Iran maintains a record of distrust of foreign powers from the West and West and will rely on a military alliance neither with the SCO, Russians nor with the Chinese. Meanwhile, stability and peace are sine qua non for development. Moreover, the Iranian current foreign policy emphasises regional cooperation as indispensable. Tehran is aware, however, that in a globalised world, no country can develop and modernise itself in isolation. President Reisi has stated over and over that Tehran will stick to a peaceful development strategy and support constructive relations with its neighbours.

Geopolitical Imaginations: A Critical Account

Iran before and after the Islamic Revolution of 1979 as an independent state, has gone through far-reaching changes in security affiliation. While up until 1979 Iran remained a member of the Western bloc and a close ally of the United States in the Middle East, it was a state outside an alliance framework immediately with the Islamic Revolution. Since then, Iran has had to think of security outside of an alliance framework. Possibly a real change in terms of the country's perception that it was secure from any external threats came gradually in Iran's East orientation and regional multilateralism in the 1990s but visibly with President Ahmadinejad. The SCO members in general and member states with veto right at the UN Security Council, including Russia and China, consider the Iranian nuclear case must be solved only through diplomacy and not by military means. Tehran aims to generate some convergence of interest and gain sustained strategic supports between SCO members for the Iranian nuclear standpoint both regionally and at the United Nations Security Council. This paper argues that Iran perceives membership in regional organisations including the SCO more in terms of a geopolitical shift toward the East than accession to an organisation focused on collective military defence. Consequently, Iran considers the fulfilment of SCO responsibilities more in terms of augmenting their armed forces or setting up a defence strategy vis-à-vis an external threat over the long term. Tehran conceives SCO and powerful members such as Russia and China as the twin pillars of the future direction of the Iranian security development. Increased support for the modernisation of the military and endeavours to improve the quality and performance of the Iranian armed forces will come when the Iranian decision-makers and the public see the post-Islamic Revolution kind of 'neither the East nor the West' transition coming to an end and the Iranian economy recovering from the shocks of the war, sanctions and transition.

There are for instance already special grounds for an alliance between Iran, Russia and China, based on shared perspectives and security interests. Therefore, Tehran, Beijing and Moscow are holding increasingly regular joint naval exercises and anti-terrorism exercises as part of trilateral security arrangements. Any perceived foreign interference in their internal affairs or the U.S. attempts to strengthen its military and political clout in Central Asia or Asia-Pacific Region can drive Iran, China and Russia to collaborate on forming a collective regional security system. Through its enhanced regional security interactions on topics including the fight against terrorism, extremism and separatism, and based on the determination to support multilateralism, the Iranian role in directing regional security is bolstered, also reinforcing Tehran's "Looking to East foreign policy". Facing devastating U.S. sanctions and being mostly treated as a pariah by the West, Iran is looking for a way out. It considers Asian powers are growing at Washington's expense and that China and Russia do not share U.S. interests in containing Iran and crushing its economy. Subsequently, by becoming a full member of the SCO, Iran hopes to neutralize Western countries' attempts to isolate Iran. Accordingly, Iran under President Raisi and his administration are now engaging with what is known as the Look to the East policy, mainly to build ad hoc diplomatic alliances with Russians and Chinese and to gain immediate political support during the ongoing Vienna Nuclear Negotiations. This is also exacerbated by the perpetual distrust towards the West and the view that the previous administration's 'Look to the West's policy. This comes hand in hand with

the view that Rouhani's JCPOA was rather unfruitful and that the sanctions as coercive means to curb Tehran's nuclear and missile programme and contain its growing regional influence will not be lifted effectively.

Hence, Iran looks for some genuine economic and trade allies. The Iranian membership in the SCO illustrates an increasing level of sophistication in the perception of post-revolution Iran towards more regional cooperation, mainly between Tehran and the SCO member states. Iran is already a vital economic and trade partner for Russia and China in the Middle East and Iran has maintained regular high-level contacts, and bilateral economic and trade cooperation with most of the SCO members and has continuously deepened it. Tehran aims to gain finance and support on a wide range of projects in multiple sectors, including energy, technology, defence, and infrastructure [36]. Significantly, China and Iran achieved a 25-year strategic cooperation pact in March 2021. As part of the agreement, China is to invest US\$ 400 billion into infrastructure operations in Iran, solidifying Iran's position as a critical link along the 'New Silk Road' of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and paving a new path for bilateral trade and cooperation [37]. Hence, Iran's membership in SCO can now create a facilitative environment for trade and business between Iran and the SCO members and it will allow Tehran to not only neutralise the effects of sanctions but also balance Iran's relations with the West by reducing some old isolations.

Iran's relations with the East is based on a real pragmatism, to face the Western maximum pressure policy and to essentially water down the effect of sanctions. Yet much of the relationship between them is also determined by their relationship with other powers. So at times when the relationship between Iran, Russia and China turned into a more difficult partnership, it was in part because Russian-American or Chinese-American relations had improved with the United States, or Europe, which had greater strength and tremendous leverage over them and pressured them to tone down their relations with Iran. Russia and China and India have also presented a reliability problem because from Tehran's perspective they were subject to the United States and European influence. Hence, neither the Russians nor the Chinese or any other member state, such as India or Pakistan will drag their feet in the threats, which paved the way for genuine debates about whether and how far Iran should continue to deal with the Eastern partners and the question of Russian and Chinese hegemonic intentions vis-à-vis Iran, which led to some degree of distrust towards them. Hence, although there is a readiness to further deepen the so-called 'East look policy', Iran remains suspicious about the East, their approach and their vision towards Iran and the region. The relations with the East are from Iran's view, based currently on setting up a framework for more economic partnerships. This is even historically a contrast to Iran's relations with the West, particularly the United States which had held a deep footprint in the Iranian politics over the last century and shaped Iranian search for modernism during the Shah Pahlavi era, in which Iran positioned itself as an ally of the West. A firm belief was that since the collapse of the Iranian monarchy in 1979, the United States and later the European powers have only reinforced Iranian anxieties and Tehran is confident that the main goal of the United States and Europeans is blocking any Iranian independent scientific attempts to develop as a sovereign regional power and to deny Iran's distinct identity.

Considering China and Russia's relations with Iran's regional rivals, their partial support of sanctions and the historic distrust of Iran vis-à-vis Russia, it seems yet that the Iranian East Look policy

and membership in SCO may be a kind of ad hoc relation for economic reasons, in which however both China and Russia particularly use the Iranian nuclear case to further strengthen their footprint in Iranian politics and the broader region, and had privileged access to the Iranian market and energy supplies. Some of the SCO members, particularly China, and Russia, and Iran, indeed view the U.S.-led West as its common main antagonist, and they can theoretically forge an ideological block based on shared animosity towards the U.S. -led international order. This is, however, by no means an indication of an enduring alliance, nor is it an alliance based on a deeply shared political, economic, or moral philosophy. Yet it must be mentioned that the SCO members are each extremely interest-oriented and maintain bilateral relations with the global West and are particularly vulnerable. Thus, they remain concerned over the implications of taking sides in any regional conflicts. As such, given Iran's sensitivity and some historical distrust, Iran and the global East will hence work together when their interests align but they are unlikely to seek accommodation when their interests diverge.

The distribution of power in the international system is indeed changing. Iran sees that the United States is declining, but Iran does neglect that the United States could still be quite damaging for a country like Iran. In other words, although we have an increasingly multipolar world, and the centre of gravity of economic power and activity is moving from the Atlantic over to the Pacific, Iran overrates the small trade relation with the East and neglects that the new distribution of economic power does not necessarily translate into a new distribution of geopolitical power. Especially, because most of Iran's international trade is paid with the US Dollar and the huge influence of the United States over international markets which sanctioned Iran as well, the Iranian administrations neglect that the United States as a superpower possesses still not only the military but also economic craft to control the currency system of the international financial and banking systems. In addition, despite this multipolarity, and Iran's relations with non-western powers and the SCO members, are a function of their respective ties with the United States, since yet for all those powers the United States is much more important than relations with Iran. Therefore, China and Russia despite rhetorical opposition to US sanctions were voting in favour of those sanctions. From the Iranian perspective, the United States tries to encircle Iran and competes with other powers in the region to build an 'empire' through a policy of unlimited expansion of influence; By some accounts, the United States and Iran coordinated quite effectively their policies vis-à-vis regional terrorism and particularly the Taliban in the past, so that is something we could see again. However, without a U.S. security umbrella there, it does not make the United States more likely to cooperate because the U.S. focuses now rather on China [38].

Conclusion. Considering bilateral relations between Iran and the SCO members, for instance, Sino-Iranian relations, the paper finds that the increased per capita GDP, political and economic relations will continue to rise over the next years. However, this trend still cannot be confirmed yet considering Iranian relations within the SCO framework which consists of heterogeneous members. Considering the impacts of sanctions and the SCO member states' particular interests when it comes to relations with the global West, this certainly does not throw light on how Iran will benefit from the SCO membership. Future research should focus on disentangling the various aspects of the integration process, including the political economy dimension. Future analysis could also focus not only on trade and financial integration

but also on transparency and political support for regional integration. Iran, as a country with Shia Islamic and a Persian national identity, has constructed international relations following its national identity, so that Iran is looking for both independence, legitimacy and modernity. Iran has been keen to keep up a public commitment to the Umma (the global community of Muslims), despite fluctuations in its foreign policy under different presidents. Iran's 'Look to the East' foreign policy orientation, particularly the enthusiasm to join the SCO is consistent with this foreign policy priority and is grounded on Iran's sense of importance as a regional power – a legacy of its history, religion and culture and distrust towards the West. Indeed, there is very little evidence that Iran pursues ideological alliance with any of the SCO states, as this would contradict Iran's identity's principles such as independence and sovereignty so that Iran conducts itself in Central Asia and vis-à-vis the SCO rather pragmatically. Iran's pragmatism is significant as it is eager to join and bolster a regional organisation that acted as a pillar of the status quo, despite some inherent contradictions with Iran's world views.

The SCO is often interpreted as an inherently anti-Western bloc, with some even calling it the "anti-NATO." Yet divergences between individual member states have restrained the bloc's policy coordination which restricts the extent of substantive cooperation on important matters such as the security and post-withdrawal in Afghanistan and the emanating threats from the Taliban takeover of power. Gaining full membership is perceived as a vehicle for Tehran to consolidate regional relationships, which have taken on more importance due to the Western coercive measures towards Iran. Therefore, Iranian membership in the SCO not just as a regional security organisation, but also as a genuine regionalism project with long-term economic payoffs to all of its member states is a political and diplomatic gain for Tehran to avoid dependence and marginalisation and promote regional security and economic integration. Iran's full accession to the SCO can help Tehran's efforts to alleviate crippling sanctions and the strategies to curb Iran internationally.

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**Organizational Emperorship, the Nomenklatura System, and the Modern Party-State:
Exploring the Mechanisms of the Chinese Communist Party's Enduring Control over
Government of the Contemporary China**

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ABSTRACT

The present article outlines and analyzes the institutional and governance mechanisms currently applied by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the context of ensuring the continuity and pervasiveness of its rule over the contemporary Chinese state and society. Based on the theoretical concepts of the Leninist party-state and organizational emperorship, it has been shown how a variety of such mechanisms have been empirically traceable across various levels of government in the contemporary China. In so doing, the article presents evidence as to the combination of the traditional Leninist party-state mechanisms with more nuanced forms of organizational emperorship on the part of the CCP. Furthermore, the author elaborates a conceptual framework for understanding the interrelationship between different levers of power available to the CCP in the contemporary context of the Chinese party-state, thereby contributing to a more holistic understanding of the subject matter.

KEYWORDS: China, Communism, Chinese Communist Party, party-state

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Introduction. The question of the specific mechanisms of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP's) control over the levers of government in China appears to have been one of the crucial aspects of the contemporary research into complexities of Chinese politics and government. As noted by Y. Zheng [1], the role of the CCP in the contemporary Chinese system of government may be most adequately captured by the concept of organizational emperorship, i.e., as that of a paramount political organization the power whereof may not be effectively or procedurally challenged, and which is able to control all other administrative and/or representative powers as mere conduits of its political power. Given the author's use of the discourse of imperial power, it may then be held that the authority exercised by the CCP would at the same time be grounded in personalization (reflecting individual political leaders' capacity) and institutionalization (representing the Party's ability to dominate and dispose of all legitimate political institutions in the contemporary mainland China;) [1]. Consequently, the present article will seek to explore how the CCP's paramount power may be embedded, sustained, and projected in respect of its institutional, rather than personal dimension, which in turn requires [1] a focus on specific mechanisms of the Party's control throughout the hierarchy of national and local government.

This aim will define the following structure of the present article. The first section will briefly present the relevant theoretical perspectives on the problem of party control over government in party-state / totalitarian political regimes, thus serving as a necessary background to further findings and discussion. Subsequently, drawing from the theoretical aspects thus raised, the article will focus on specific mechanisms of control on the part of the CCP over national government, with a view to developing a preliminary model of those mechanisms' relative significance. The third section of the article's main body will further address the aspects of the CCP's control mechanisms exercised in respect of local government in China, which may further be incorporated into the model in question. Thus the concluding section will summarize the findings arrived at in the aforementioned main body sections whilst providing potential suggestions for further research directions.

Literature Review. The problem of the party's control over the government in one-party regimes which are commonly referred to as 'the party-state' and/or 'the totalitarian state' would preoccupy the researchers dealing with the political repercussions of Leninism for a long time. As noted by S. Koleva [2], the Communist party-state would be characterized by a pivotal role of the party as the actual driver of the state and the society's development guided by its supreme right to define the limits to and conduct any public socio-political activities within the scope of the revolutionary ideology the party would represent. In that sense, purely administrative agencies of government, or 'state machinery' (as per Lenin himself; cf. [3]), would hence be regarded as subordinate to the party as the driving force of the process of socialist construction, which was indeed assumed to usher in a society without class antagonisms, and hence without the state / government (the withering away of the state concept; [4]). This internal contradiction of the Communist state's underlying paradigm must thus be borne in mind in the context of any discussion of the party-state as a theoretical and operative concept.

Proceeding from those broader philosophical considerations, one should now address the generic topic of mechanisms of party control over government / state apparatus that would be observable in Leninist party-state regimes. The most basic form of such control would be effected via the mechanism of institutional linkage between respective party bodies and organs of government, whereby a party cell

or committee would be entrusted with executing the function of coordination between the party's overarching political line and the specific agency's functional activities [5]. The dominant role of party cells within governmental agencies would mean that the latter would be permeated by the party as a mass organisation defining the state's political life. Such institutional linkage would hence contribute to overseeing that the ruling party's political line and ideological principles be implemented across the variety of governmental bodies and agencies, making the latter an effective instrument at the party's disposal [5]. Furthermore, the legal monopoly of the dominant party on legitimate political activities would be at times enshrined in the constitutional norms (e.g., in the 1977 Soviet Constitution; Article 6, whereupon it was stipulated that "the Communist Party, armed with Marxism-Leninism, determines the general perspectives of the development of the society and the course of the domestic and foreign policy"). In so doing, the party could be legally elevated above the 'regular' apparatus of government, with the latter thus legally obligated to act upon the decisions of the party's congresses and standing bodies in the context of their own administrative / governmental proceedings.

Further, Leninist parties would have been known to exercise personnel control over all the appointments throughout the various levels of the hierarchy of government while exerting clear dominance in regard of the electoral process, whether one may deal with national or local elections (e.g., [6] [7]). The institution of the so-called nomenklatura system would imply that the progression of individuals along their careers in national government would have to be granted upon the consent of the party's respective body (usually its central committee), even though such consent might be couched in terms of 'recommendations' (see [8]). Hence the so-called development of cadres for principal bodies of government, whether central ministries or other such administrative agencies, would be thoroughly controlled by the party's hierarchy. In effect, in most cases, the party's leaders would at the same time be chief officials in national government, invoking the concept of dual roles for the party's leadership as top government officials ([9], p. 648)). Therefore, possible discrepancies between separate party and government bureaucracies would be levelled down due to the party leaders personally presiding over key bodies of administrative government. Similarly, party secretaries would perform similar role at the level of regional and in many cases even local authorities.

Thus, based on this theoretical overview not being exactly specific to China's case, one may see that the mechanisms of control over national and local government historically utilized by Leninist party-states are likely to enable the latter to wield their authority in a comprehensive and uncontested manner throughout various aspects of executing powers of government. Hence, the case study of the CCP will now serve to demonstrate the viability of the aforementioned model and showcase the comparative importance of its various elements.

Methodology. Given a formally constitutional nature of the government system of the People's Republic of China, the question of the CCP's constitutional role with regard to national government should be posed first. The constitutional documents of the PRC as issued and amended between 1954 and 1982 (four separate constitutions with multiple amendments) would accord the principal role in respect of formal operations of government to popularly elected institutions; however, in effect, the CCP would stand above such bodies due to its status as the leader of "a broad people's democratic united and joint front, composed of all democratic classes, democratic parties and groups and popular organizations, and

led by the Communist Party of China” (Preamble to the 1982 Constitution of the PRC, cited in [10], p. 214]. Thus, even though such formulation would appear to be less imperative than the one applied in the 1977 Constitution of the USSR to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, it would nonetheless attribute to the CCP a functional role of “mobilizing and rallying the whole people” (Preamble), thereby implying that the party as the vehicle of the all-Chinese mass movement would be superior to formal agencies of government. At the same time, unlike in the Soviet system, the CCP has been relatively separated from direct governmental work since the times of Deng Xiaoping, who would insist on the need for the State Council and other governmental bodies to exercise their functions without directives from the Central Committee and other party bodies whilst continuing to be guided by the latter’s political leadership (the notion of separation between the party and the government; [11, p. 254]. Consequently, in both constitutional and theoretical terms, the relationship between the CCP and national government would be conceived of as involving political guidance / leadership rather than direct policy oversight (once again, as opposed to the Soviet constitutional system), though in practice, such distinctions may effectively blur.

Results. The emphasis on the guiding role of the CCP that is implicitly rather than explicitly embedded in the PRC’s constitutional system would then give rise to several specific mechanisms of such guidance (and hence control) over key policy areas in the system of national government. Y. Zheng [11] would place emphasis on four such mechanisms, namely (1) the nomenklatura system, as embodied in the provisions related to the “Party’s management of cadres” (*dangguan ganbu*); (2) central leading small groups (LSGs); (3) the ‘systems’ (*xitong*) oversight of specific functional areas of government by the respective party committees at their appropriate levels of competence; and (4) Party groups (*dangzhu*) within each governmental agency. In addition, the researcher would single out a separate mechanism of the CCP’s control over the judiciary, as embodied in the institutions of the Central Political and Legal Committee (CPLC) and the Central Discipline Inspection Committee (CDIC; [11]p. 268). In so doing, the variety of elaborate mechanisms of the CCP’s control would apparently transcend its supposedly political guidance-oriented role as asserted by Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s. Therefore, it would be necessary to examine the specificity of each controlling mechanism in due detail.

To begin with, the *dangguan ganbu* / *nomenklatura* system constitutes one of the foundations of the Party’s control over appointments, promotions and dismissals in both Party and non-Party offices and positions throughout the PRC. The contemporary system of the management of cadres is coterminous with the aforementioned principle of ensuring the Party’s control over the government by making sure that the Party’s leaders would at the same time be top officials of the state: thus, both inner and outer cabinet members of the State Council, the PRC’s top government body, are at the same time high-ranking members of the Central Committee of CCP [12]. As for non-Party positions that the relevant committees of the CCP are in charge of supervising, here the ‘one-level-down’ approach is practiced, e.g. the Political Bureau of the Central Committee is in charge of political appointments above vice-ministerial level, ranging from the Chairman of the PRC to state counsellors, which is carried out via selecting the list of the candidates and forwarding it to the National People’s Congress for approval / confirmation [11, p. 256].

The Central Committee's Organization Department is in charge of compiling the list of the political and administrative cadres to be approved and supervised by the respective Party's bodies, which would basically involve three 'trees', i.e. (1) cadre positions to be filled in and overseen by the Central Committee; (2) positions falling within the competence of regional Party's committees but due to be reported to the Central Committee for ultimate authorization; and (3) 'cadre reserve' positions at regional and local levels [13] Examples of the first category include members of the State Council, state-owned banks and enterprises' corporate management under the authority of the State Council, diplomats and overseas representatives in international organizations, as well as the judiciary and the procuratorate [14] whereas the second category covers such functional positions at local and regional levels as deputy positions in local judiciary and procuratorate bodies, directors of local units and offices of state banks and the People's Insurance Corporation of China, but also such key provincial positions as governors, deputy governors, mayors, and deputy mayors [11; 14]. In that sense, the nomenklatura system would enable the CCP's headquarters to assert its control over appointments, promotions, and dismissals across all major levels of governmental authority in China.

In turn, the CLSG system would refer to CCP Central Committee Political Bureau's involvement in ad hoc and inter-departmental processes of decision-making at the top level of national government. The rationale behind this institutional mechanism is that recommendations issued by LSGs would supposedly streamline the process of bureaucratic coordination by providing the Political Bureau's guidance on essential aspects of public policy likely to require extensive coordination on supra-ministerial level, included but not limited to such issues as foreign affairs, Taiwan affairs, Hong Kong-Macao affairs, economy and finance, propaganda and ideology, national security, and politics and law [15]. In so doing, the top leadership of the CCP would perform the consensus-building function, thus standing above and mitigating potential inter-departmental disputes at the level of national government. The reforms of the Party and the government undertaken by Xi Jinping after 2013 would be marked by an unprecedented proliferation of CLSGs as 8 new CLSGs would have been created after the 18th CCP Congress in November 2012, including a powerful LSG on Comprehensively Deepening Reform as chaired by Xi Jinping himself [16]. The comparative assessment of the fields of competence of CLSGs as opposed to LSGs overseen by the State Council would demonstrate that the former are generally concentrated in the fields of external affairs and security as well as domestic politics, while the latter predominate in respect of socio-economic issues (Figure 1). Hence, it may be assumed that the Political Bureau's guidance / 'recommendations' would be most strongly felt exactly in these areas of the state's policy. As noted by Y. Zheng [11, p. 261], "in some cases, the policy-making body will simply adopt a CLSG's recommendation with little or even no modification". Hence the coordinating / consensus-building role of the Political Bureau would display its superiority over central bodies of the government.




Figure 1: Distribution of CLSGs versus State Council-led LSGs, by sphere of competence [16].

For their part, the *xitong* system would make the coordinating role of the Party's organs more explicit by anchoring it in a permanent oversight of specific functional areas of government. The Party Affairs and Organizational Affairs *xitong* may be seen as occupying uppermost stature in this respect, as they would be in charge of overseeing the Party's general work and the nomenklatura system, respectively [11, p. 219-220]. The Political and Legal Affairs *xitong* would secure the Party's control over public security organs at both national and local levels by implementing the so-called dual leadership system under which both a territorial party committee and a hierarchically superior public security organ would oversee the lower-ranking organ's activities [17], p. 224]. Thus, the Ministry of Public Security would be effectively controlled by the Political Bureau itself. Similarly, the Finance and Economics *xitong* would represent the Party's controlling function with regard to national economic development, with both the Ministry of Commerce and the State Development Reform Commission falling under the purview of its respective Central Committee's sections, namely the Finance and Economics Leadership LSG / the Finance and Economics Commission [17], p. 228]. Such arrangements would further demonstrate the relevance of CLSGs as mentioned above in terms of their capacity to supervise the national government agencies in their respective sectors.

Finally, the *dangzhu* groups would enforce the Party's control over the governmental bureaucracy within each individual governmental agency. It is significant that these groups, also known as 'core groups' are not elected by CCP members active in the relevant agency / department but are rather appointed by a Party committee of the next upper level of the CCP's hierarchy [11, p. 265]. In so doing, the control of higher-ranking Party bodies over core groups would be maintained, in spite of the rhetorical

separation of the Party from the government [8]. The effective function of the core groups would concern overseeing such key activities of the governmental agency in question as “policy-making, policy implementation and personnel appointment” [11, p. 266], hence ensuring the Party’s control over its key decisions. In those rare cases when a non-Party member would be appointed to hold a senior position in the national government of the PRC (e.g., Wan Gang as the Minister of Science and Technology in 2007; [18]), the Party’s core group would effectively supervise their decisions in regard of policymaking. Hence, the institution of the Party’s core groups should provide further lever for the CCP to use to ensure that the national government’s bureaucracy is to follow the Party’s line.

While the institution of the nomenklatura system would already by default provide the CCP’s leadership with an effective mechanism of control over local authorities such as mayoralities, procuratorates, or governorships (see above), further elements of the Party’s control would be employed at local level of China’s government as well. In the first place, given that village and township elections are the only form of contested elections within China’s political system [19], the CCP would in effect rely on that mechanism for alleviating the bureaucratic capacity-associated problems that might arise in the context of immediate micro-management of the local administration [20]. It should be noted that village and township-level local Party committees would still retain substantive powers over the affairs of local administration, with Party secretaries retaining power of concurrent signature with village chairmen in some cases whilst wielding the power of unilateral signature in some affairs of village administration [20]. In that sense, in spite of the Westerners’ initial enthusiasm about contested village and township elections in China [19] it would still have to be noted that local Party committees are likely to further qualify the powers of elected village and township councils in their own favor.

On the other hand, the CCP’s headquarters is able to exercise the powers of oversight across the levels of provincial administration by applying the procedures of so-called cadre exchange system as enabled by the aforementioned practice of reporting new cadres’ appointment to the Central Committee [11]. The latter would imply that cadres coming from different localities are regularly exchanged from one comparable bureaucratic position to another, so that the degree to which they may engage in local power politics and resist the headquarters’ directives based on the influence of local vested interests may be diminished [21]. In doing so, the Party would further utilize disciplinary authorities as exercised by the aforementioned CPLC and CDIP to carry out regular disciplinary checks with a view to culling the local cadres suspected of corruption and other forms of misdemeanor [1]. In that sense, the control over local administration would be enforced just as consequentially as over the central one.

Discussion. Bearing in mind the aforementioned, one may conclude that the mechanisms utilized by the CCP to implement its control over the agencies of national government in China would be broadly in line with the theoretical assumptions as to the Leninist party-state’s mode of activities in this regard as presented in the theoretical background section of this article. The ranking of the mechanisms covered above may enable one to infer that the following hierarchy may be established as to their relative importance.



Figure 2. A preliminary model of the CCP's mechanisms of control over the government (created by the author)

Hence, it may be assumed that the CCP's power is derived primarily from its ability to master and implement the nomenklatura system providing for the Party's control over both Party and non-Party cadres, which is further expressed and cemented in the form of GLSGs and *dangzhu* groups both within and across the bureaucratic agencies in question. Finally, the *xitong* system is likewise derivative of the *nomenklatura* one as it enables the Central Committee's oversight and control over the governmental bodies it would itself staff. In that sense, the ability of the CCP to control the Chinese state may be expected to be retained as long as the Party would be able to enforce the nomenklatura system across different levels of the government so that ensuring the coherence of the Party's hierarchy would be a must for the leadership of the CCP, as the case may be.

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Archetypes of individual and collective in the model of the universal social cycle

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ABSTRACT

The article deals with the peculiarities of the interaction of archetypes of individual and collective in the context of the model of the universal social cycle and the history of the development of corresponding concepts. Modern sociological theories are the attempts to find answers to challenges of the ongoing modernization process. Controversial approaches in most sociological theories seem to be methodological individualism or methodological holism. Accordingly, the modern space is marked by the dominance of the “instrumental mind”. With the onset of the Early Modern, a rigid (revolutionary) opposition to traditional social institutions and values arises. For the developed Modern the ideals of stability and security of both the individual and the collective, are inherent. Instead, the late Modern (or Postmodern) reinforces the controversy in individual and collective relations, stimulates social disintegration, blurring of individual and collective identities. The open question remains the nonlinear, cyclic approach to the highlighting of the interaction of archetypes of individual and collective. For every person living in the society in one way or another is connected with the information–energy interaction between society and the individual, between “WE” and “US”. Postmodernity also actualizes the other side of social life of man, society and civilization, which is a cyclical psychosocial process. Each of the stages of this process reveals, as evidenced by the research of the Ukrainian school of archetype, national peculiarities of social systems, and typical for one or another historical epoch psychosocial characteristics, and socio–historical development appears interaction of mental and social structures.

KEYWORDS: Archetype, Individual, Collective, Universal social cycle.

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Introduction. Modern sociological theories are the attempts to find answers to challenges of the ongoing modernization process. Controversial approaches in most sociological theories seem to be methodological individualism or methodological holism. Accordingly, the modern space is marked by the dominance of the “instrumental mind”. With the onset of the Early Modern, a rigid (revolutionary) opposition to traditional social institutions and values arises. For the developed Modern the ideals of stability and security of both the individual and the collective, are inherent. Instead, the late Modern (or Postmodern) reinforces the controversy in individual and collective relations, stimulates social disintegration, blurring of individual and collective identities.

Swiss psychologist K. G. Jung defined the archetype as an irrational unconscious, which he denoted as an abstract soul, common to all people, even if it manifests itself through individual consciousness. In fact, the archetype is a collective unconscious cultural stereotype that affects the behavior and history of mankind. Since the archetype is a phenomenon of the human unconscious, which manifests itself in culture and religion, then it is characterized by a certain socio-historical dynamics, which has its own laws. The first attempt to demonstrate the relationship between the development of world history and the idea of archetype on the example of the development of local civilizations was made by the German philosopher O. Spengler.

The experience of many generations, accumulated in the spiritual treasures of the memory of the cultures of many nations, generally forms the landscape of archetypes of local civilizations, each of which is a part of the world civilizational space and the embodiment of certain groups of peoples, ethnic groups and states that are self-identified by the community of spiritual, cultural, ethnic and religious values, historical destinies and geopolitical interests. The follower of C. G. Jung and the founder of archetypal psychology J. Hillman in the monograph “The Power of character” notes that “character is the driving force” [1, p.178.] This character is formed in the interaction of archetypes of individual and collective.

Analysis of the main research problems. E. Durkheim, the founder of the French sociological school, proposed to consider society as a superindividual and subindividual reality that possesses individuals and does not depend upon on them. At the same time, the German philosopher and founder of phenomenology, E. Husserl, emphasized that “Me” is before everything conceivable, and it is for the subject who expresses such a judgment, the primordial intentional base of his world [[2],p.137-138]. Today, in the leading countries of the world, with the help of innovative communication systems, the individual gradually acquires an greater degree of individual freedom. He creates its own virtual world that goes beyond the boundaries of a national state body, even becomes a leading producer of intellectual information, which can claim to play a role independent on the state and social group in the world.

On the other hand, this leads to a certain conflict between the movable interests of the “autonomous personality” and the social values consolidated within the nation. Gradually, this becomes an important contributor to the contradictions between the global subject “Me” and the permanent form of social organization, which ultimately “pushes” the human community into a new cycle of world-historical development. In essence, there is a contradiction actualized between an individual and the authorities, which was successfully described by the ideologues of anarchism from P. Kropotkin and

M. Bakunin, who protest against various international forums and declare themselves to be “fighters with anti-human ideas of globalization”.

The formation of an early Modern is in one way or another connected with the ideas of K. Marx and F. Engels regarding the development of “productive forces”, in which the individual is regarded as a source of physical strength, and the economy is limited by the relationship “goods — money — goods” (a kind of production for the sake of consumption). Industrialization, becoming the leading idea of the modern epoch, exacerbates the social issue and the relationship between an individual and collective. In the context of individual archetypes there are phenomena of “social fetishism” and “individual alienation” [3,p.114]. The German sociologist M. Weber attracts our attention to “methodological individualism”, he describes the problem of subjective perception of social relations. American sociologist T. Parsons, answering the question of how a social system can exist, states that it exists only through collective values [[4], p. 155]. German sociologist N. Elias spoke about the dual civilization process, characterized by uneven distribution of models of civilized behavior among individuals and in society as a whole [4, p. 196]. I. Wallerstein, *The modern World-System*. New York: Academic Press, 1976.

One of the co-founders of the Frankfurt Philosophical School T. Adorno in the middle of the twentieth century wrote that we live in the age of “disintegrating individuals, and societies that regress” [[5], p. 361]. In the work “Dialectics of Enlightenment” T. Adorno, along with M. Horkheimer noted that “people are radically alienated from each other and from nature” [6, p. 270].

German futurist H. Opaszowski writes about the danger of the middle class blurring and the emergence of the phenomenon of the procuracy, that is, the temporarily employed labor force. The progress of technology kills many jobs. A new phenomenon for the western civilization is the poverty of those who work. There is no more favorite work, which parents used to have. There is a constant shortage of qualifications. Flexible change in occupations leads to loss of employee loyalty and a shortage of social time. As a result, the democratic political system becomes unstable [7, p. 45]. H. Opaschowski, *Deutschland 2030. Wie wir in Zukunft leben*. Gutersloh, 2008. There is a hybridization of consumption in an aging society. Due to the increase in anthropological load, nature loses the usual mechanisms of self-regulation. In social life there is an irreversible process of losing the privacy of personal data. Life in metropolises is de facto taking place under permanent video surveillance. Anomie gives a real picture of the destruction of collective morality. Instead of two genders, gender pluralism is already under discussion [8]. The process of globalization makes hybrid national forms of social inequality. M. Hardt and A. Negri in the monograph “Empire” drew attention not only to the political tendency of transition from modernist imperialism to postmodern imperial order without external borders and with limited national sovereignty, but also to the hybridization of technology and nature, as well as technology and human beings [9]. In his latest monograph, “The Metamorphoses of the World”, the German sociologist W. Beck draws attention to the fact that climate change integrates nature and society [10, p. 65].

Overview of unresolved tasks. The open question remains the nonlinear, cyclic approach to the highlighting of the interaction of archetypes of individual and collective.

The purpose of the paper is to demonstrate the epistemological capabilities of the author's cycle model of the universal social cycle on the example of the interaction of archetypes of individual and collective.

Presenting main material. For every person *living in the society in one way or another is connected with the information-energy interaction between society and the individual, between "WE" and "US"*. Accordingly, the links between the societal psyche, which characterizes the current postmodern society as an integrity, and the individual psyche of a certain person, which undergoes dynamic changes today, are actualized. In the context of these changes, there is every reason to consider the subject only the part of the society that actively influences others beyond itself. For example, the subjects of politics are large social groups with their specific interests that define the meaning of political action. At a certain stage of their development, they create their own political structures, made to act effectively in the interests of their groups. The direct organizers of political actions are individuals, if they determine the direction, course and content of political processes, so an important role is played by another subject — a political leader as a person who has a crucial influence on the members of a particular social group.

A leader is an subject that has an organizational and integrating influence. As evidenced by the rich historical experience, the activity of the leader promotes the disclosure of the creative potential of a small or large social group, and sometimes, on the contrary, prevents it. It is appropriate to note that liberalism considers the symbolic "end of history" the liberation of an individual from all forms of collective identity. And all this happens in the context of the implementation of a system-building for the postmodern age psychological factor.

Postmodernity also actualizes the other side of social life of man, society and civilization, which is a cyclical psychosocial process. Each of the stages of this process reveals, as evidenced by the research of the Ukrainian school of archetype, national peculiarities of social systems, and typical for one or another historical epoch psychosocial characteristics, and socio-historical development appears interaction of mental and social structures.

Not the last value for social life and behavior of social systems is carried by biological cycles. The annual cyclicity of ancient agricultural societies established the tradition of cyclic understanding of being. In particular, O. Chyzhevskiy linked human (social) activity with the rhythms of space cycles. The activity of the Sun displays a tense social system from the state of equilibrium, becoming a signal for its switching to another quality [11, p. 24]. All the life of a person of a traditional society, says Russian philosopher A. Ahiezer, is an endless system of cycles, which he reproduces as rituals. Sacred rituals were a way of adaptation to natural, cosmic cycles [12, p. 122]. In addition, human mental development have cyclic nature. In particular, in the psychological structure of human activity, the communicative (mastering of tasks, motives, norms of human activity and development of emotional sphere) and substantive (formation of operational possibilities) are interchangeably actualized [13, p. 96].

The general scientific principles of the author's concept of the universal social cycle are logically associated with the notion that the “inanimate” nature is characterized by symmetry, whereas the ***“animated” nature***, including the social form of matter, which is hierarchically higher than all the others, is ***characterized by the asymmetry*** caused by the gender dichotomy of society.

Twenty years ago, speaking to the National Library of Ukraine named after V. I. Vernadskyi, with the jubilee (to the author's fiftieth anniversary) lecture “Social relativism or sociology of the transitional age of social development” E. Afonin drew the attention of his colleagues to the law of Louis Pasteur (1822–1885) and Pierre Curie (1859–1906), who, in studies on crystals, showed and explained the dissymmetry of “living” nature. And a decade earlier, based on the original system engineering model of the Russian A. Gribashev's “Semisloika” and the intuitive sense of the asymmetry of “animated” nature, it was managed to construct an author's projective psychodiagnostic technique of “Color Tendencies” (1987). Using as a stimulant the seven colors of the “rainbow”, the technique allows to distinguish 49 human psychotypes. Adapted to mass sociological surveys, the variant of the methodology allowed to measure the codes of Ukrainian (62:38), Russian (56:44) and Belarusian (37: 63) cultures in 1992 and to begin monitoring of system-wide changes in Ukraine (1992–2017).

The author's idea of the possible distribution of codes of world cultures somewhat resembles the periodic system of chemical elements of the table of Russian chemist D. Mendeleev — the classification of chemical elements, which establishes the dependence of various properties of elements on the charge of the atomic nucleus. The key hypothesis of the author's concept is that the psychosocial characteristics of the Eastern and Southern national cultures are close to symmetry, while their Western and Northern cultural controversies — to asymmetry. Under such conditions it is logical that the socio-historical cycles, starting at the East and South, in the process of deploying of a large epochal cycle, move the center of the historical civilization process to the West and the North. Now mankind is again at a crossroads.

The idea of a new cyclical paradigm of the historical process consists in understanding the fundamental difference of the very nature of the deployment of social cycles. Unlike cycles that occur in nature, and are, as we already know, symmetric, the repetition of historical cycles is also asymmetrical. Symmetric cycles (spiral) correspond to the model of the pendulum, whereas the rhythms of social cycles are asynchronous. The principle of asymmetry of cycles has practically not been taken into account in previous concepts of the cyclical development of social objects, and traditional notions of cycles still connect the final phase of development with the repetition of the first one, although the content of the social cycle is naturally regarded as a set of connected phenomena and processes, which reflect the completed development cycle for a certain period of time.

For understanding the cyclic model, the notion of the difference in the cyclic time paradigm from the linear one has a big importance. Social reality is historical in its essence. A historical phenomenon can not be adequately explained outside of its time. Instead, the term “social time” describes human activity and social relations during certain social processes. At the same time, every society or local civilization has its own configurations of social time. In ancient times, the concept of “historical time” was introduced into scientific circulation, it is *kairos* (from the Greek language —

“favorable moment”) as a period of time, favorable or unfavorable for a particular event. Instead, *chronos* was defined as “physical time”. In the Orthodox tradition, *kairos* is a time that has a specific historical meaning. It is *kairos* that fills the social historical periods. Historical time is a local characteristic of the development of the organic part of the nonlinear environment. The internal (biological) time of existence of a particular system characterizes its functioning. Instead, the external (socio-historical) time is the time of its change. For example, in the opinion of the Polish sociologist P. Stompka, internal time consists of short-term social changes, and external time is a real historical time, which enters into eternity [14, p. 287].

Generally, social time is a value-normative concept that determines the existence and functioning of society. Social time characterizes the sequence of different activities and is a non-material form of wealth of society and each member. The rhythm of social life is almost always uneven, because it consists of many rhythms of components.

Accumulated in a certain physical time, information is not transmitted automatically to every person from birth. Instead, people who are in a particular historical situation are trying to absorb it throughout their lives. Therefore, people who live in different historical epochs possess qualitatively different levels of knowledge. There are also ways to master knowledge, as well as the pace of their building-up. In particular, according to American A. Toffler, 70% of the population of the Earth live in different past, 25% — in the present, 3% — in the future [15, p. 81]. History studies the past, sociology — present, futurology — the future. Symbiosis of these sciences gives a real picture of being.

The most common models of social time are linear, cyclic, point and phase. In a linear model, time runs continuously and irreversibly from the past to the present, and then to the future. In the classical cyclic model, the flow of time is constantly repeated and forms a closed circle within which the time consequently and continuously proceeds in one direction from the past to the future, and then again to the past. In addition, the traditional interpretation of the full cycle is reduced to a model in which the final phase is converted to the original one, and the cycle begins again, passing the same route.

In the “universal social cycle” designed by the authors, the reverse process does not coincide (in form) with a series of previous processes. It is embodied in the general trajectory of a spiral, when successive states are mostly similar, but not identical. Reverse processes in a spiral signify a repetition of the process at a relatively high level or (for a downward model) at a relatively low level. The general duration of the cycle is not absolute (the same), but depends on the type of cyclic processes. So, the universal social cycle is non-rhythmic, and the intervals between the phases of this cycle are not equal. Actually, such a cycle, according to the authors, is only able to withstand chaos and anarchy.

Let's say more, the concepts of “evolution” — “revolution” that are existing from the time of the Modern notion of social development on the basis of dichotomy — are not adequate to the modernity and the present complexity of the historical process. Moreover, they contradict the laws of dialectics, in particular the denial of denial law, according to which the natural cycle, which consists of two normative periods and two transitional states, should be reproduced in social nature. *The authors propose a model of the “Universal Social Cycle”, the parts of which are two normative periods: “involution” and “evolution” and two transitional states: “revolution” and “co-evolution”.*

Revolution. During the revolution there is a peculiar “war of everyone against everyone” (Latin *Bellum omnium contra omnes*), by which the English materialist philosopher T. Hobbes describes the natural state of society before the conclusion of the “social contract” and the formation of the state, since in the social system the possible number self-sufficient individuals reaches its maximum. The uneasy nonlinear process of terrifying revolutionary vicissitudes seems to have a logical temporal inversion. An example of such reverse processes in the USSR was the period of the NEP (New Economic Policy), which lasted from the end of the Civil War (1921) to the beginning of industrialization (1929). In the end, together with the formed collective entity “Us” the revolutionaries of the Soviet system led the masses to “gain the common fruits of historical creativity”. True, in the socio-historical terms, the revolution naturally opens the way to a social involution, the consequence of which is the collapse of the social space. Yet the general historical result of the involution is the assimilation by the future generations of new — modern — social meanings. Currently, psychosocial mechanisms that enhance the role of myths and traditions, which are, in fact, the main regulators of the “static social norm”, enhance their influence. The degree of freedom of an individual in such a society is limited to the influence of the collective and society as a whole.

Involution. *The psychosocial basis of the involution determines the emotionally sensitive type and behavior of the person based on the material picture of the world, the orientation to socially significant values, intuitional thinking, evaluative-volitional decision-making, reliance on external social control, the functioning and maintenance of integrity as a feature social and productive activities. The fundamental meanings that cultivate the science of the involutionary era are the source of the development of the collective unconscious. The mechanism of transforming these meanings into the collective unconscious is the school as a social institution, which, due to the collective nature of educational activity, produces invariants of these actions. In particular, according to the theory of “phased formation of mental actions” of the Soviet Ukrainian psychologist P. Galperin [16, p. 236-277], any action, other than operations, consists of an IBA (indicative basis of action) — a system of representations of the nature of the environment, conditions, purpose, plan and means of action. Transfer in the learning process of action-skills in habit patterns — automatic actions, in fact, are the mechanism that transforms the knowledge component of the action (theoretical knowledge or their meanings) into the collective unconscious.*

Coevolution. The general configuration of the changes in the co-evolutionary transitional state is mirror to its controversy — the revolution. In its bowels a new — individual — value appears, and its carrier is affirmed — the subject “Me” (a self-sufficient individual) who squeezes on the periphery of the social system of the former colleague “Us”. It is this moment in the history of independent Ukraine that the first “maidan” — “Orange” (2004), which, in fact, gave birth to a citizen or self-sufficient Ukrainian. Thus, for 33.7% of adult citizens, 21.3% were self-sufficient Ukrainians, and 12.4% were collectivists [17, p. 101]. “Dignity maidan” (2013-2014) took place against the background of the essential growth of these indicators: 44.3%, 24.1%, 20.2%. At the end of 2017, these indicators increased, to 46.8%, 25.5% and 21.3% respectively.

It is worth noting that unrealized overestimated expectations from the Orange Maidan regarding the adoption of new values as the basis for further development of the country generated (2006) authoritarian (controversial) trends in the social system — (such as “NEP inside out”) and pathosichological state (such a cow that got on ice), which Ukraine (as well as other post-Soviet countries) still has [17, p. 100]. Essentially, this state is legitimately tied to violations of inter-system relations, which a priori puts Ukraine in a situation of non-controllability. Prognostically, it should be noted that both the entrance and the exit of the social system from an uncontrolled pathosychological state occurred and will occur “unexpectedly”, although according to the dialectical law the transfer of quantity into quality, as evidenced, in particular, by the growing number of social reforms: 1 (2005) — 28 (2010) — 62 (2014) — 144 (2017).

According to the monitoring studies of “System-wide changes in Ukraine”, which are carried out during 1992-2017, representatives of the Ukrainian School of Archetype predict a high probability for a Ukrainian society of coming out of the pathosychological state and of the systemic crisis as a whole during the period 2019-2021. Actually, a new phenomenon of the country — “Ukrainian miracle” — will be associated with the period, not related to destructive activity, which in general was inherent in the country from 2013 to 2014, but with the continuous social growth of Ukraine, which, in particular, in the economic aspect will significantly exceed the projected by World Bank’s 2.5-3.0% annual economic growth. In addition, this growth will already be on an updated psychosocial basis.

In the context of the key forecast of the Ukrainian School of Archetype on the prospects for social growth in Ukraine, we would like to recall the 50-year-old historical novel by P. Zagrebelnyi’s “Divo” (1968), which combines the plot lines of the times of Kyiv Rus and then-present, the fate of Yaroslav the Wise and the talented architect with fates of Soviet contemporaries. But, if the described by P. Zagrebelny Ukrainian miracle grew up on myths and traditions as social regulators of the Soviet era, then the current, predicted by representatives of the U.S.A. Ukrainian miracle, will grow on a purely rational basis. And together, both these miracles, like the two sides of one medal, will be united through the Ukrainian psychosocial nature and its cultural code — the Golden Section — and will feed the main — the human resource of Ukraine’s growth.

Evolution. *The psychosocial basis of evolution will be determined by the rational type and behavior of the person based on the subjective idealist picture of the world, the orientation towards utilitarian values (material benefits, economic efficiency, etc.), sensory-logical thinking (according to the formula “if I don’t touch, I do not believe”), the peculiarity of decision-making as a consequence of a reasonable calculation, reliance on internal self-control, dominance in the social system of innovation development as an extension of the existing state of affairs and communication with the outside world as a communicative activity and harmonization of public, state and industrial relations.*

The increase of complexity and heterogeneity of the new social structure, its functioning and development as a subject occurs on the basis of developing an ever-widening variety of social meanings. At the same time, the prerequisite for such a large-scale innovation activity in the evolutionary period is the emancipation of the individual and the strengthening of the subject-cognitive

component in the psychological structure of the individual, which was investigated by the Swiss, J. Piaget. It should also be noted that in the evolutionary period of the deployment of the social cycle, there is a search for a social solution that promotes the adaptation of the subject to the constantly updated system of motivation. Due to this, in the new structure of social activity, the subject-individual changes not only himself and his goals and improves the means of their achievement, but actively forms his new social environment. Existing social meanings in the context of innovation processes are extrapolated to new social phenomena.

The field of existence of the social, thus, focuses on the interaction and co-existence of the individual and the social. Individual and social can be considered as a two-sided characteristics of social, and in the foreground there is now a personality. Classical sociology considers it not in the prism of unique properties and qualities (in essence, it is the subject of psychology of personality), but from the standpoint of its socially typical features as a subject of development of society. At the same time, each person is considered not only as a component of a small social group, but also as a typical representative of a certain large social group with the norms, traditions, values, attitudes typical of this group. The integration of the individual into society is carried out through socialization, that is, the process of formation of the individual, acquiring by him values, norms and patterns of behavior inherent in the society to which the individual belongs. The dialectics of the relationship between the individual, society and civilization poses the problem of social integration or the isolation of these subjects from the social environment.

On the other hand, the individual compared to the social, and even to civilization, is more variable, because the social time of its development is limited to the duration of human life, which is measured by the century, while the duration of social life – by centuries, and the duration of civilization life – by millenia. At the same time, the historical periods of the past, of the present and future of society are made up of the lives of different generations who lived and acted in a certain historical time. Unfortunately, the Soviet age psychology did not cover not only the prenatal period, but also an adulthood, which became a serious disadvantage, as it violated the holistic consideration of the individual's mental life.

Thanks to the complex of military and social studies of Professor E. Afonin in 1992-1994 he was able to empirically state that the ontogenetic development of personality is described by four small cycles of socialization and one (final) large cycle of human self-realization [18, p. 14]. On the contrary, social cycles of society develop from a large cycle of prehistory to small cycles of self-actualization of society. Similar (in form) to the ontogenetic development of personality is the ontogeny of the development of mankind (civilization) [18, p. 128].

The personal social cycle unfolds faster than national-state and civilization ones, it is realized through the change of generations. The Spanish philosopher H. Ortega-i-Gaset rightly emphasized that the rotation of generations is an important historical mechanism. In the involutinal state of the cycle for a person conscious social position is objectively determined by a certain social interest. In a co-evolutional state, a demonstrative presentation of the position is initially followed by interest. In the involutinal phase of the cycle the problem of the impact of the whole social organization on the

individual is solved. Instead, in the evolutionary phase of the cycle, the individual's influence on social organization and culture is crucial.

At the same time, identification is not with individual people, but with small or large communities. The model of the action of this mechanism can be presented in the form of interaction "Me" — "Us" — "Others". In this context, one can distinguish between the directive and the chosen identities, and the social identity has the motivational properties of self-esteem. According to E. Erickson, in general, the identity has three features:

1) the sense of internal identity and integration in time of action with the past, and hopes for the future are experienced as being associated with the present reality;

2) a sense of internal identity and integration in space: a person perceives himself everywhere as an integrity, and all his actions and decisions are considered not as accidental or imposed ones, but as internally conditioned;

3) identity is experienced among significant others: relationships and roles help to maintain and develop the sense of an integrated, prolonged identity.

It is the personal cycle that deploys in the fastest way. It is regulated through the change of generations. Age cohorts of socio-cultural socialization can be analogues for understanding the hierarchically higher types of historical deployment of social cycles. In essence, the personal socio-cultural cycle is the foundation of the cyclical development of macrosocial subjects of the higher level of the hierarchy.

Conclusions

1. New — postmodern — communicative environment transforms the very nature of information and informational network of sociality. Thanks to the communicative revolution, mankind has been given the opportunity to spread his knowledge quickly. High technology and biotechnology change the human environment. Human cloning transforms existing traditional religious beliefs and values. Total computerization changes the perception of the material and virtual worlds, when the first of them involves the physical body of man, and the latter one involves his spirit.

2. The transition society (revolution and co-evolution) is undergoing institutional changes, during which social structures and social norms are blurred, social ties become weaker and even ruptured during inversion, and the hierarchy of factors that make up the mechanisms for the reproduction of social structures is violated. The researcher should realize that in a transitive state, not only social norms are blurred, but also causative-consecutive relationships that lie under the rational scientific method are violated.

3. From the political point of view, the social actors "Us" and "Me", which are crucial for the normative periods of involution and evolution, differ radically in the following ways:

3.1) *by the political consciousness of individuals*, which significantly influences the nature and way of exercising power: in a totalitarian society dominated by the "We", it is a total state (external to the individual) control and violence, in the autocratic society there are certain zones of freedoms that are inaccessible to state control; Under the conditions of the "pre-democratic regime", the authorities begin to engage in dialogue with independent groups that have matured in the time of autocracy in

peculiar enclaves of social freedom, but they determines the results of this dialogue themselves; finally, the power is exercised on a representative basis, in accordance with the laws, on the basis of a democratic regime;

3.2) *by the attitude of people to the regime:* totalitarian consensus is characterized by a merger with state power; for authoritarian power — alienation from power; for a pre-democratic regime, it is a limited influence on power; for democratic power, the choice of certain representatives of power;

3.3) *by the status of horizontal social structures:* the totalitarian regime destroys any horizontal structures, authoritarian allows them to exist until they are of a political nature, the pre-democratic regime allows any organization, other than those who claim to power, while the opposition has the same mentality as the authorities; in a democratic society the structure of public organizations becomes the foundation of the political system.

3.4) *by the hierarchy of social taboos:* in a totalitarian society it is allowed if it is ordered by the authorities, the rest is prohibited; in an autocratic society the right to life is something that does not apply to politics; everything is allowed in a pre-democratic society, except for change of power; in a democratic society — everything that is not prohibited by law is allowed;

3.5) *by political ideals:* a totalitarian society demands from the authorities omnipotence, and from people — enthusiasm and modesty; an authoritarian society requires competence from the authorities, and from people — professionalism and loyalty, a pre-democratic society require from power morality, from people — activity and certain irresponsibility, a democratic society requires from the authorities and citizens only law-abidingness.

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Higher Education 4.0: The Adaptation of Global University

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ABSTRACT

The main mission of higher education institutions in Thailand by the Office of the Commission on Higher Education [1] states that higher education institutions must perform in four aspects: producing graduates, researching, providing academic services to society, and the preservation of arts and culture. It is a strict practice that universities across the country must carry out such missions, which is a broad mission framework. If the context of the environment should be taken into account especially in the context of time because in the present era. The environment of tertiary education has changed dramatically. Especially when entering the Education 4.0 era, as Paitoon Sinlarat [2] has said that Thai education 4.0 is education in the productive era. It is an era that requires as many products or products as possible for the benefit of one's own community and other communities, with educational skills that focus on doing and doing. And then come out as a product. Moreover, Thai education 4.0 is considered an era entering the 21st century where Thailand must look at productivity in a manner that can keep up and move forward.

KEYWORDS: New educational world, Adaptation, Global university

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Introduction. Therefore, the real mission of Thai higher education Therefore, it is a new mission that, in addition to taking into account the guidelines related to the four main missions of higher education institutions set by the Office of the Higher Education Commission, is therefore a new mission. University personnel in the era of Education 4.0 will have to unravel the concept of the old framework that has been done and is being worked on. to a new adaptation to be consistent with the current situation Because higher education institutions are academic centers. as a flag for society and is the foundation of the country's thinking to drive development in various fields Up in the country, especially in the Thailand 4.0 era, the world is not the same world anymore.

Graduate production: The first task that is compulsory for university professors in Thailand in addition to doctoral studies is entry into academic positions This is a mission that is halfway between the production of graduates and research. It is indirectly producing graduates. In addition to entering academic positions. The role of thesis advisor is also one of the main tasks of university professors. And the mission of being a supervisor for an internship or cooperative education of students is another role of university professors. culminating in an entry into an administrative position. Research: Entering academic positions with research results. writing teaching materials Teaching documents for the course Composing academic textbooks or a collection of academic works and academic books for the course It is the primary role of university professors in research missions.

Academic Services: Research Tool Verification Mission Including the mission of being a qualified person to consider research articles or academic articles It is an important mission when it comes to academic service or academic service to society. that university professors have acted on behalf of the university and on behalf of the academic network or being a consultant to government agencies business organization and civil society groups

Preserving Arts and Culture: culminating in admission to administrative positions appointed by the University that are directly related to art and culture preservation obligations, mainly due to its activities. It is the role of line B and line C personnel that is not the teaching mission of line A personnel.

Higher Education 4.0

If we consider the context of today's world, there is a code for different eras. happening in the world It started in the 1.0 era, which refers to the agriculture era, 2.0 is the industrial age, 3.0 is the information and communication technology, and 4.0 is the post-information and communication technology world. The direction in which the world is moving has pushed all circles to follow be it political, economic, social, and national and international level

Toffler [3] referred to the First wave or the first wave of humanity. It is an agricultural society that has existed for thousands of years, beginning from the first day that humans stopped hunting expeditions. turned to farming and raising animals which is considered a big turning point in life to bring together groups, to form a society, to develop into a culture and began to have time to

consolidate, which coincides with the 1.0 second wave era, or the second wave, Toffler said, is a post-industrial revolution that focuses on large-scale production and markets. Use machines to make lots of items. By having influenced many changes in the way of life of people. Third wave or the wave that It is the era of connectivity and access to information systems from all over the world. Under the linkage of basic elements that must have technology to support both computers and telecommunication structures born into a community be a network It is the starting point for the transition and the emergence of a new economy.

This is in line with Case [4] that the first wave in terms of information and communication technology (ICT) is from 1985-1999, the second wave is from 2005-2016. Third, from 2016 onwards, Case sees that the Internet has expanded greatly from 1986 to the present. and will play many roles in working for the global society whether education public health or even tackling terrorism, solving global warming and solving poverty.

Jeera Hongladarom [5] said that the first period was the period when the Internet was not very new, but after the year 2000, there were new IT products such as Search Engine, Google, Yahoo or Facebook that expanded very largely. climb But Steve Case's third wave is the Internet of Things. The role of the Internet will expand to the people widely. object point And can be connected to a lot, which follows Robots Robots are Things, but there will be Internet or Software that has the ability to do a lot. including thinking and having emotions Human-like intelligence, perhaps the third wave of the Internet was called the Fourth Industrial Revolution or the Fourth Stage Industrial Revolution.

It can be seen that the direction in which the world is moving has pushed all circles to follow whether it is political, economic, social, especially in the education field. which is a source of human resource incubation for various industries including government organizations, state enterprises, private sector, industrial sector, business sector, trade, commerce, financial and banking sector. and other sectors Therefore, administrators of higher education institutions in the Thailand 4.0 era must be executives with a vision that is up to date with the rapidly changing era. school in the new era Has moved a long way through the management style of old projects and paradigms.

Thailand 4.0

Talking about Thailand 4.0 is like talking about the changing times of the world society, that is, starting from the 1.0 era is the agricultural world, the 2.0 is the industrial world, and the 3.0 is the information and communication technology world. The 4.0 era is a post-information and communication technology world.

Thailand in the past has had continuous economic development since Thailand 1.0 focuses on agriculture, Thailand 2.0 focuses on light industry, Thailand 3.0 focuses on heavy industry and exports, Thailand 4.0 focuses on innovation-driven economy, with the main idea being: Shifting from product manufacturing to innovative products Suwit Maesincee [6] said Thailand 4.0 has thus

transformed the country's drive from the industrial sector. to driven by technology creativity and innovation and shifting from focusing on the manufacturing sector to focus more on the service sector

Developing the country under the concept of Thailand 4.0. by focusing on the participation of the private sector Finance and Banking Sector People's Sector Educational Institution Sector Universities and research institutes brainstorm Join forces to drive through projects, memorandums of cooperation, activities or research. by the operations of various groups of civil states, namely group 1, upgrading of innovations and products, amending laws and government mechanisms. Developing the industrial cluster of the future and attracting investment and the development of infrastructure; group 2, development of modern agriculture and development of basic economics and civil state; group 3, promotion of tourism and miles monetization and stimulating public spending, Group 4, Basic Education and Leadership Development or Pracharath Schools including the upgrading of professional quality and Group 5 promotion of exports and foreign investment. including promoting new entrepreneurs Each group is laying out a system and formulating guidelines for intensive policy driving.

The Adaptation of Global University

Higher education in Thailand 4.0 era amid rapidly changing situations in politics, economy, society, and cross-cultural concepts that are big trends in the context of globalization. Especially the knowledge of robots or Robotics, which is a new trend in the economy. Which has applied the concepts, theories and research related to robots to be applied in a variety of fields, as Phu Iamcharoenying [7] said about teaching and learning about robots that The robot market will grow a lot. The main reason is the rapid and continuous development of technology. If humans had better tools, they would be robots. It will help to save more labor and increase productivity. We need these technologies to increase productivity. optimize and reduce operating costs These are the keys to increasing competitiveness. and will be able to reach lower costs By working with more efficient and smarter processes. can create new innovations To help drive the economy Many countries around the world are paying special attention to this issue. Because he sees this as the heart of the future of competition. has turned to support the study of robotics Programming and STEM (Science Technology Engineering Mathematics) to the fullest by bringing these subjects to school from elementary school.

Not counting unmanned aerial vehicle technology or Drone Technology and Autonomous Cars Technology or Automatic Cars and 3D Printing Technology or 3D Printing (2017) which is a type of industrial robot refers to the process which is used to create three-dimensional objects by There is a layer of material next to it. together under the control of the computer These objects come in many shapes, such as geometric shapes. which has the same working principle as 2D printing technology that is printed in plane or X-axis and Y-axis by adding part of the Z-axis to create a 3rd dimension in printing

In line with the Kasikorn Research Center [8], which has discussed the use of robotic technology to help financial analysis, known as FinTech as FinTech, is a combination of Financial + Technology that literally means "financial analysis". Financial Technology In the future, FinTech will

become one of the key mechanisms that drive the financial system of the digital era. The global growth of FinTech will lead to the development of many new forms of financial services. especially the services in the 3 main financial transaction groups related to general consumers. Including transactions related to payments/transfers personal finance management and credit and funding Today, we can see examples of outstanding and world-renowned FinTech financial services in each of the major financial transaction segments. invest more thoroughly.

Especially the group of young income earners who are interested in modern technology. Due to the advantages of low service fees due to the use of computer programs primarily in operations, it reduces the cost of opening branches and hiring a large number of personnel as in traditional service providers. There is also a minimum investment limit set. or no minimum investment limit As a result, investment/financial advisory services are no longer limited to high-income groups as in the past.

Consistent with Jakkrit Siririn [9], who mentioned the meaning of Web 4.0 technology that the meaning of Web 1.0 (1990-2000), which is the beginning of the Web Broadcasting or One-way Communication until the Web 2.0 era (2000-2010) is the current time of Social Network, Web 3.0 (2010-2020) or Semantic Web will have characteristics of a semantic network or Semantic Network such as Intelligent Agent or Semantic Search and Web 4.0 (AD 2020-2030) is a Symbiotic Web or a website that works with Artificial Intelligence (AI) or artificial intelligence An example that has emerged is how the Siri program works on the iPhone.

In the current era, it is Web 3.0 era (2010-2020), or Semantic Web era, has applied Semantic-based Knowledge Management. This is the idea of John Davies, Marko Grobelnik and Dunja Mladenic [10] in the book Semantic Knowledge Management: Integrating Ontology Management, Knowledge Discovery, and Human Language Technologies. main mission Semantic-based Knowledge Management is the acquisition of in-depth knowledge, or Deep Knowledge, with the aim of applying knowledge in a specific field or Domain Knowledge, especially when linked to a computer system in the Web 4.0 era. based Knowledge Management is a precursor for building a knowledge base for computer programs. Ontology, which refers to the domain knowledge model, has two components from knowledge: Knowledge Engineers and Domain Experts The purpose of Ontology is to apply knowledge in a specific field to create a knowledge base for application in a variety of computer programs by technology, knowledge engineering, or Knowledge Engineering, which is responsible for system development, collection, arrangement. Collect and share knowledge from field experts applied to computer technology Especially Internet technology or Web 4.0 in order to manage knowledge for running more intelligently.

And is more automated at present There are several Ontology development programming languages for sharing and exchanging information on the Web, such as OWL (Web Ontology Language) standards, RDF standards (Resource Description Framework, XML Languages (Extensible Markup Language)), and URI (Uniform Resource Identifier) reference standards. And today, at least

two leading academic institutions have created tools to support the development of Ontology: Stanford University's Protege program and Osaka University's Hozo program.

The real mission of higher education

At present, although the main missions of higher education institutions by the Office of the Higher Education Commission are based on four aspects: producing graduates, research, and providing academic services to society, and the preservation of arts and culture, but in the context of the 4.0 era, higher education institutions or universities in the big picture It is necessary to accelerate the creation of new missions. This is a hidden mission in the form of bringing innovation or information and communication technology, to be applied in teaching and learning management Whether it is robotic technology or Robotics Technology, which includes unmanned aerial vehicle technology or Drone Technology and driverless car technology or Automatic Cars, there is also 3D printing technology or 3D Printing.

Including requiring Organize teaching and learning in a new way, taking into account the concept of FinTech or financial technology. Combined with theories about Web 4.0 or Symbiotic Web with Semantic-based Knowledge Management or Semantic Knowledge Management. To integrate in the management of education in the 4.0 era, the main principle is that Higher Education 4.0 will not become a forgotten field of higher education. can only be considered when adding new missions in innovation or information and communication technology to be integrated into the main mission of higher education institutions by the Office of the Higher Education Commission. society and the preservation of arts and culture, which means the production of graduates 4.0, research 4.0, academic services to society 4.0, and the preservation of arts and culture 4.0 by inserting the hidden mission in the form of bringing innovation or information and communication technology, to be applied in teaching and learning management In addition to being in line with the context of the world 4.0 era, higher education institutions or universities in the big picture is also consistent with the phrase When the world is not the same: a new adaptation of the university must also occur.

Conclusion. The true mission of Thai higher education These are the production of graduates 4.0, research 4.0, academic services to society 4.0, and the preservation of arts and culture 4.0, which must accelerate the insertion of latent missions in the form of applying innovations or information and communication technologies in teaching and learning management. To be in line with the context of the world 4.0 and education 4.0, whether it is robot technology or Robotics Technology, Unmanned Aircraft Technology or Drone Technology, Autonomous Car Technology or Automatic Cars, 3D Printing Technology or 3D Printing Financial Technology or FinTech theory Web 4.0 or Symbiotic Web using Semantic-based Knowledge Management to help manage knowledge. This is to encourage personnel in higher education institutions in the era of Education 4.0 to unravel the concept from the original framework that has been done and is being worked on. to a new adaptation to be consistent with the current situation Because higher education institutions are academic centers. as a flag for society and is the foundation of the country's thinking to drive development in various fields Up in the

country, especially in the Thailand 4.0 era, the world is not the same world anymore. And in order to be in line with the Thailand Education 4.0 era, which is considered the era that has entered the 21st century, Thailand must look at productivity in a manner that can keep up and move forward.

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Strategy for the development of the tourism sector of the country and its regions in a crisis

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ABSTRACT

The article presents the development and justification of the anti-crisis strategy for the development of the tourism sector of Ukraine and its potentially attractive tourist regions in a crisis. The importance of the advanced concept of anti-crisis management, features of strategic planning in the crisis, the need to take into account changes in business conditions and criteria for effective operation of economic entities. The article analyzes the impact of the 2020 pandemic on the state and development of the global tourism industry and related industries, including air transport. Particular attention is paid to the impact on international tourism of the introduction of strict quarantine restrictions on travel in China, analyzed the development of tourism in Thailand. The article presents forecasts for the recovery of the world tourism industry. The dynamics of external and internal tourist flows in Ukraine is presented: the rapid growth of tourists by 2020 and their sharp decline during the global lockdown. The main problems and directions of development of the tourist sphere and full use of the resource potential of Ukraine are offered.

The article proposes a scheme of the process of anti-crisis management in the tourism sector at the level of public authorities. A matrix for assessing the degree of risk impact on the activities of interested participants in the tourism market has been developed. SWOT-analysis was used to diagnose the state of the tourism sector of Ukraine. Strategic prospects of tourism intensification are offered; one of the options for the structure of the tourism cluster as an opportunity to join forces and respond to the inevitable changes in a crisis.

KEYWORDS :Anti-crisis strategy, Tourist sphere, Crisis phenomena in the tourist sphere, Matrix of qualitative assessment of the degree of risk impact, Scheme of the process of anti-crisis management in tourist activity

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1.Introduction .In the current conditions of development of global processes in the economy, the tourism industry has become one of the defining and priority areas in the world economy. Tourism affects the socio-economic development of entire countries and individual regions.Until recently, the tourism industry developed in favorable conditions and brought significant profits. Ukraine has also sought to successfully develop its market for tourism services, to make known its tourism competitive advantages and to increase domestic and foreign tourism flows.

According to the UN World Tourism Organization, the contribution of tourism as part of the world's gross domestic product is about **10%**. Tourism is one of the main sectors of the world economy and one of the ways to implement the foreign policy of any state.Ukraine has sufficient resources and unlimited potential tourist opportunities. But at present our country cannot compete with developed tourist countries. For the rational and effective use of natural, medical and recreational resources of Ukraine it is necessary to form an anti-crisis strategy for the development of the country's tourism sector in a crisis, which will ensure the development, implementation and supply of a competitive tourism product.

Problems of the tourist sphere have been studied by many scientists, including L. Vasylykevych, I. Golovchan, L. Hryniv, O. Gulych, A. Gukalyuk, J. Dubenyuk, I. Zhuk, N. Kindrachuk, N. Kolenda, V. Motolych, O. Palamarchuk, A. Panasyuk, O. Pylypyak, E. Popova, J. Poplavska, V. Rudenko, D. Stechenko, E. Falko, L. Cherchyk, L. Shevchuk, V. Szymanska. But despite the large number of scientific studies, the issue of forming a strategy for the development of tourism in a crisis remains relevant.

The purpose of the article is to develop and substantiate the anti-crisis strategy for the development of the tourism sector of potentially attractive tourist regions of Ukraine in a crisis.

2. Proposed Techniques / Algorithms .The subject of the article is a set of scientific-theoretical and methodological principles of forming an anti-crisis strategy for the development of the country's tourism sector in a crisis.

General scientific methods of analysis and synthesis, structural-logical method, generalizations, tabular-graphic, calculation-analytical methods are used to solve the set tasks.

2.1 The First Technique

The stable operation of the enterprise in the uncertainty of market conditions requires an immediate response to an adverse factor in the state of the business entity. To this end, it is advisable to have a list of preventive measures. These measures will prevent or mitigate the crisis, mobilize all internal reserves to overcome the crisis. Particular attention should be paid to the advanced concept of crisis management. It is aimed at early warning and response to the crisis in the activities of any entity, designed to provide comprehensive identification, analysis, solution and forecasting of problems to make advanced management decisions to achieve tactical and strategic goals [1]

The company's anti-crisis strategy must be a timely and effective response to existing changes in the environment. It is important to develop a system of alternative management decisions based on the study of previous experience of the situation at different stages of the life cycle. Resolving

differences between the goals of the entity, available resources and the impact of external and internal environment on its development is the main task of anti-crisis strategy. That is why the anti-crisis strategy should be considered as a way for the subject to achieve the main goal of the activity, taking into account the influence of external and internal environmental factors, which are the source of crisis phenomena. The strategic security system should be able to take into account future changes that may cause future crises and negatively affect businesses.

The period of time that exists before the crisis and that which means the arrival of the crisis can be interpreted as follows:

- 1) the crisis came spontaneously and very quickly;
- 2) the process of preparing the firm for the perception of a crisis situation can be fast or slow.

An entity may influence the speed of its own preparations to prevent the adverse effects of a crisis. The development of anti-crisis strategy should be based on the peculiarities of strategic planning, take into account changes in business conditions and criteria for effective operation [2] Crisis phenomena in the tourism sector have always existed and could be caused by natural disasters, political instability, military action and so on. The current pandemic crisis is special because it has spread to all countries in the world at the same time.

Experts note that in 2020 the losses of the tourism industry reached 1.2 trillion dollars. Losses from exports in the world tourism industry due to the coronavirus pandemic in the first half of 2020 amounted to 320 billion dollars. with the reduction of international tourist flows by more than 50%. More than 120 million jobs in the industry are under threat. Tourism is the third largest export sector of the world economy after energy and chemicals, and in 2019 it accounted for 7% of world trade. In a certain list of countries, tourism accounts for more than 20% of GDP. Managers of the Market and Competitiveness Division of the United Nations World Tourism Organization state that the export losses in tourism in the amount of 320 billion dollars from January to May 2020 are 3 times higher than in the third quarter of 2009. Coronavirus has affected tourism in all countries of the world. Revenues from the export of tourist services decreased in 2020 by 910 billion dollars. to 1.2 trillion dollars, world GDP fell by various estimates by 1.5-2.8%. Workers in tourism and related industries, which provide jobs for 144 million people worldwide, are in a difficult position. Small enterprises are especially vulnerable [3] Due to the pandemic and the decline in the tourism industry, the number of jobs in the world decreased by 12-14%.

It is necessary to note separately on two most noticeable crisis waves in the tourist sphere of China: sharp decrease in the Chinese tourists and in general travels in Europe. According to various estimates, for example, in 2018, Chinese tourists spent from 130 to 227 billion dollars outside their country. In 2019, the Chinese were abroad 166 million times. In the first quarter of 2020, China's loss in world tourism was tens of billions of dollars due to severe quarantine. In 25 years, Thailand has experienced a large-scale economic crisis (1997), and a tsunami (2004), periods of political instability (2006, 2008, 2010, 2014). However, Thailand's tourism statistics have been positive in the last decade. The tourism industry developed dynamically, the country was called "Teflon Thailand". If in 1960 the country was visited by about 80 thousand foreign tourists, in 2019 their number reached 39 million. In 2019, the tourism business added \$ 60 billion to Thailand, which is 20% of

the country's national income. In Thailand, tourists from China accounted for 25% of the total number of visitors.

The largest loss from quarantine restrictions during the pandemic is over \$ 8 billion. were in Italy, because tourism is a significant part of the country's economy, accounting for about 13%. Prior to the pandemic, Italy ranked first among European countries in the number of air routes to China. According to Tourism Economics, the losses in the field of travel and tourism in the United States could amount to 24 billion dollars. The analysis of the development of the tourism sector shows that the US tourism industry is depressed: the total unemployment in the tourism sector is 51%. The global aviation industry is one of the worst hit by the coronavirus crisis. Initially, most airlines stopped or reduced flights to China, and later the air business in Europe was hit. According to the latest estimates of the International Air Transport Association (IATA), the industry has tripled to \$ 113 billion [4] Extended UNWTO scenarios for 2021-2024 indicate that it may take 2.5 to 4 years for international tourism to return to 2019 [5]

All regions of the world were affected during the pandemic. Asia and the Pacific (-84%), the first region affected by the pandemic and the region with the highest level of travel restrictions currently observed, saw the largest decrease in arrivals in 2020 (300 million less). The Middle East and Africa saw a 75% decline. Europe has seen a 70% reduction in tourist arrivals. The biggest drop in the region was in absolute terms, in 2020 by 500 million less international tourists. The resumption of world tourism depends on quarantine restrictions and vaccination. Analysis of the state of the tourism sector in the current economic conditions should be divided into periods up to 2020, and after, under quarantine restrictions. According to experts, the pandemic crisis season will provide consumers with priority in terms of: choice of shorter vacation periods, predominance of individual travel (motor tourism) and individual accommodation, choice of health, sea and rural tourism.

This crisis has led to changes in consumer preferences, accelerated the introduction of online technologies, hygiene and healthy lifestyles, the active use of non-cash and contactless payment methods and targeted delivery [6]

In fig. 1 presents the number of tourists served by tour operators and travel agents, by type of tourism in Ukraine since 2000.




Fig 1. Number of tourists served by tour operators and travel agents, by type of tourism in Ukraine (persons) *

*According to the materials of the State Statistics Service of Ukraine

We can observe an increase in the intensification of tourist traffic in Ukraine by 2020 for all types of tourism. In 2020, Ukraine's tourism industry lost (according to industry experts) more than \$ 2 billion due to the coronavirus pandemic. Although experts note that Ukraine still does not have detailed statistics on the tourism market and its participants. Therefore, in Ukraine it is planned to create a Unified Tourist Register, where all accommodation facilities and tourism entities will be able to register and receive monthly operational statistics. [7] In the structure of Ukraine's foreign trade, the share of travel-related services is quite stable - from 3.2% in 2005 to 2.1% in 2010, 2011, 2015, 2016, 2019.

As the global crisis and pandemic over the spread of the COVID-19 virus exacerbates competition for the consumer of the tourism product, it is encouraging industry to reconsider approaches and tools for their sales. Therefore, in the current conditions for the tourism industry, which has suffered the most from the pandemic, the position of domestic tourism is especially strengthening. In this context, the development of thematic tourism in the country should be considered. At the conference of the World Tourism Organization in Lisbon, based on the results of the Tourism 2020 Vision study, 5 most promising tourist destinations of the 21st century were announced, and one of them is thematic tourism, in particular, rural green tourism and its varieties. In Ukraine, 2020 has been declared the Year of Tourism Development in Regions and Rural Areas. This requires a detailed study of

the demand for the tourist product, change offers, provide modern infrastructure, effectively use the promotion, and establish a quality service at affordable prices [8] According to the World Economic Forum, Ukraine currently uses less than 30% of its potential tourism potential. According to experts, if we fully reveal the tourism potential of our country, the revenues to the budgets of all levels can reach the mark of 10 billion dollars. USA per year. Today, these are the revenues of those countries that are on a par with Ukraine in terms of their tourism potential [9]

The main directions of development of the tourism industry and full use of the resource potential of Ukraine are:

1. Creating safe conditions for tourists to stay in the country, protection of their legal rights and interests.
2. Development of a network of autocampings.
3. Improvement of recreational areas and tourist facilities.
4. Development of cycling tourism.
5. Stimulating the development of sanatorium tourism.
6. Stimulating the development of rural tourism
7. Conducting advertising campaigns for tourist resources.
8. Creating a brand "Ukraine is unique".
9. Publication of promotional catalogs in different languages.

The main problematic issues still remain: underfunding of the tourism industry, the presence of queues at checkpoints, imperfect legislation governing the field of green tourism, the lack of specialized specialists. Strategic tasks and priority areas for increasing competitiveness are directly related to the strategic prospects for intensifying the tourism sector in the region.

2.2 The Second Technique

We are convinced that we need to learn to prevent the crisis, and in case of its occurrence to be able to neutralize its negative consequences. To develop an anti-crisis strategy for the development of the tourism sector in Ukraine, it is necessary to go through the following stages (Fig. 2) and take into account the need for sustainable tourism development in the region:

The first stage of developing an anti-crisis strategy begins with the formation of anti-crisis planning. At this stage, we propose to design a general idea of tourism management in the event of a crisis (recurrence). It is necessary to take into account all possible types of risks and predict their quantitative impact on activities in the field of tourism, to develop an action plan for each type of risk.




Fig 2. Scheme of the process of anti-crisis management in tourism activities at the level of public authorities *

* Improved by a team of authors

It is necessary to assess the possible consequences of the crisis not only qualitatively but also quantitatively. We agree with the opinion of many scientists and propose to use a matrix to assess the degree of impact of risk on the activities of stakeholders (see Tables 1, 2).

Table 1. Matrix of qualitative assessment of the degree of risk impact on tourism activities in Ukraine

Danger level	Event	Probability of occurrence of the event	Description
1	The next wave of coronavirus, the introduction of quarantine restrictions in Ukraine	High	In the autumn there may be an increase in the incidence of respiratory infections, Introduction of quarantine restrictions in some regions, introduction of restrictions on free interregional movement
2	The crown of the crisis in Europe, especially its closest neighbors, including Poland	High	Quarantine restrictions are possible in the countries where foreign tourists come from. This will especially affect the holding of international festivals planned in the region
3	Decrease in solvency of the population of Ukraine (Ukraine is mostly visited by domestic tourists and excursionists)	Average	Rising prices, which will reduce the effective demand of domestic tourists and excursionists
4	Insufficient promotion of tourist locations in Ukraine	Average	Limited information and propaganda campaign to promote Ukraine as a tourist region
5	Overstatement of prices for visiting Ukraine as a tourist region	Low	Setting high entrance fees and sightseeing of tourist attractions in the region

*Developed by a team of authors

Table 2. Matrix for quantitative assessment of the degree of risk impact on tourism activities in Ukraine *

Probability	Impact assessment				
	Invisible influence	Insignificant impact	Noticeable impact	Significant impact	Catastrophic impact
1 – high	HL	HL	UHR	UHR	UHR
2 – high	MR	HL	HL	UHR	UHR
3 – average	LR	MR	HL	UHR	UHR
4 – average	LR	LR	MR	MR	UHR
5 – low	LR	LR	MR	MR	MR

*Developed by a team of authors

UHR – ultra-high risk; HL – high level; MR – moderate risk; LR – low risk.

Depending on the current situation, the following strategies should be selected to respond to the risks that will help mitigate the negative effects of the crisis or neutralize them:

1) in the case of ultra-high risk it is necessary to take immediate measures, which provides for an anti-crisis strategy;

2) in case of high risk it is necessary to adjust the management of tourist activities in the region on the basis of appropriate anti-crisis measures;

3) in case of moderate risk it is necessary to focus on the adjustment of certain areas of tourism, which are projected to have the most crisis phenomena, here it is necessary to use preventive anti-crisis programs;




Fig 3. Recreational cluster structure*

*Updated with.[10]

4) in case of low risk it is necessary to ensure the management of tourism activities in Ukraine in the usual way. The second stage should be the creation of a team of anti-crisis managers, who should be selected from among the employees of regional administrations, in particular in the department of foreign relations, investment attraction and tourism and resorts; Department of Culture, Religions and Nationalities; information and internal policy management.

Here it is necessary to select specialists-experts in the areas of risky external events, to establish effective communication between them for the exchange of information, joint development of measures and organization of their implementation. The third stage should be the development of a mechanism for immediate response to the first signals of the crisis, establishing cooperation with other economic entities that form the tourist product (accommodation and catering establishments, tourist and excursion bureaus, cultural institutions, museums. At the same time, an important tool of preventive anti-crisis management is the creation of a tourism cluster with the participation of regional executive authorities. We believe that in crisis situations, by joining forces, the members of the tourism cluster will be able to respond to the inevitable changes. In Figure 3 we offer one of the options for the structure of the tourist cluster. At the final stage, we need to strengthen the reputation of the country, the region and the tourist attractions of our region. The tourist image must be created at all levels of government. In general, this work is being carried out in our country, but in times of high probability of repeated quarantine restrictions, this activity should be intensified.

3. Experimental Results .We propose to support the position of scientists to intensify tourism in Ukraine, that the economic development of our country in the long run will take place with possible economic downturns. Taking into account these assumptions, the directions of strategic prospects of moderate intensification of tourist activity of the country are formed.

Strategic prospects for intensifying tourism are as follows:

for the short term (2021-2022), the projected growth rate for indicators (gross regional product, number of foreign tourists) is 1.2, as the Ukrainian economy has been affected by the global crisis, which, in our opinion, will reduce the growth of these indicators;

for the medium term (2022-2024) the projected growth rate for the analyzed indicators is 1.5;

for the long-term period (2024-2026) the growth rate will be 2.0, which is 0.5% more than in Ukraine.

In accordance with the methodology, similar average annual growth rates for the analyzed periods are characteristic of the strategic prospects of institutional support for innovative development, nature management, environmental protection and interstate efforts in solving global environmental and economic problems.

In case of successful fulfillment of tasks of strategic prospects of a variant of moderate activation of tourism further it is expedient to pass to development of a strategic prospect of a variant of optimistic

activization of tourism having increased the forecast coefficient of average annual growth rate from 1,5 in 2022-2024 to 1,8, and in 2024-2026. from 2.0 to 2.3.

To diagnose the state of the tourism sector in Ukraine, it is advisable to use such a tool of strategic analysis as SWOT-analysis.

Thus, the above information allows us to identify those strengths that allow us to fully realize the potential of the region's tourism potential. It is obvious that the convenient geographical location will allow to effectively realize the possibilities of cross-border cooperation, recreational complex and integrate into European transport flows. However, the lack of skilled workers weakens the realization of these opportunities. Therefore, we should focus our efforts on the development and support of interstate transport arteries, the definition and observance of clear rules for private business, the development of educational centers for the training of specialists in the field of tourism.

The most threatening are the processes of demographic crisis and labor migration, which is aimed at the departure of the working population abroad. These threats completely offset such strengths as the availability of human resources and small business development. That is, in the absence of investment and support of private business, the available labor potential loses its qualification or goes abroad. Therefore, a package of laws and regulations should be developed that would stimulate foreign investment in the development of transport infrastructure and tourism. It can be concluded that the high energy dependence of the region and insufficient development of infrastructure have the most significant impact on the realization of the country's capabilities. Ukraine has significant potential for tourism, but it is worth overcoming existing obstacles and strengthening opportunities. Therefore, central and regional authorities should be the main driver of anti-crisis strategies to prevent the negative impact of crisis situations on tourism in the country.

Internal factors External factors	Strengths 1. Active activity of small and medium business in tourism. 2. Convenient location of the region at the intersection of highways. 3. Availability of unique natural resource potential. 4. Cultural and architectural heritage.	Weakness 1. Low investment attractiveness and innovation. 2. Inefficient development of agritourism. 3. Inefficient use of renewable energy. 4. Underdeveloped transport and tourist infrastructure. 5. Low income.
	Opportunities	SO WO
1. International transport corridor "west-east". 2. Cross-border relations. 3. Development of recreational tourist complex. 4. Development of the hotel sector. 5. Improving the business climate..	1. Development and support of interstate transport highways. 2. Development of educational centers in the field of tourism. 3. Support for private business in the field of tourism.	1. Intensify the process of using alternative energy sources, using the experience of EU countries. 2. Development of a tourist and recreational complex to attract labor potential and opportunities for cross-border cooperation.
Threats	ST	WT
1. Demographic crisis. 2. Labor migration of the population of the region. 3. Instability of legislation. 4. Fluctuations in exchange rates. 5. Quarantine restrictions	1. Stimulating the inflow of foreign investment in the field of international tourism and infrastructure. 2. Involvement of the working population in the development of small business with export orientation.	1. Protection of investment and innovation activities at the state level. 2. State support of agro and eco-tourism.

Fig 4. SWOT-analysis of tourism in one of the most attractive regions of Ukraine – Volyn region *

* Developed by the authors

4. Discussion and Conclusion .After the end of the crisis related to the COVID-19 pandemic, it is proposed to pay attention to consolidating Ukraine's tourist demand at the international level. In the modern market of tourist services there are global changes in tourist products, consumer needs and the general tourist model. A large number of improvements in the organization of tourism will be directed to the organization of virtual tourist routes, which in many countries around the world will remain after the crisis COVID-19.

In modern economic conditions, the tourism industry around the world is suffering as a result of measures to counter the COVID-19 pandemic. At the same time, the current situation should be considered not only as a problem, but also as an opportunity to bring the tourism sector in Ukraine to a qualitatively new level.

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รายนามผู้ทรงคุณวุฒิพิจารณาบทความ (Peer Review)

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บทความทุกเรื่องที่ตีพิมพ์เผยแพร่ได้ผ่านการพิจารณาทางวิชาการโดยผู้ทรงคุณวุฒิในสาขาวิชา (Peer review) ในรูปแบบไม่มีชื่อผู้เขียน (Double-blind peer review) อย่างน้อย 2 ท่าน

บทความที่ตีพิมพ์เป็นข้อค้นพบ ข้อคิดเห็นและความรับผิดชอบของผู้เขียนเจ้าของผลงานและผู้เขียนเจ้าของผลงาน ต้องรับผิดชอบต่อผลที่อาจเกิดขึ้นจากบทความและงานวิจัยนั้น ดังนั้นบทความที่ตีพิมพ์ได้ผ่านการตรวจสอบคำพิมพ์และเครื่องหมายต่าง ๆ โดยผู้เขียนเจ้าของบทความก่อนการรวมเล่ม

