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National Interest

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วารสารวิชาการผลประโยชน์แห่งชาติฉบับที่ 19 นี้ ได้จัดทำขึ้นระหว่างช่วงปีใหม่ไทย บรรณาธิการขออัญวยพรให้ผู้อ่านทุกท่านมีสุขภาพอนามัยที่แข็งแรง บรรลุความฝันที่ตนเองจะสร้างสรรค์ในปีนี้ และขอให้สันติภาพเกิดขึ้นในโลกอย่างแท้จริง

สำหรับเป้าหมายของวารสารวิชาการผลประโยชน์แห่งชาติในฉบับนี้ เป็นผลงานของนักวิชาการ 5 ท่าน

บทความแรก เกี่ยวกับขนาดของจีดีพีของเบรตตัน วูดส์เมื่อเข้าสู่โหมดสงคราม บทความนี้กล่าวถึงการเปลี่ยนแปลงของจีดีพี ที่เกิดขึ้นในช่วงสงคราม มุ่งเน้นไปที่ธรรมชาติของเศรษฐกิจรัสเซียที่เน้นการผลิตและทรัพยากรที่ไม่สามารถหมุนเวียนได้ สิ่งนี้แสดงให้เห็นถึงปัญหาในการใช้ จีดีพี เป็นวิธีเดียวในการวัดผลเศรษฐกิจ ยังแสดงให้เห็นถึงความสำคัญในการมีทรัพยากรและสินค้าที่ผู้คนต้องการอย่างต่อเนื่อง ในบริบทของการค้าระหว่างประเทศ บทความนี้ยังพูดถึงความสำคัญของอำนาจทางเศรษฐกิจด้วย ซึ่งสร้างสรรค์โดยนักวิชาการไทยซึ่งมีมุมมองด้านความดีทิวมีรัฐศาสตร์ และเศรษฐศาสตร์การเมืองที่แตกต่างจากชาติตะวันตก

บทความที่สอง เป็นผลงานของนักวิชาการชาวยุเครน เรื่องราวเกี่ยวกับแผนการการทุจริตทางวิชาการในกิจกรรมการตีพิมพ์ผลงานทางวิชาการและมาตรการป้องกันการทุจริตดังกล่าว การตรวจสอบความการศึกษาค้นคว้านี้มีวัตถุประสงค์เพื่อระบุและวิเคราะห์แผนการฉ้อโกงทางวิชาการที่เกี่ยวข้องกับการประพันธ์สิ่งพิมพ์ทางวิชาการ โดยใช้กระบวนการต่าง ๆ เช่น การวิเคราะห์ การสังเกต การสัมภาษณ์ และวิธีกราฟิก เพื่อระบุรูปแบบต่าง ๆ ที่นักวิชาการใช้เพื่อเพิ่มการตีพิมพ์ของพวกเขา ผู้เขียนได้สร้างรูปแบบแผนการฉ้อโกงทางวิชาการขึ้นที่ไม่มีมาก่อนพร้อมทั้งเสนอมาตรการแก่สถาบันอุดมศึกษา สถาบันวิชาการ คณะบรรณาธิการวารสาร และสำนักพิมพ์เอกชน การศึกษาค้นคว้านี้เน้นย้ำถึงภัยคุกคามของการใช้งานอย่างไม่สุจริตในเอกสารทางวิชาการในรูปแบบอิเล็กทรอนิกส์โดยทั้งสองบทความเป็นบทความวิจัย

ในขณะที่อีกสามบทความเป็นบทความวิชาการของนักวิชาการชาวยุเครนเกี่ยวกับพรรคการเมืองยูเครนในช่วงสงครามโดยผู้เขียนศึกษาพรรคการเมืองในบริบทของกฎอัยการศึก บทความนี้มุ่งเน้นไปที่ประเด็นหลักสี่ประการของกระบวนการทางการเมืองในยูเครนในปี 2022-2025 ได้แก่ การปราบปรามทางการเมืองและการห้ามพรรคการเมือง การล่าช้าการเลือกตั้ง และการเตรียมการสำหรับโครงการทางการเมืองใหม่ ๆ ผู้เขียนโต้แย้งว่าขอบเขตทางการเมืองของยูเครนถูกจำกัดลงอย่างไม่เป็นธรรม โดยห้ามพรรคการเมืองฝ่ายซ้าย และห้ามรวมแนวคิดของกลุ่มหัวรุนแรงฝ่ายขวาไว้ในอุดมการณ์ของรัฐอย่างเป็นทางการ การขัดขวางดังกล่าวทำให้มีความต้องการเพิ่มขึ้นในการปรับเปลี่ยนระบบการเมืองของยูเครน

บทความที่สี่เกี่ยวกับบุคลิกภาพและสื่อ: การสร้างเรื่องราวสงครามสมัยใหม่ งานชิ้นนี้ดังกล่าวผลกระทบของสื่อสมัยใหม่ต่อสงครามรัสเซีย-ยูเครนแสดงให้เห็นว่าภาพของศัตรูสามารถบิดเบือนความคิดเห็นของประชาชนได้อย่างไร เน้นย้ำความแม่นยำของนักข่าวในการรายงานความขัดแย้งและความรุนแรงในอนาคต นักข่าวต้องเสี่ยงไปพร้อม ๆ กับการยึดมั่นในมาตรฐานวิชาชีพเพื่อช่วยให้สังคมเข้าใจเหตุการณ์และสงครามที่ซับซ้อน ความเป็นอิสระของสื่อมวลชนและการปกป้องสิทธิมนุษยชนขึ้นอยู่กับการสนับสนุนนักข่าวและการเคารพผู้ที่เสี่ยงต่อชีวิต

บทความวิชาการชิ้นที่ห้า เกี่ยวกับการเปลี่ยนแปลงทางดิจิทัลของการศึกษา: ความท้าทาย โอกาส และกลยุทธ์การพัฒนา ผู้เขียนตรวจสอบวิวัฒนาการของการศึกษาผ่านวิธีการดิจิทัลเพื่อตอบสนองต่อความท้าทายระดับโลก เช่น การระบาดของโควิด-19 และความขัดแย้งทางทหาร การอภิปรายครอบคลุมถึงความท้าทายต่าง ๆ เช่น ช่องว่างทางดิจิทัล การสนับสนุนด้านเทคนิค ความรู้ด้านดิจิทัล และการพิจารณาด้านมนุษยธรรม บทความนี้เน้นย้ำถึงศักยภาพในการเปลี่ยนแปลงทางดิจิทัลผ่านการบูรณาการเทคโนโลยีคลาวด์ ปัญญาประดิษฐ์ และแพลตฟอร์มการเรียนรู้แบบปรับได้ จำเป็นต้องมีกลยุทธ์ที่ครอบคลุม ครอบคลุมถึงการปรับปรุงกฎระเบียบ การสนับสนุนนักการศึกษา ความสามารถด้านดิจิทัล และมาตรฐานแบบบูรณาการ งานวิจัยเน้นย้ำถึงความสำคัญของการนำเทคโนโลยีดิจิทัลมาใช้เพื่อยกระดับคุณภาพการศึกษา

สรุปแล้ว บทความในวารสารผลประโยชน์แห่งชาติฉบับที่ 19 จำนวน 5 เรื่องได้จัดสรรบทความนำเสนอผ่านการประเมินจากผู้ทรงคุณวุฒิที่มีประสบการณ์ในสาขาที่เกี่ยวข้องจากต่างประเทศ และในประเทศ

บรรณาธิการขอแจ้งให้ผู้อ่านผู้เขียนบทความรับทราบว่า วารสารวิชาการผลประโยชน์ได้ดำเนินการตามจรรยาบรรณว่าด้วยการแจ้งอัตราค่าธรรมเนียมการตีพิมพ์บทความ วารสารวิชาการผลประโยชน์แห่งชาติก่อนกองดำเนินการวารสารฯจะส่งบทความให้ผู้ทรงคุณวุฒิพิจารณบทความ (Peer Reviewers) จำนวน 3 ท่านและทางวารสารได้กำหนดนโยบายการอ้างอิงให้เป็นรูปแบบเดียวกัน

ผู้เขียนที่สนใจที่จะถ่ายทอดผลงานวิชาการ และผลงานวิจัยเกี่ยวกับภูมิรัฐศาสตร์ ภูมิเศรษฐกิจศาสตร์ นวัตกรรม และเทคโนโลยี สามารถศึกษาคำแนะนำในการเขียนได้ในท้ายวารสาร ซึ่งทางเรายินดีอย่างยิ่งที่จะพิจารณาผลงานในด้านนี้ เนื่องจากเป็นแนวทางวิชาการที่มีความต้องการอย่างมาก และที่สำคัญมีการพัฒนาอย่างรวดเร็ว จนทำให้แวดวงวิชาการปรับตัวอย่างมากในกระแสธารการเปลี่ยนแปลง โดยเฉพาะอย่างยิ่ง ในสถานการณ์การทหาร เศรษฐกิจแบบใหม่ อุดมการณ์ใหม่ เทคโนโลยีใหม่ ทุกสาขาที่นำมาใช้ เพื่อให้เกิดการก่อกองในทางวิชาการอย่างสร้างสรรค์ และใช้ฐานข้อมูลทางวิชาการของนักวิชาการจากยุโรปตะวันออก เอเชียโดยตรงในมุมมองที่แตกต่างกับ

ดร.จักรกฤษณ์ สิริริน

บรรณาธิการวารสารวิชาการผลประโยชน์แห่งชาติ

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The size of Bretton Woods' GDP is not the victor on the battlefield

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ABSTRACT

This article examines the changes in the size of GDP during the war and the availability of GDP under Bretton Woods, depending on the central bank's management and the price controls of raw materials. The Western elite struggled to control the Russian economy during the war due to the dollar ban. The Russian economy is production-orientated and relies on non-renewable resources. Geopolitics has a significant impact on the economy, and the decline of the industrial sector is a negative factor. Sanctions imposed on inaccurate hydrocarbon export forecasts highlight the limitations of measuring the economy using GDP alone. On the battlefield, the outcome depends on one side's ability to maintain a continuous supply of ammunition and financial resources. Similarly, a country's economic strength is determined by its capacity to provide essential goods, industrial products, and energy; engage in international trade; ensure reliable supply chains; and sustain itself in isolation.

KEYWORDS: Bretton Woods GDP, size of Bretton Woods' GDP , geopolitics, Non-renewable resources, War mode

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Introduction. According to the understanding of Anglo-Saxon economists, the gross domestic product (GDP) of the global economy is the economic power determinant. English-speaking economists say that the size of the world economy's gross domestic product (GDP) shows how powerful it is. Based on this idea, the economies of Anglo-Saxon countries are the main forces that drive the world economy. Due to the regular reporting of annual economic performance by international organizations like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the global community has adopted the psychological belief that these outcomes reflect the economic strength of each nation. Prior to the conflict between the West and Russia in Ukraine, the Pentagon resolved not to engage in negotiations with Russia, addressing the red line issue and the enhancement of NATO infrastructure in Ukraine before the conclusion of 2021. So, it looks like Western and US security agencies are figuring out that GDP can sometimes reflect how happy people are,

but the global scene cares more about resources and credibility. The economic sanctions aimed at dropping the ruble to around 120 rubles per dollar might just lead to a serious economic crisis and even famine in Russia, which could stir up some unrest and push for a new government to take over from the pro-Western one. Interestingly, since the sanctions kicked in, the ongoing military operation in Ukraine has turned into a bit of a boost for the Russian economy. Energy exports are a source of funding for the Russian economy, which is independent of the global economy. The real indicator of a country's growth is its share of global GDP. On the other hand, it has never been shown that smaller countries are less able to fight or resist the unipolar world order of the United States. The Russian economy can still provide strategic support for the war and the West. In the current situation, the United States wants to survive and be the winner, so it agrees to negotiate an end to the war with Russia and reduce its status to accept Russia's proposals. The question is, does the size of GDP when entering war mode depend on the survival of the state and the preparation of forces to gain superiority over the opponent? This article aims to analyse the change in the size of GDP when entering war mode and the preparation to enter war mode.

Methodology

1. The main way to compare statistical data is by showing differences or advantages using numbers related to different items, which helps identify the traits of the object being studied. The most important elements that can be compared are recognized as specific techniques that allow one to identify characteristics that are inherent to a particular object of statistical observation. The actual size of the object, event, or process being studied in its real-life context and how it changes over time in the social framework being used (Kiseleva et al., 2023, p.68). The ideas from the Anglo-Saxon school and Russian economics are compared to help identify different production sectors, measure national economic strength, use comparative analysis, and examine various parts of the production and service sectors in the national economy, including currency, production volume, and other characteristics of the top countries' economies, as well as how they maintain their leading position in the economic system.

2. Taking into account production statistics, commodity prices, the proportion of the economic structure, the meaning and consideration of vague concepts, basic rules and principles, problems, methods, origins, and understanding of the topic under study, dialectical and genetic approaches help to explain what something means and how it fits in the rules. Infrastructure helps other pursuits, including transportation, logistics, etc.

The following are the two categories of data sources:

1. Data collected from international agencies with global GDP data, such as the United States, China, Japan, Germany, Russia, and India, is compared between manufacturing and services sectors from 2022 to 2025.
2. Details gathered from books, articles, and other written works related to the problems being looked into, along with statistical studies of the arguments of manufacturing and service labour for the creation of value-added, economic statistics, and other factors.

Literature review

The evolution of the GDP concept as it appears in academic economics literature can be divided into two categories based on the work of classical political economists and the Bretton Woods financial system.

Table 1

Comparison of classical GDP and Bretton Woods GDP concepts.

Classic GDP	Bretton Woods GDP
Individual wealth determines a country's social status and economic potential. People assume that the amount of wealth and goods an individual accumulates determines their assessment of an individual's well-being (Anikin, 1979).	The volume of virtual economy-generated GDP is increasing, with capital shifting to areas yielding high returns. The transition from the gold standard to the paper dollar standard establishes a substantial financial market (Katasonov, 2018).
Adam Smith posited that the annual income, net income, and goods produced annually by individuals are indicative of their consumer preferences; this is the activity that generates the annual product of labour and land (Stolyarova, 1993, pp.231-232).	The Bretton Woods system, established after the Cold War, made the dollar a reserve currency without commodities or gold backing and used it to measure GDP in dollars. It created funds, stock markets, and money circulation technology but focused on production and finance. Central bank interest rates controlled the value of money but did nothing to stimulate global growth (Suwan-achariya, 2025).
Marx (1987) The creation of tangible goods and services for personal and business use contributes to economic growth and diversity, as well as the integration of people, goods and services, labour resources, the workforce, and the ways in which people interact with each other and the economy.	Virtualization of the economy replaces real production with pictures, titles, and simulations. This changes real production by creating fake capital in the form of shares and other derivative financial instruments that Marx, Engels, Hilferding, and Keynes came up with (Sazhina, 2012).
Kuznets proposed that GDP is a tool for macroeconomic analysis, focusing on the	The financial economy enables the economy, particularly the US economy, to function in an

Classic GDP	Bretton Woods GDP
improvement of industries and the creation of differential value-added— the nationality of the	environment of constant demand, resulting in a system of goods that consumers desire. This
factors of production used to determine the market value of all final goods and services produced(Gargola ,2019).	creates a “distortion” in which a significant portion of the economy exists by stimulating demand and printing large amounts of money with no effect on the economy(Kremen & Ilyin, 2009).
GDP measures economic development, with violations affecting profits and industrial sectors. Economic types include increasing and decreasing returns, with commercial success influenced by technological advancement(Reinert, 2011, p.38, 109).	The real economy suffers from the virtual economy’s production of virtual goods, causing global financial market turmoil. The United States, the primary hub for virtual processes, distributes real goods from the periphery to the centre(Ryazanov, 2016)

Note. Summary based on the author’s comprehension

The GDP table shows how the presentation of economic size is moving towards a financial sector consistent with the Bretton Woods model. The financial sector stimulates growth in Western economies, so GDP calculations do not focus on the value of labour in production or tangible goods, especially non-substitutable ones, but rather on the value of goods and services. Of course, we cannot calculate the total labour cost for each step in the production process. Russkova et al.(2022, pp.8–9) points out that the calculation of costs for the middle and downstream parts of the product supply chain for producing final goods to meet social needs is rather uncertain. How might the size of GDP from the Bretton Woods system affect the transformation of a country’s economy into a war economy, and what does the state’s power during a war depend on? There is not much research on this topic.

Results

1) Change the size of the GDP when going into war mode.

The annual statistical reports from international groups like the World Bank and the IMF are used to compare the sizes of the GDPs of Western countries. The West often uses reasoning such as claiming their GDP constitutes 60% of the world’s total, compared to Russia’s 1.5%.The world’s GDP is 40 times that of the Western world. Russia is no match for us because we are 40 times stronger(Vechernyaya Moskva, 2024).Andrew Liliko told a skewed story about how big Russia’s military might be when he said that Russia’s economy is only 85% the size of Italy’s and that the country has 140 million people.The case relies on the GDP figures, although these figures frequently serve as propaganda or present an overly narrow perspective(Bosnic,2024).

Table2

Size of GDP in countries

G D P R a n k i n g b y Country (nominal)			GDP Ranking by Country (PPP) (Billions)			G l o b a l GDP(%Share,2024)
Rank	Country	2024	Rank	Country	2024	
1	U n i t e d States	\$25.43 trillion	1	China	41,303.81	19.6
2	China	\$14.72 trillion	2	USA	26,888.91	12.7
3	Japan	\$4.25 trillion	3	India	20,547.42	9.7
4	Germany	\$3.85 trillion	4	Russia	7,581.82	3.6
5	India	\$3.41 trillion	5	Japan	6,310.33	3.0
6	U n i t e d Kingdom	\$2.67 trillion	6	Indonesia	5,920.25	2.8
7	France	\$2.63 trillion	7	Germany	5,762.32	2.7
8	Russia	\$2.24 trillion	8	Brazil	5,479.48	2.6
9	Canada	\$2.16 trillion	9	France	4,415.58	2.1
10	Italy	\$2.04 trillion	10	U n i t e d Kingdom	4,4146.90	2.0

*Note.*From *GDP Rankings:2024* (<https://www.worldeconomics.com/Rankings/Economies-By-Size.aspx>);*Top 15 Countries by GDP in 2024* (<https://globalpeoservices.com/top-15-countries-by-gdp-in-2024/>).In the domain public.

In the market value of dollars,the US and Western countries' GDP is much larger than Russia's due to its focus on consumption and access to direct consumption in all sectors of the economy. Domestic and international transactions depend on the dollar, but geopolitical conflicts make quantity calculations difficult.China,India,and Russia have an advantage in GDP based on purchasing power parity.The supply chain's repeated calculations limit the volume of transactions and overestimate dollar value compared to local currencies.More product parts increase costs and GDP.Effectively, GDP only shows payments.Russia constitutes 3.6% of global GDP,representing 35% of the GDP of the United States. Despite being only 35% of the US GDP,Russia's potential for producing physical goods in a confrontation with the US is significant.Russia's economic output is half that of the US, including its sizeable shadow economy,which accounts for thirty percent of Russia's GDP.The US now accounts for less than 15% of world GDP.Most previous Western studies have primarily concentrated on consulting and financial services,which are intangible assets that contribute only a small portion of the overall economy.These studies have ignored the source of GDP figures and implicitly relied on Western data agencies.

Geopolitical conflict forces one to rethink supply chains and negotiating power; thus, it is like a crust cracking of the earth. With more than 70%, the West rules the service industry; the digital economy is starting to take center stage in the post-industrial era. Developed countries concentrate on information flow covering manufacturing,collecting,sorting,accumulation, transmission,storage,and transportation.With China and Russia helping greatly to GDP,the digital age will alter upbringing and education.Individuals psychology and way of thinking have to change with the digital economy.Although industrial production—which China and Russia both excel at—accounts for more than 30% of GDP,drilling,oil,gas,coal, metallurgy,defence,and food mostly contribute to Russia’s GDP. Western countries prioritise the service sector, which accounts for 60–70% of GDP,while the industrial sector is secondary.Oil- producing countries,such as Europe,see the service sector as an international division of labour.The United States possesses a substantial service and financial sector,with a GDP inferior to that of China and Russia.Russians perceive and denounce the Russian economy as feeble, notwithstanding its industrial output.Industrial production involves the production of components, parts, and semi-finished products using specialised tools and labour. European elites consider the country’s economy to be dependent on industry or processing as backward and unprogressive.




Figure 1.

Proportions of economic sectors in the gross domestic product (GDP) in selected countries in 2023

Note. From “Proportions of economic sectors in GDP in selected countries 2023,” by Aaron O’Neill, 2025 (<https://www.statista.com/statistics/264653/proportions-of-economic-sectors-in-gross-domestic-product-gdp-in-selected-countries/>) In the public domain.

Table 3

The significant contribution of the Russian economy to global GDP

Draws attention to the upstream and midstream supply chain connectivity of food sourcing and products.	Over 30% of the "fertilizer basket" in Europe comes from Russian fertilizer exports.
It is the only country that can supply petroleum, gas, tungsten, titanium, aluminium, uranium, and rare earth minerals to any other country.	Approximately 19.5% of global grain exports are under Russian control.
Russian gas is essential to the survival of European industry. It is an important player in the world of raw materials, and countries that consume it may face serious difficulties if there are supply disruptions	It exports more nickel than any other country (20.4%). Products made of semifinished steel (18.8%), 30% palladium and 40% enriched uranium
Nearly one-third of the natural resources currently in Russian reserves are used by the global economy as raw materials for transportation and industrial processing.	The country is well-positioned to provide low-cost raw materials, raw material processing, and transportation logistics benefits to China and Europe.

Note. The author's summary and collection.

Countries that trade with Russia will gain from having enough food, agriculture, military and energy sources, which will boost their competitiveness and help them catch up with their Western rivals if they wish to be economically strong. The Russian economy has been growing consistently in spite of constant sanctions. The situation has improved as the stability of the industrial and service sectors increases GDP. Although exports bring income for the Russian government, Russia's energy problems have more effect on European nations. Economic advisers to Western allies believe Russia's economy is poor and declining, ranking 11th among economies with a GDP of \$1.5-1.6 trillion. The impact of sanctions on Russia is expected to hasten its demise, with the IMF and World Bank claiming that Russia's economy is 10-15 times less robust than leading economies. A six-month suspension of Russian gas imports could improve regulatory compliance and the effectiveness of sanctions on the Russian economy. Russia's economy will suffer as long as it relies on oil and gas revenues. If the Western economy can withstand at least six months, the Russian economy will collapse by the autumn of this year. However, sanctions have not yet destroyed the Russian economy, and the policy of focusing on Russia is preparing for a major war involving Russia, which will necessitate the transfer of resources for military operations, putting the economy under significant stress. The management of national economies, which often coincides with state expansion, is a major concern during conflicts. The nature, scale and duration of military operations determine military and political objectives. The European Union has borne the brunt of the war with Russia through sanctions,

increased military spending, and arms supplies from the United States. However, such analyses neglect access to tangible assets and productive resources. Russia has reduced its energy supplies to Europe, causing the country to shift its focus to non-raw material production and increase the value of its domestic products.

Table 4

Analysing the relative economic might of warring states.

The economic dominance of Western nations	The economic strength of Russia
The underused dollar system in the United States hinders Western industries' access to low-priced resources, leading to budgetary issues during war, despite a real GDP of \$15 trillion and 52% dollarization.	Russia, with over one-third of global raw materials, a stable financial position, and a well-resourced economy, requires disconnection from global markets for industrial revival and an independent economy ("It became clear why, after the USSR's", 2025).
It was hard for Western industries to get their hands on cheap resources, which hurt their ability to stay in business. These things happened because Western businesses couldn't get to the same places where they could get cheap materials.	Russia had a stable economy, more than a third of the world's raw materials, and enough resources to run its own business with help from the government during the war. But it was necessary to pull away from the global market to get industries back on track and build an independent economy ("It became clear why, after the USSR's", 2025).
Altering the trajectory of international trade is challenging due to the disparity between high-tech products manufactured by Western nations and those produced by Russia.	Russia's commodities, primarily raw materials and energy, are adaptable and account for 20% of global foreign goods trade. It regulates Asian raw material transportation to Europe.
Western accounts and interest-bearing bond investments support currency through foreign reserves, but frozen reserves are no longer needed, raising liquidity issues in Europe and limiting SWIFT's services.	The Increased currency supply, particularly monetary and commodity-valued goods, can enhance the Russian ruble's conversion if domestic producers create the currency value.

The economic dominance of Western nations	The economic strength of Russia
The Union's GDP growth rate is merely 1.9%, whereas the BRICS nations exhibit nearly 5% growth. The BRICS nations possess a 36.7% share of the global economy, surpassing the G7's	Russia is a prospective target for sanctions owing to the expanse of its territory and the agricultural land it holds. The drilling of oil wells will enhance crude oil production and supply additional
thirty percent share. Implementing sanctions will prove difficult without the cooperation of India and China.	minerals, facilitating the growth of the domestic manufacturing sector.
Problems with social security and a lack of support for defence are caused by Germany's military budget, which accounts for 2% of the country's current gross domestic product. This budget is the source of the problems	The Russian government is using tax breaks and long-term savings programs to attract private investment in the financial sector, demonstrating that increased GDP spending doesn't hinder economic growth (Dokuchaev & Trushina ,2024).

Note. Summary based on the author's comprehension

Western sanctions have caused Russia to shift its focus from extracting oil and gas to manufacturing products other than raw materials. Policies that replace imports have also caused a flood of Russian goods to enter markets that were mostly filled with Western goods before. The war between Russia and the West has resulted in rising prices and gas shortages, which have unintended consequences for European economies. The Bretton Woods model of GDP growth suggests that the war has resulted in lower industrialization levels, as well as lower electricity consumption. By adopting our currencies, Russia, China, India, and other countries have been able to improve their relations with one another. It's bad for the West that things are going badly in Ukraine right now. If things keep going badly, the West might stop supporting the country as much. Moreover, the five regions that were formerly a part of Ukraine are currently under the military control of Russia.

2)Preparing for the War

For national defence, war production is dependent on economic resources. These resources enhance potential, mobilization readiness, and stability during times of active conflict. For this reason, it is necessary to adopt organizational, regulatory, legal, financial, economic, technical, and technological measures. For the purpose of coping with the war, the state declares a state of emergency and proceeds to restructure the economy. The processes of reorganising management, implementing measures, and adjusting the economy to adapt to the conditions of war are all components of economic mobilization. Access to resources and the size of the budget are both critical factors. Countries like the United States rely on revenue from goods sales, while Russia has global influence and can sell resources at any price.

Table 5

Comparison of wartime support forces readiness.

Parameters	Western countries	Russia
Defence budget	European countries that spend 2 per percent	Russia spends 7 per cent.
Resource and Technology Base	Despite a lack of resources, the military industry is not in war mode.	It has an abundance of energy and mineral resources to build weapons and factories.
Combat support requires rapid response.	It is up to foreign companies and their shareholders to make a decision based on the return.	Based on government orders
Modifying and modifying the establishment profile's attributes	The component assembly proved difficult. With thousands of components coming from different parts sources all around the world, there was plenty of space for final assembly. Long shipping meant delays in obtaining assistance.	Take advantage of the traditional military-industrial complex by shifting some industries to engage in the assembly of equipment such as drones through three-shift operations, building defense structures and other critical infrastructure.
Repercussions	The elevated expenses stem from the monopolistic market structure of the economy. To attain the production phase, it is crucial to sustain long-term orders spanning decades(Mayor grom,2023) to achieve financial equilibrium.	The incorporation of supplementary products mitigates disparities in certain production sectors.In 2023, tank production will escalate sevenfold, whereas passenger car and freight car production will grow 1.7 and 1.4 times, respectively(Reporter,2023). Moreover,additional production sectors essential for fulfilling the requirements of economic development will also augment domestic demand

Parameters	Western countries	Russia
Mobilization	Producing in small quantities remains challenging due to market mechanisms, necessitating budget allocation for cost-effectiveness and safety. The product was procured from the United States.	Expertise in coordinating resources and strategising by governmental entities to address deficiencies quantified in physical units.
Circulation of commodity money	It circulates in the United States as military-industrial labour (taxes, wages, and profits) from corporations and certain military support labour in Poland.	Businesses in the country receive all circulating money, which includes taxes, wages, and corporate profits. Taxes are remitted directly to the Russian budget. Salaries will rise, thereby expediting the augmentation of the supply of consumable goods

Note. Summary derived from the author's comprehension

The United States depends on the sale of goods to assist oil-dependent nations during economic conflicts. The European Union's decision to stop buying gas from Russia has limited Western control over resources. The move has given Russia the power to set prices for other goods and trade them at lower prices. Russia's vast natural resources, which include oil, gas, and minerals, make it a secure location for military production. The defence industry significantly contributes to the economy. Every year, billions of dollars enter the pockets of ordinary citizens. In contrast to financial instruments and services, Russia's economy is based on raw materials and self-sufficiency in defence technologies. The emphasis is on the value of infrastructure in maintaining economic stability, as well as the importance of food, water, and energy during wartime (Novichkov, 2022). The government did not take any significant action during the war, and gas and food prices increased. These factors made it hard for the U.S. to get the money it needed to fight Russia and grow its economy. Countries that can handle sanctions have economies that are mostly based on energy, with big tech companies leading the way. Not having solid financial and economic forecasts made it tough for the U.S. and its allies to come up with effective plans to put pressure on Russia and isolate it internationally. The division between allied and adversarial countries complicated supply chains and raised concerns about the role of the US dollar in the global financial system. Russia's survival depended more on its industrial and raw material sectors than on the inflated services sector.

3) The weak GDP of the Bretton Woods system.

The Bretton Woods monetary system, based on US power and gold independence, has weakened and become irrelevant, as have dollar inflation, energy crises, and leadership crises. Russia's power has dwindled due to its dependence on foreign food and capital, along with declining domestic sales and consumption. The country's sanctions-resistant economy is built around its energy sector, which is led by

large technology companies. The lack of accurate financial and economic forecasts has made it difficult for the United States and its allies to carry out their plans to eliminate Russia through economic pressure and international isolation. The division of the world into friendly and hostile nations has complicated supply chains and raised concerns about the value of the US dollar in the global financial system. The US Treasury has issued more government bonds, raising concerns about the country's ability to repay debts. Russia's survival depends on the industrial and raw material sectors rather than the artificially inflated service sector.

Table 6

The financial and production sectors of Bretton Woods are compared.

Parameters	Financial sector	Production sector
fluctuation	The capital markets exhibit significant volatility, with growth characterised by a capital-to-production ratio of 4/5 relative to consumption, leading to pronounced fluctuations.	The production process of goods and services is generally stable, barring short-term fluctuations associated with technological availability.
feature	It is impossible for circulation to generate value without the use of alchemy. The rapid deindustrialization process started with the transfer of production capacities to countries such as China, Southeast Asia, and other regions.	The exchange of goods and services in the real sector, also known as the production process, is accompanied by the production of value, also known as real assets.
Asset Limits	Because it is intangible, virtual, and always replaceable, it can't work on its own and needs different parts of the economy, like technology, financial tools, and scientific knowledge.	It can be quantified in physical terms but is irreplaceable or has minimal substitutes for circulation in value creation, as exemplified by oil, gas, timber, minerals, fertilisers, and labour.
Encouraging positive infrastructure	The country relies heavily on the digital network and energy support system, logistics technology	National monopoly of location.

Parameters	Financial sector	Production sector
Production capacity	Depending on labour segregation in supply chains for products in cases of geopolitical concern and resource scarcity.	Increasing the production workforce and reaching the objectives of the national economic program as well as international cooperation with friendly nations clearly show this.
Consumption's expansion	It supports unlimited demand; thus, the building of a global governance system is time-limited since no more money can be printed.	Using their technology and economic sovereignty, they will help boost production labour.
Inflation rate	Inflation is zero or close to zero, so indexing social payments to the level of inflationary law means that a much larger proportion of the population will have to rely on social assistance than in Russia. If inflation reached 5%, it would be a complete disaster, with no food or shelter.	Nonmonetary factors influencing inflation include consumer behaviour and import costs, as well as Western nations' plans to cap raw material prices.

Note. Developed by the author.

Due to inaccurate forecasting, the United States of America and its allies have been unable to successfully implement a strategy to destroy Russia through the use of economic pressure and international isolation. With this, access to fundamental resources has been hampered, and questions have been raised about the value of the United States dollar within the context of the global financial system. The increased issuance of government bonds has raised concerns about the United States Treasury's ability to repay its debts. The interest rates set by the Federal Reserve of the United States are intended to slow the expansion of the global economy.

Table 7

Dimensions of GDP Partner Cooperation

Parameter	GDP US	GDP: China,Russia,Iran
The partners' GDP size	25%	= 18+2+2=22%.

*Note.*The author's summary and collection.

The Russian economy is an important player in global energy and commodity markets. Western countries, particularly those in the European Union, are concerned that their industries will not recover unless they can replace depleted resources with cheap ones. Given that the West accounts for more than 70% of its GDP in services, which manage spending and drive economic growth, the financial sector must develop its seventh-generation technologies that are not reliant on Russian energy sources. Russia plays a big part in the world's food and energy markets, so it has been able to change the direction of trade and bring in new goods, which has made oil prices go down. The EU's ban on Russian oil has increased Moscow's dependence on China and India. By creating a "shadow tanker fleet" and using "black market" strategies, Russia has been able to get better terms on its maritime insurance. Countries such as China and India have expressed strong support for trade cooperation and sanctions relief.

Discussion.

1.A country's GDP does not determine its war power.

The assertion that Russia's gross domestic product (GDP) is ten times lower than that of the United States suggests either a deliberate attempt to influence public opinion or a significant disparity in economic knowledge. This assertion implies that opposition against the United States is pointless and that capitulation is unavoidable. Different industries, such as finance, real estate, business, consulting, advertising, and law, contributed a sizeable portion of GDP in the United States during the 20th century. They accomplished this by controlling the social product consumption or distribution. Ponyatnyyefinansy (2025),While Western statistics seem to hide the problems of corruption, inequality, and dishonesty existing in the present market system, Western economists are developing theories about economic growth. It is imperative to understand that without the required electricity and power for important data processing, information technology—also known as digital solutions—cannot run as it should. The link should be limited to the manufacturing sector to enable quick and affordable procurement of raw resources, compromising the national economy, and reducing labour output. The conditions listed could lead to a smaller workforce and make it harder to keep up a strong military or use proactive global strategies to protect national interests. In times of war, a state's geopolitical status can be significantly influenced by its access to raw materials, which can either bolster or erode its position. Economies are particularly susceptible to fluctuations in the prices of raw materials worldwide due to the nature of extractive industries. Substantial quantities can influence the economy, either accelerating or decelerating its pace. Conversely, mineral resources are irreplaceable; therefore, geopolitical

stability is contingent upon seamless access to raw materials. Due to a lack of raw materials, developed nations have had to move their production to different areas. The effective handling of raw materials should be in harmony with geopolitical management strategies (Komleva, 2013). This idea, not the GDP framework or the Western GDP identity, is what will change the outcome on the battlefield. It's not a good idea to think that the service sector can help prepare for war because it only shows money and not real assets, as shown by the fact that it makes up over 70% of GDP. At a time when geopolitical tensions are high, we can't turn financial technologies, debt instruments, and technological capabilities into things that cause conflict.

Entering the war mode, the textbook definition of GDP should not include the service sector since it is not relative, and its use to gain an advantage on the battlefield is just academic propaganda. Still, a storable, heatable, movable object is only valuable when sold and used. Frequent additions to the monetary value of the transaction will distort the result. The last good generated is the result of labour that leaves the manufacturing line and moves into the unproductive consumption stage. This approach enables a reasonable estimate of the goods generated through household and government expenditures on goods and services, as well as total expenditure on final consumption. Based on the labour theory of value, which holds that all labour costs in an economy are finally directed towards the production of goods that satisfy the needs of its members or final goods, GDP—also known as production—is computed mostly. The correct computation of the total labour costs by aggregating them at every level of production determines the exact amount of product generated. Though these rates are valid only after adjustments, excluding the expenses at the previous levels, the prices of products reflect the market's evaluation of labour costs at every level of production (Russkova et al., 2022, pp.7-9). Thus, using transactions, we estimate the GDP of the US industrial sector. We should deduct that figure from the national GDP. Consumer expenditure on goods and services currently determines 14.82% of the US GDP. Two-thirds come from real estate and health care; the remaining one-third comes from consumer goods. From food and clothes to cars and home appliances, overall consumer spending makes about 68% of the GDP. Government expenditure (18%) and investment (18%) are the next highest indicators. By year's end, the US budget deficit will top \$6.6 trillion—a record high (Smirnova, 2024). Including 30% of the Russian economy, the actual production of the Russian economy is 65% of the GDP of the United States—about \$10 trillion. Still, this isn't really significant.

Vechernyaya Moskva (2024), since the GDP of Russia mainly consists of sectors including oil, gas, coal, metallurgy, defence, and food. People are more interested in commodities; thus, the defence sector is suffering in Europe. Even if Europe has enough money, the economy cannot instantly turn to the defence sector. Russia has enough military technology and mineral resources and can establish its own military industry; thus, unlike other nations, Russia possesses the capability to produce all of its military equipment independently in times of conflict. Obyasnyayu Na Pal'tsakh (2021) argues that conflicts between resource-rich nations are more favourable than those involving affluent Wall Street traders. He also says that the size of a country's economy doesn't really affect how a war turns out. Examples include the Taliban, Vietnam, North Korea, Iran, and the Soviet Union. Despite Chechnya's GDP representing merely a small portion of Russia's, the spectre of military hostilities persists over the years. Furthermore, the expansive nature of the

US GDP prevents it from swiftly transitioning out of a wartime framework and ensuring its prosperity .The actual US GDP, estimated at 15 trillion, amounts to less than one-sixth when divided by 95. This means the GDP per capita is relatively low. Because of this, it is not possible to keep the global dollar system going in this situation(Khazin,2024). Should the United States economy endeavour to maintain the Bretton Woods system, it would inevitably lead to a rapid decline in the manufacturing sector.

2.The Bretton Woods GDP is based on a unipolar world

The Bretton Woods GDP used as a calculation is based on the principle that all natural resources have been owned since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Labour and capital are under the control of foreign financiers. Western global projects have monopolised the losses, making access to capital challenging. The economic model turns the extra money into added value. The financial model serves to distribute capital. Printing money is similar to taxing others, causing prices of goods to rise. Therefore, there is a problem. People with cash are going to lose value(Divannyypolitikan,2022). The flow of trade value and services is determined by the Bretton Woods financial GDP environment of the country's monetary zones, controlling production zones under the dollar transaction and the central bank's supervision of interest rates, inflation and stimulating consumption as long as it relies on political and military power. Investors continue to focus on the American market, with the dollar serving as the reserve currency. The Russian economic model is built in such a way that it is completely dependent on the functioning of the Western market and Western capital, and this not only makes the sale of minerals and primary resources of Russia completely dependent but also reduces the opportunity to use the same products. The impact of Russia on the world's GDP is 2%. The resilience of the Russian economy depends on the misunderstanding of the size and importance of the Russian economy. Since the country's small economy cannot withstand the size of Western nations that are several tens of times larger, the ruble supply problem in Russia is mainly caused by the inflow of foreign currency from Western countries. Russia needs more dollars and euros to strengthen its economy; it can get these by selling resources or letting foreign corporations operate oil fields. The Bretton Woods system distributes income in line with surplus. Europe has a competitive advantage over other world economies since its economy shows a surplus of money. This leads to inflation, which lowers non-Western city residents' savings and forces non-Western producers to battle yearly needs. Although Western products are less easily available to Russians than they are to Western citizens, Western nations have the privilege of letting the Russian economy purchase goods and services generated using Russian resources. Most Russians still lack the money to cover their basic needs even if prices are rising and the economy is expanding since items must be produced or acquired before being paid in dollars or rubles. The Western elites, devoid of economic




Figure2.

Gross Domestic Product of Bretton Woods

Note. The author adapted Divannyypolitikan's work(2022).

knowledge, hold the belief that if they don't sell certain items to the European Union, the Russian economy will collapse. Without Russian energy, Europe will suffer still more. Should they stop manufacturing some products, their economy might suffer since purchasing from elsewhere reduces their competitiveness due to price variations. Given Russia's GDP makes up about 2% of the global economy, this is a narrow-minded and propagandist perspective of Western economists. Unquestionably, Russia is one of the major providers of resources; hence, there is nothing that could replace these quantities in the medium term or for some products over the long term. The penalties for the erroneous forecasts of hydrocarbon exports gently highlight the inadequacy of measuring the state of the economy based just on GDP since, on the battlefield, the outcome (production volume) depends on the ability of one side to survive with a constant supply of ammunition and financial resources, and the ability of the nation to supply essential industrial goods and energy determines its economic strength.

The low degree of economic knowledge among the Western elites causes them to think that should Russia be banned from exporting specific goods to the European Union, the Russian economy would collapse. Still, Europe would suffer more without Russian energy. Stopping some products could trigger a recession, as purchasing resources from outside sources reduces the competitiveness of specific goods due to price differences. Western economists have a narrow-minded and propagandistic viewpoint because they overlook the complexity of global resource dependencies and focus too narrowly on GDP figures like Russia's 2% contribution to the world economy. Some products, in terms of volume, are not replaceable in

the long or medium term. The sanctions on the inaccurate forecasts of hydrocarbon exports subtly emphasize the inadequacy of measuring the state of an economy based solely on GDP because, on the battlefield, the outcome (production volume). Edkiy natr ZZ(2022) depends on the ability of one side to survive with a continuous supply of ammunition and financial resources and the economic strength of a country is determined by its ability to supply essentials, industrial goods, and energy; trade on international markets; the reliability of supply chains; and its ability to survive in isolation. Russia can provide food, energy, housing, and social services; develop its businesses; keep a contemporary military; and advance science and technology, for instance. The Russian economy can replace the resources under its adversary's control. Supply routes are not under control by the enemy, their general size and economic power notwithstanding, whether one is working alone or in tandem with allies. During economic crises, the US depends on the sale of goods to help oil-dependent nations. Because the European Union stopped buying gas from Russia, the West no longer has as much control over resources. This means that Russia can set prices for other goods and trade resources at low prices. In contrast to financial instruments and the service sector, Russia's economy is centered on raw materials and defense technologies. Because of the US government's inaction during the conflict, it was challenging to secure the funding required to combat Russia and expand its economy. The division between friendly and hostile nations raised concerns about the US dollar's place in the global financial system, and also made supply chains more difficult

Conclusion. People often judge a country's economic strength of its non-product-based dollar and the size of its GDP under the Bretton Woods system, which often leads to high inflation. However, a country's real value lies in its nonrenewable resources, like minerals and hydrocarbons. Furthermore, the size of a country's economy is influenced by its location with trade and exports, as well as geopolitics as a strategic asset. When geopolitics improve, exports may become more sustainable and efficient. Conversely, when geopolitics deteriorate, industrial sectors may contract. Economic growth raises people's awareness of politics and society in a unique way that GDP cannot: by demonstrating a nation's wealth, power, preparedness for war, or capacity for retaliation. The importing class's ability to persuade a country that its economy depends on its resources and that it can easily change its development path in response to sanctions is a strong sign of that country's political, military, and strategic strength. Furthermore, they must advocate self-determination-orientated self-insurance. Technological progress, development path, and resource reserves, especially those that can't be replaced, have a big impact on a country's power. The Anglo-Saxon model's bad economic decisions come from the Bretton Woods view, which says that bigger economies should force smaller ones to do what they want. However, there is a lack of knowledge about what makes a good national leader and the subtleties of geopolitical capabilities.

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The schemes of the academic dishonesty in scientific publication activities and measures to prevent them

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ABSTRACT

In the conditions of open access to electronic versions of scientific materials (articles, books, dissertations), a great threat has appeared regarding their dishonest use. In addition, some authors of publications use unscrupulous schemes to increase and speed up their authorship. The purpose of the study is to identify and analyze schemes of academic dishonesty related to the authorship of scientific publications and to determine measures to prevent them separately for different subjects. The following methods were used to realize the purpose of the research: analysis, observation, interviewing – to identify various schemes of academic dishonesty, which are used by scientists to increase the number of their own publications, or for other reasons; graphic method – for their schematic representation. The author considers nine schemes of academic dishonesty, which were formed on the basis of the analysis of personal pages of scientists and articles in scientific journals, observations of scientific activities, and interviewing. The reasons and goals of their occurrence are indicated. A laconic symbolic name was selected for each scheme: «Migration», «Voualization», «Resection», «Intervention», «Extraction», «Cooperation», «Compilation», «Accumulation», «Evacuation». In order to prevent manifestations of academic dishonesty, a number of measures are proposed separately for higher education institutions and scientific institutions, as well as editorial boards of journals and private publishing houses, where materials are submitted for publication.

KEYWORDS: academic integrity, academic dishonesty, schemes of academic dishonesty, scientific publishing activity, scientific publications

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1. Introduction. According to Art. 42 of the Law of Ukraine «On Education», «academic integrity is a set of ethical principles and rules defined by law, which must be guided by the participants of the educational process during learning, teaching and carrying out scientific (creative) activities in order to ensure trust in the results of training and/or scientific (creative) achievements» (Legislation of Ukraine, 2017). However, in the conditions of open access to electronic versions of scientific materials (articles, books, dissertations, etc.), the possibility of their free copying, a great threat has appeared regarding the unscrupulous use of fragments of texts both by students of education and scientific-pedagogical, pedagogical and scientific workers. In particular, facts of such misconduct have become widespread: academic plagiarism, self-plagiarism, fabrication, falsification, deception.

Undoubtedly, the image of scientific-pedagogical, pedagogical and scientific workers is an integral part of the image of higher education institutions or scientific institutions in which they work. Therefore, the participation of educators and scientists in various schemes of academic dishonesty negatively affects both their personal image and the image of the organizations where they work.

If we focus attention on the authorship of scientific publications, then the following definition-antithesis can be formed here: academic dishonesty in scientific publishing activities, as opposed to academic integrity, is a violation of ethical principles and rules that should be guided by scientific-pedagogical, pedagogical and scientific workers during proceedings scientific (creative) activity in order to ensure trust in scientific (creative) achievements.

2. Literature Review. Note that the majority of modern scientific studies consider violations of the principles of academic integrity by students. Given this situation, it is also appropriate to describe and analyze the schemes of academic dishonesty related to the authorship of scientific publications, and to determine measures to prevent them. After all, as stated in the Code of Ethics of a Ukrainian scientist, «only a real creative contribution to scientific work can serve as a criterion of authorship» (Legislation of Ukraine, 2009).

Among Ukrainian scientists, we note the following articles on academic dishonesty: studied the problematic aspects of the implementation of the culture of academic integrity in the Ukrainian institution of higher education (Karahodina et al., 2019); considered the general methods of preventing academic dishonesty of students during knowledge testing in the conditions of distance education (Miniailova, 2022); highlighted the typical means of preventing and combating academic and scientific dishonesty in the 20 best universities in Australia (Polotska, 2018); established the peculiarities of the examination of scientific texts for the detection of academic dishonesty (Romakh, 2021); considered the problem of dishonest behavior of students in the process of learning and performing scientific research work (Varava, 2020).

Academic dishonesty was also investigated by scientists from other countries. In general, publications on the given topic can be grouped according to a number of features.

Regarding academic dishonesty in specific cities or countries around the world: psychometric properties of the academic dishonesty questionnaire in English students in Cuenca, Ecuador (Arellano & Tornero, 2023); the impact of student-faculty interaction on academic dishonesty on the example of a community college in California (Bluestein, 2015); cases and types of violations in one Czech

university, characteristics of students that predispose them to withdraw, some reasons for this, measures that were taken as a solution to the identified problem (Dannhoferova et al., 2022); elementary school teachers' attitudes and behaviors toward academic integrity and dishonesty in the United States (DiPauro, 2022); academic dishonesty in the context of evaluating students' dishonest practices and teachers' academic dishonesty during education on the example of Slovakia (Ferkova & Zacharova, 2023); factors associated with university professors' perception of academic dishonesty among dental students from two universities in the capital of Peru (Ladera-Castaneda et al., 2023); typology, frequency, prevalence, level of academic fraud and its causes from the perspective of students of a higher education institution in the city of Barranquilla (Martinez et al., 2015); behaviors, attitudes and values related to academic integrity reported by Croatian students in higher education institutions (Petрак & Bartolac, 2014); academic misconduct among nutrition students at a public university in Brazil (Sousa et al., 2024).

Regarding specific types of academic integrity violations (attrition, plagiarism): the relationship between academic attrition and impulsivity in a large sample of adolescents who attended medical education classes in high school (Anderman et al., 2010); writing off as resistance to testing (Doerr, 2021); solving the problem of plagiarism by students of higher education (Pamies et al., 2020); a survey to determine the reasons that lead students to possible plagiarism during their studies using the example of the University of Maribor in Slovenia (Sprajc et al., 2017); Croatian teachers' perception of the frequency and acceptability of different types of attrition, as well as their perception of the reasons for attrition and their reactions to attrition (Stambuk et al., 2015); the phenomenon of academic plagiarism among middle and high school students (Sureda-Negre et al., 2015); students' and teachers' attitudes toward writing off when assessing students' performance (Vuckovic et al., 2020); the impact of implementing plagiarism detection software in higher education on plagiarism rates (Youmans, 2011).

On e-dishonesty in education, online assessment: digital learning and digital cheating (Conway et al., 2017); peculiarities of the organization of evaluation of the results of distance learning in schools of Ukraine under martial law (Holovko et al., 2023); practices of electronic dishonesty among Science Education students based on measurement models in the context of higher education in Romania (Mata et al., 2020); ensuring the reliability of online assessment procedures, which includes methodological and organizational components (Pakki, 2022); disruption of space, place, and material conditions caused by the shift from traditional on-site language teaching to emergent distance teaching in an English for academic purposes program, namely student engagement and academic integrity (Vasilopoulos & Bangou, 2022).

Regarding other aspects of academic dishonesty/integrity: US elementary school teachers' concerns about career threats, the viability of virtual learning, academic dishonesty, etc. (Compton et al., 2010); the influence of the source of information on students' assessment of academic dishonesty (Engler & Landau, 2011); new ideas for promoting academic honesty and ethical behavior and for preventing and combating academic dishonesty (Glendinning, 2021); perception by university teachers of their role in the field of academic integrity (Gottardello & Karabag, 2022); students' attitudes and beliefs about academic dishonesty and their decision to enroll in or withdraw from a course taught by a professor who does not tolerate academic dishonesty (Levy & Rakovski, 2006); the role of university teachers in teaching academic integrity by teaching students communication, writing and referencing

skills, and teaching their students to prevent plagiarism (Peters et al., 2019); a scalable approach that empowers teachers to be primary agents of change in transforming the problem of academic dishonesty into an opportunity for positive youth development (Stephens & Wangaard, 2016).

As we can see, academic dishonesty among teachers and scientists is not sufficiently studied.

3. Methodology. The purpose of the study is to identify and analyze schemes of academic dishonesty related to the authorship of scientific publications and to determine measures to prevent them separately for different subjects. To realize the goal, the following methods were used: analysis, observation, interviewing – to identify various schemes of academic dishonesty among teachers and scientists; graphic method – for their schematic display. Note that the schemes described below were formed by the author based on an analysis of the personal pages of scientists and articles in scientific journals, observations of scientific activities, and interviewing.

4. Results. So, let's consider the schemes used by scientists to increase the number of their own publications, or for other reasons. We chose a concise symbolic name for each scheme: «Migration»; «Vualization»; «Resection»; «Intervention»; «Extraction»; «Cooperation»; «Compilation»; «Accumulation»; «Evacuation».

The «Migration» scheme of academic dishonesty consists in the fact that a co-author who is not the first in the list of co-authors of a collective publication, in the case of mentioning the bibliography of this work on his personal Internet page, in a report or other document, puts himself in the first place. In this way, he increases his status. **Fig. 1** shows an illustration of such a scheme in the case of four co-authors, where the last co-author identifies himself first.





Figure 1. Scheme of academic dishonesty «Migration» (Created by the author)

In the case of applying the «Vualization» academic dishonesty scheme, the co-author of a scientific article in the «Literature Review» section mentions only the co-authors when citing his collective works. This is done to hide self-citation. **Fig. 2** shows such a scheme, where the author was the second in the list of co-authors.






Figure 2. Scheme of academic dishonesty «Vualization» (Created by the author)

The «Resection» scheme of academic dishonesty is that a collective article is created, but one or more of the co-authors do not advertise their contribution. This may be related to their performance of their work to order for a certain fee, or to family ties. **Fig. 3** shows an illustration of such a scheme in the case of two co-authors, when one of them is not indicated when the work is published.




Figure 3. Scheme of academic dishonesty «Resection» (Created by the author)

The «Intervention» scheme of academic dishonesty is the inverse of the «Resection» pattern. It consists in the fact that the author of a scientific work adds to it other «co-authors» who did not work on it. This is very common when students, graduate students, or doctoral students prepare research papers and credit their professors, supervisors, or advisors as a sign of gratitude for their cooperation or for extra points toward the evaluation of educational courses. **Fig. 4** shows an illustration of such a scheme in the case of the addition of one «co-author».




Figure 4. Scheme of academic dishonesty «Intervention» (Created by the author)

In the case of application of the «Extraction» scheme of academic dishonesty, the author prepares an article in full at the request of another person without indicating his authorship, mainly for a certain remuneration or as a result of family ties. It is shown in **Fig. 5**.




Figure 5. Scheme of academic dishonesty «Extraction» (Created by the author)

The scheme of academic dishonesty «Cooperation» consists in the fact that a number of authors, by prior agreement, prepare individual articles, where they include other «co-authors», and they do the same in return (according to the principle: «You to me – I to you»). Thus, the authorship of one person increases in proportion to the number of persons involved in this scheme. The main reason for participating in such a scheme is to accelerate the increase in the number of own publications. **Fig. 6** shows an illustration of such a scheme in the case of three authors.




Figure 6. Scheme of academic dishonesty «Cooperation» (Created by the author)

In the case of application of the scheme of academic dishonesty «Compilation», the author creates his scientific work by borrowing a part of someone else’s work (reworked or without changes) without proper citation. In fact, this is pure plagiarism. The scheme is used to borrow other people’s ideas. **Fig. 7** shows an illustration of such a scheme. It is appropriate to mention here the authors’ use of artificial intelligence (AI), as well as borrowing from foreign-language publications.




Figure 7. Scheme of academic dishonesty «Compilation» (Created by the author)

The scheme of academic dishonesty «Accumulation» is that the author publishes his article in various journals. In fact, this is self-plagiarism in the form of duplication of publications. The main goal is to increase the number of own publications. An illustration of such a scheme is shown in **Fig. 8**.




Figure 8. Scheme of academic dishonesty «Accumulation» (Created by the author)

In the case of the application of the academic dishonesty scheme «Evacuation», a collective book is published, for example a monograph, but each of the co-authors receives copies where only he appears on the title page. In this way, a collective book turns into an individual book. The main goal is to become the author of a one-person book. **Fig. 9** shows an illustration of such a scheme.




Figure 9. Scheme of academic dishonesty «Evacuation» (Created by the author)

In general, there can be more schemes of scientific dishonesty, depending on the goal pursued by the persons participating in it. Note that the reasons for this behavior of scientists may be a lack of time, the use of administrative resources, or simply laziness. The task of the scientific community and publishing houses is to prevent such cases in their activities.

In particular, we recommend the following measures for institutions of higher education and scientific institutions:

- formation of a culture of academic integrity in all participants of the educational process, scientific workers (to avoid the use of any academic dishonesty schemes, including «Extraction» scheme). This is possible through the implementation of the Code of Academic Integrity in each higher education institution and scientific institution;
 - organization of courses on time management of scientific activity;
 - encouragement of individual works (for example, with the help of more points in the annual university-wide rating of teachers);
 - creation of a system of prevention and detection of academic plagiarism in the scientific and educational activities of higher education applicants, doctoral students, scientific-pedagogical and scientific workers. This is possible, in particular, by using online platforms and programs for checking text for plagiarism, including AI plagiarism;
 - monitoring by heads of departments of teachers' personal pages on university resources, careful study of their annual reports (to prevent the use of the academic dishonesty scheme «Migration»).
- For editorial boards of magazines, it is advisable to carry out the following measures:
- checking scientific articles for plagiarism (to prevent the use of schemes of academic dishonesty «Compilation», «Accumulation»);
 - limitation of the number of authors of one publication (at the discretion of the editorial board of the journal);

- fixation of the specific contribution of each co-author in each collective work (to prevent the use of schemes of academic dishonesty «Resection», «Intervention», «Cooperation»);
- encouragement of individual works (for example, on a free basis, or with a discount in payment, if publication in a journal is paid);
- checking the «Literature Review» section in the articles for the presence of mentions of all authors from the article's source list (to prevent the use of the «Vualization» academic dishonesty scheme).

Private publishers should not conspire with co-authors of collective books to print single-author covers (to prevent the use of the academic dishonesty scheme «Evacuation»).

Of course, the described nine schemes of academic dishonesty of authors of scientific publications do not pretend to be a complete description of academic fraud. Their number can be supplemented in part:

- 1) incorrect reference to sources of information in the case of using ideas, developments, statements, information;
- 2) violation of legislation on copyright and related rights;
- 3) provision of unreliable information about research methods and results, sources of used information and own pedagogical (scientific-pedagogical, creative) activity;
- 4) weakening or lack of control over the observance of academic integrity by those seeking education;
- 5) biased assessment of learning outcomes.

5. Conclusions. In modern conditions of openness and availability of academic texts, cases of their illegal use have become more frequent. In addition, in pursuit of increasing the number of their own publications and their citations, individual authors participate in schemes of academic dishonesty. The article describes nine schemes of academic dishonesty related to the authorship of scientific publications, which are obtained on the basis of the analysis of personal pages of scientists and articles in scientific journals, observations of scientific activities, and interviewing. Each scheme, in accordance with its content, received a concise name («Migration», «Vailization», «Resection», «Intervention», «Extraction», «Cooperation», «Compilation», «Accumulation», «Evacuation») and graphic display, which can be considered a certain innovative approach to identifying the problem. Each of the schemes has its own characteristics: «Migration» – moving the author to the first place in the list of co-authors of a collective publication when forming a list of own works; «Vualization» – absence of mention of the author in the review of the literature of a new scientific article, provided that his works are included in the list of references of this article, in order to hide self-citation; «Resection» – not indicating all the co-authors of the collective work who participated in its writing; «Intervention» – adding to the co-authors of a scientific work persons who did not participate in its writing; «Extraction» – replacement of the author of the article with another person; «Cooperation» – mutual addition of «co-authors» of a scientific publications; «Compilation» – plagiarism of someone else's work; «Accumulation» – duplication of the author's publications; «Evacuation» – publication of a collective work as an individual work by all co-authors.

The practical significance of the conducted research consists in proposing a number of measures to prevent manifestations of academic dishonesty separately for higher education institutions and scientific institutions, editorial boards of journals, and private publishing houses: formation of a culture of academic integrity, organization of courses on time management of scientific activity, encouragement of individual works, verification of scientific articles on plagiarism, avoiding collusion with co-authors of books, etc.

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Ukrainian political parties in the times of war

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ABSTRACT

The activities of the Ukrainian political parties are studied in the context of martial law. This article is focused on four main aspects of political process in Ukraine in 2022–2025: political repressions and prohibition of parties, political radicalization, elections delay, and preparation for new political projects. The author argues that Ukrainian political spectrum had been artificially narrowed with the left parties forbidden and the right radicals' ideas incorporated in the official state ideology. This perturbation caused an increasing demand for the reload of the political system of Ukraine.

KEYWORDS: political parties, political process, political elites, political participation, election, political leadership, political projects, party affiliation, electoral behavior, political activity, right radicals, radicalization, political repressions.

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Introduction. The conflict with Russia, started from the political overturn in February 2014, that grew up to the full-scale war eight years later, put Ukraine into the focus of the world politics and media. In the last ten years Ukrainian studies were much more popular than ever before. However, these studies, conducted by think tanks, universities and individual researches, in general, concentrated on the main aspects of the international conflict – military (Center, 2025), economic, diplomatic, geopolitical (Masters, 2023), and their historical background (Badavi, 2023; Feinstein & Budjeryn 2022; Mankoff, 2022) as well. At the same time, many important internal factors, especially those of the current Ukrainian political life and its peculiarities in the times of war, are still poorly known to foreign observers.

The Russian-Ukrainian war from its very beginning was regarded highly pathetically by many intellectuals, and historic role of this war was very exaggerated (Reid, 2022). This conflict was presented as a crucial moment, a turning point for the world, at least for the Europe, a war over Ukrainian identity (Kasianov, 2022), that can change the world order and the world map drastically. Consequently, this

existentialism is reflected in the documents and public appeals of the political parties of Ukraine, whose leaders either truly believe in their special mission for saving humanity, at least the European civilization, or just cynically use this apocalyptic rhetoric.

The purpose of this article is to examine, how the war influences the political development of Ukraine, present the specifics of political process in Ukraine, analyzing activities of the political parties and their leaders. It should be mentioned, that it is important to study not only the parties that have their factions in the Verkhovna Rada of the current convocation. In some aspects, the activities of banned parties' leaders, new political projects' front men, radical groups, local politicians, political prisoners and political emigrants are even more interesting and useful for the research regarding the dynamics of the Ukrainian party system.

Prohibition of the “Pro-Russian” Parties and Targeted Political Repressions

The Verkhovna Rada on May 3 adopted the law 2243-IX introducing amendments to certain legislative acts of Ukraine regarding the ban on the activity of political parties (The Verkhovna, 2022a). The legislation expands the list of grounds for banning a political party through the courts. Relevant grounds are justifying, recognizing as lawful or denying armed aggression against Ukraine, including by presenting armed aggression of the Russian Federation and/or the Republic of Belarus against Ukraine as an internal conflict, civil conflict, or civil war. On May 14 President Volodymyr Zelensky has signed this law (Proskurova, 2022).

It should be mentioned, that the bill 7172-1 (the draft of this law) was proposed by a group of 35 (thirty five!) deputies from the ruling party on March 28. So, it went through all legal procedures just in fifty days (The Verkhovna, 2022b). That was very quickly for the law devastated the Ukrainian political landscape.

In 2022, as a result of the enforcement of this law, 16 political parties were banned, almost all in June (Marusyak, 2022). It is interesting to note, that the first in this ban list (on June 8, 2022 – just three weeks after the enforcement of the new law) had become the “Opposition Bloc”, connected by many experts with Rinat Akhmetov, the richest Ukrainian citizen. This party was always loyal to Ukraine, never demonstrated sympathy to Putin’s Russia, and its leaders presented themselves as Ukrainian patriots. Moreover, all prominent figures of the “Opposition Bloc” several years were under Russian sanctions.

In 2023 two more parties were banned, among them the Party of Regions, which was, under the leadership of the ex-president Viktor Yanukovich, the most powerful in the Ukrainian politics from 2010 to 2014. One more party was banned in 2024.

In accordance with the Procedure for the Transfer of Property, Funds and Other Assets of a Political Party Banned by the Court, approved by the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No.896 dated 12.08.2022, the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine has identified and transferred to the state ownership the following property, funds and other assets:

- ✓ cash in the amount of over 23.7 million hryvnias;
- ✓ 53 vehicles;

- ✓ 10 objects of intellectual property rights;
- ✓ 83 real estate properties (Official, 2023).

In general, 19 political parties with almost 3,000 of their structural entities (regional, city, district organizations and primary party cells) lost their legal status in the times of war. Three of them – the “Opposition Platform – For Life”, the “Opposition Bloc”, the “Our Land” – were represented in the current convocation of the Verkhovna Rada. Three others – the Communist Party of Ukraine, the Socialist Party of Ukraine, and the Party of Regions – were among the most powerful and influential in previous times with their leaders at the highest state positions. The majority of the banned parties belonged to the left wing of the left center of the Ukrainian political spectrum. In fact, it is possible to say, that after 2022 there are no left parties in Ukrainian politics. It is interesting to note also, that the state authorities have banned all strong enough political forces promoted local and regional self-governing, as well as ideas of the sovereign industrial development. So, the political landscape of Ukraine existed in the post-Soviet period of its history (Bielashko & Yakushik, 2016) had been changed drastically.

Despite the prohibition of political parties, many of their representatives, including iconic figures, have managed to maintain their positions in Ukrainian politics. For example, the 2019 presidential candidate from the “Opposition Bloc”, Oleksandr Vilkul, heads the military-civil administration of Kryvyi Rih, the birthplace of Volodymyr Zelensky (Burdyga, 2022). Yuriy Boyko – the first number on the electoral list of the “Opposition Platform – For Life” (“OPZZh”) in the parliamentary elections and the OPZZh candidate in the presidential elections – has headed the “Platform for Life and Peace” parliamentary group since April 2022 (at the time of publication, it consists of 21 deputies, all but one of whom were elected on the list of the banned party) (The Verkhovna, 2024). Obviously, such adaptability would have been impossible without personal agreements at the highest level.

At the same time, not all high-ranking members of the banned parties were able to reach an agreement with the authorities on terms acceptable to them. Several members of parliament were forced to resign their mandates and leave the country. Nestor Shufrich, a long-time comrade-in-arms of the odious Viktor Medvedchuk, ended up in Lukyanivska Prison, the most famous pretrial detention facility in Ukraine.

Growth of the Right Radicalism Supported and Used by the Authorities

Wikipedia gives the list of the Ukrainian ‘far-right political parties’ as this:

- Social-National Party of Ukraine (1991–2004);
- Ukrainian National Assembly (1990–present);
- Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (1992–present);
- Svoboda (political party) (2004–present);
- Social-National Assembly (2008–2015);
- Ukrainian National Union (2009–present);
- Right Sector (2013–present);
- National Corps (2016–present) (Wikipedia, 2025).

In 2022, as before in 2014-2015, there was a rapid increase in the resource base of the Ukrainian right radicals. They recruited new supporters en masse, formed elite combat units within the Armed Forces of Ukraine, received intensive media coverage, provided large-scale financing for their activities, and demonstratively dealt with ideological opponents. However, as sociological surveys show, this rapid growth has not received mass electoral support. The number of people ready to vote for representatives of the right-wing radicals in the elections remains critically low. Expressing their sympathies for the ‘military patriots’, Ukrainian voters are still going to vote for more moderate political parties.

The Ukrainian right radicals, especially those who have not become leaders, understand this situation very well. The author of the Telegram channel “Ballads of the IV Empire” (previously called “Tales of the IV Reich”) writes: “The right movement is going through hard times. High turbulence will only increase. A very small niche audience, but a lot of bright personalities are trampling on one square meter, pushing each other out. The winner should show itself to be a large and organized force, capable to influence radically the state of affairs. To influence, not to bargain. To sweep away everything in its path, not to sell out. Like in the good old days, when important people were guided by the Idea, not their own benefit” (Ballads, 2025).

At the same time, the activity of the right radicals and the positive media coverage of their activities determine the gradual radicalization of other political forces. Their slogans have become an integral part of the state ideology of modern Ukraine. Mainstream parties have adopted their rhetoric and conceptual apparatus. This led to a permanent radicalization of Ukrainian politics and society as a whole. As a result, citizens loyal to the regime actually extend their loyalty to the right radicals, including outright extremists. Others are forced to move into an ‘internal emigration’ with a voluntary rejection of any form of political participation, since it turns out to be either ideologically and morally unacceptable or simply dangerous.

Fears and hopes associated with the Ukrainian right radicals are mostly outside of party politics. They are perceived not as an alternative within the political and legal system, but as an anti-systemic alternative. Moreover, they are perceived not as an alternative to the government, but as an alternative to the opposition. In fact, they are now acting as anti-systemic guardians of the system, no matter how paradoxical it may seem at first glance.

Elections Delay and Political Disposition

In 2024 the next presidential and parliamentary elections should take place in Ukraine. However, Ukrainian political parties agreed to postpone elections until after the war. The agreement was reached at a meeting held in the format of the Jean Monnet Dialogue for Peace and Democracy on 10-12 November, 2023, in Zakarpattia. The Verkhovna Rada leadership, together with the chairs and delegated representatives of all parliamentary factions and groups signed the memorandum stated that “future free and fair national elections (parliamentary, presidential) shall be held after the end of the war and the end of martial law with a period of time sufficient to prepare for elections (at least six months after the end of martial law)” (Shumilin & Romanenko, 2023).

This unanimous decision was forehad with intensive information campaign, conducted by loyal to Zelensky media (Kalnysh, 2023). The arguments for the postponing elections were disseminated for

several months, not only in the Ukrainian media, but in the European and American as well – in order to insure the support of the Western political community. Moreover, this doubtful thesis was promoted by some well-known political scientists, close to the Ukrainian diaspora, stated that “organizing an inclusive, free, and fair national vote right now would be extremely challenging, and could damage Ukraine’s democracy” (Onuch & Way, 2024).

At the same time, the level of Zelensky’s popular support began to decline gradually to the prewar marks. This tendency inevitably downgrades the rating of his party. From May 16 to 22, 2024, the Kyiv international Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted the all-Ukrainian public opinion survey “Omnibus”, to which, by order of the Center for Strategic Communications “Forum”, questions were added about the 5th anniversary of president Zelensky. The results were alarming for the ruling party: only 7,2% assessed its record list positively, while 54,9% were dissatisfied (see Table 1) (Hrushetskyi, 2024a).

Table 1

According to the results of the elections to the Verkhovna Rada, Volodymyr Zelensky’s party “People’s Servant” (“Sluha Narodu”) won the majority, which single-handedly formed the parliamentary majority. How would you rate its activity?

% in the column	Ukraine as a whole	West	Center	South	East
Very good	1.8	0.8	2.2	2.7	1.3
Rather good	5.4	3.5	5.3	6.1	10.3
Neither good nor bad / neutral	30.8	33.8	31.0	30.4	22.1
Rather bad	23.1	21.4	27.0	18.5	24.4
Very bad	31.8	35.4	27.8	32.1	36.1
Difficult to say (do not read)	6.0	4.0	6.7	9.4	1.1
Refusal to answer (do not read)	0.9	1.1	0.0	0.8	4.7

From December 1 to 9, 2024, the KIIS conducted another “Omnibus” regarded the activities of party factions in the parliament. Anton Hrushetskyi, the executive director of KIIS, asserts: “The Verkhovna Rada is traditionally perceived by Ukrainians as quite critical, but in this survey we see that the assessment of the activities of individual factions is better than the usual perception of the parliament as a whole” (Hrushetskyi, 2024b), arguing this statement by the fact that more than half of respondents – 55% – positively assess the activities of at least one faction from the list. However, none of the political forces represented in the Ukrainian parliament has positive balance of the respondents’ assessment (see Table 2). This is a bright illustration of the deep crisis of the institute of political parties in Ukraine, and the political system in general. Moreover, the president’s party “People’s Servant” has the most negative balance of popular attitude (+18/-65). It is even worse than “Platform for Peace and Life”, the deputy group left from the banned party of Viktor Medvedchuk (+15/-50). So, about two thirds of Ukrainians suppose that the ruling party hinders the development of their state. At the same time, the parties with the best marks – the “European Solidarity” (+36/-41) and the “Voice” (+29/-35) – can be described as pro-Western opposition.

Table 2

Assess the activities of factions in the Ukrainian parliament. In your opinion, does the activity of such a faction in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine rather benefit Ukraine or hinder the development of the state?

Parliamentary faction	Rather benefits Ukraine	Rather hinder the development of Ukraine
“European Solidarity” / “Yevropeiska Solidarnist”	36	41
“Voice” / “Holos”	29	35
“Fatherland” / “Batkivshchyna”	25	47
“People’s Servant” / “Sluha Narodu”	18	65
“Platform for Peace and Life” / “Platforma za Myr i Zhyttia”	15	50

To be more objective talking about Ukrainian sociology, it should be noted that a significant portion of respondents refuse to participate in social surveys, fearing punishment for their ‘incorrect’ views. And those who agree to answer sociologists’ questions keep in mind the official state ideology and propaganda patterns.

In the end of the 2024 the topic of elections got the actuality again. Donald Trump’s victory on the US presidential election had become a serious challenge for the Ukrainian regime even before his inauguration. Ukraine’s political parties had to change their agenda, trying to establish new contacts in Washington or refresh existing ones.

At the beginning of 2025 Zelensky claimed, that elections in Ukraine can be held “once we manage to achieve the end of the hot phase of the war for Ukraine along with a strong army, strong

weaponry package, and strong security guarantees” (RFE/RL’s, 2025). It can be assumed that Zelensky is ready to hold elections if he has good starting conditions for his re-election and the victory of his political project in the parliamentary elections, although it is still unclear whether it will be the “People’s Servant” or some other party.

It is impossible to make political parties the representation instruments of Ukraine’s national interests without the rationalization of political participation and the tough civil control over the political class (Bielashko, 2023). But it is very difficult for political parties to develop active grassroots self-organizing, as well as to build strong horizontal ties on the basis of common values and common images of the future, in the times of war. Especially, if these parties are not close enough to the state authorities.

The Ukrainian government, using martial law, harshly opposes any attempt to really compete with it. Therefore, the main political forces in opposition are looking for forms of political activity that provide an opportunity to distance themselves from the increasingly less popular government without entering into direct conflict with it, trying to delay the inevitable escalation of political confrontation. That is why the Ukrainian opposition is positioning itself diligently as ‘constructive’ and ‘patriotic’. However, this mimicry helps only partially.

Petro Poroshenko’s “European Solidarity” found itself in a rather difficult situation. Its leader is officially accused of treason, financing terrorism and assisting the activities of terrorist organizations. The corresponding suspicion was announced on December 20, 2021 – less than two months before the Russian invasion (Notice, 2021). In February 2024, the case was transferred to court, and in January 2025 new episodes appeared in it. At the same time, the ruling party initiated the removal of Poroshenko from participation in plenary sessions of the parliament. In addition, a campaign was launched to discredit his son Oleksiy Poroshenko as a draft dodger who fled abroad.

Yulia Tymoshenko has long minimized her public activity on key aspects of political discourse. Her party “Fatherland” has actually shown solidarity with the government, voting in parliament for all significant government initiatives. A similar line of political behavior is demonstrated by the above-mentioned Yuriy Boyko. It is significant that even the complete cessation of gas transit through Ukraine was not used by political ‘old-timers’ to criticize the government. And this is despite the fact that Tymoshenko and Boyko are professionals in the energy sector.

This situation, like a litmus paper, illustrates the generation gap in the Ukrainian politics. The youngsters try to use any event to promote themselves and their agendas, while the elders try to keep their status and minimize risks. A good example is the deputy of the Verkhovna Rada Alexander Dubinsky, who is in pre-trial detention on suspicion of treason, asked on his Telegram channel: “I would really like to hear the position on the transit of Russian gas from our ‘gas princess’ Yulia Tymoshenko. Yulia Vladimirovna, you call yourself a gas specialist – tell us, how will all this affect the accounts of Ukrainians?” (Ganev, 2025).

Preparation for New Political Projects

The expiration of Volodymyr Zelensky's presidential term has intensified the political process. A number of outsiders desiring to find their place among Ukrainian political actors look for the optimal format for their participation in the next electoral cycle, which can start immediately after the end of war and the lifting of martial law.

Valeriy Zaluzhny, who is considered a very promising candidate for the presidency, became the Ukrainian ambassador to Great Britain, essentially giving up his political career. However, it is quite possible that Zaluzhny will at the last moment become the front man of either a new political project created especially for him, or one of the parliamentary parties that are in dire need of rebranding. He published his memoirs with some criticism of Zelensky, met with Ukrainian military commanders, commented on major issues such as how a new Ukrainian elite could be formed or the West's global strategy. "Zaluzhny's popularity continues to grow, and at least **80** percent of Ukrainians say they trust him. In many ways, Zaluzhny's appeal lies in his status as an outsider – just like Zelensky when he was first elected president in **2019**... If Zelensky was hoping Zaluzhny's job in London would remove him from the political fray, he miscalculated" (Skorkin, 2025).

Kyrylo Budanov, the youngest head of the Main Intelligence Directorate during its entire existence, controls a powerful resource and positions himself as a "general of the new formation", a "blend of James Bond and George Patton" (GlobalSecurity.org, 2024). Budanov has a very wide space for political maneuver. As a political leader, he can unite Ukrainian patriots, ideologically neutral adherents of the 'strong hand', liberal pragmatics, technocrats, influential mayors and popular journalists. If Zelensky and/or Zaluzhny do not participate in the presidential elections, Budanov will have good chances to win. Moreover, in the case of extreme political turbulence, he may come to power using the special forces.

Several political projects compete for the right to reap the electoral harvest on the field of 'Antimaidan' (the name for the protests against **2014** state coup). They speculate on the mood of people criticizing not only President Zelensky and his party, but the political regime established in February **2014**. This agenda includes the following key issues:

- direct negotiations with the Russian Federation and the earliest possible conclusion of peace agreement;
- radical reduction of state functions and a real fight against corruption;
- revision of cultural and humanitarian policy (refusal to put pressure on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, ousting the Russian language, destroying the Soviet and imperial heritage);
- elimination of the influence of foreign agents ('sorosites') on Ukrainian politics, economy, and public administration.

At least three such projects can be identified as of early **2025**.

1. Aleksey Arestovich and Yuriy Romanenko can be considered the front men of a group of public experts gathered around the Ukrainian Institute for the Future, whose position is covered by an ever-expanding network of new media.

2. Anatoly Shariy is a well-known journalist and blogger, leader of the banned Shariy Party. He has been living in the European Union, recently in Spain, since **2012**, but remains a significant player in Ukrainian politics and media.

3. Aleksandr Dubinsky, Yevgeniy Shevchenko, Artem Dmitruk were members of the 'People's

Servant' parliamentary faction elected in majoritarian constituencies. At different times and for different reasons, they found themselves in opposition to Zelensky and were suspected of committing treason. Dubinsky and Shevchenko ended up in the Lukyanovsky pretrial detention center, the most notorious prison in Ukraine, and Dmitruk illegally left the country and settled in London.

It is remarkable that all these figures were either quite closely affiliated with the authorities or played a significant role in the electoral triumph of Zelensky and his party in 2019.

Today, it is too early to talk about some kind of institutionalization of the above-mentioned projects. Moreover, it is not even entirely correct to call them projects. Rather, they are proto-projects formed through the ideological consolidation of audiences of public figures. The main channels of such virtual integration are YouTube and Telegram. Facebook plays a supporting role, as does the increasingly popular X (Twitter).

Conclusion. The return of Donald Trump to the White House has breathed new life into the Ukrainian politics. The change in the US Administration has become a powerful stimulus for the further evolution of the Ukrainian party system, which was effectively mothballed after the upheavals of 2022. All more or less significant political forces are trying to establish relations with Donald Trump's team. The rest are simply trying to position themselves as Trumpists. The disposition of parties in the next electoral cycle will largely depend on who show themselves as worthy partners for Washington to both American Republicans and Ukrainian voters.

The main challenge for both the government and the opposition, and for new political projects as well, is the peace agreement with Russia, which Trump has declared one of the main priorities of his foreign policy. Ukrainian society, which has been actively pumped with anti-Russian propaganda for ten years, is mostly not ready to accept the inevitable concessions. Ukrainians will frustrate in any case, even if the peace agreement, given the current situation, is maximally beneficial for their side.

Political parties can minimize this frustration by honestly explaining to their voters the real state of affairs and offering a realistic trajectory for further movement. In order to successfully cope with this task, they need to radically change the paradigm of their activities – from the logic of war to the logic of post-war development. Otherwise, the external enemy will be replaced by internal confrontation, and the Ukrainian political class, deprived of the constraints of wartime, will quickly move into the mode of 'war of all against all'.

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Personality and media : shaping modern war narratives

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ABSTRACT

The article analyzes Shaping Modern Narratives during the Russian-Ukrainian war, asserting that modern media often use enemy images that can influence event perception and public opinion formation, while also serving as a powerful tool for manipulating public opinion and mobilizing support. It is noted that during the war, communication is often accompanied by high emotional intensity – fear and hatred, despair and hope intertwine in people’s interactions, creating complex emotional patterns.

It is emphasized that in the face of modern warfare, journalists play an important role in providing information about future conflicts, and their task is to convey objective and accurate data about the political situation, escalation between countries, and potential threats to the audience. Journalists must be prepared to take risks, but at the same time, remain true to their professional principles; their work helps society understand complex events and the impact of war on the world. It is important to support the independence of journalism and respect those who risk their lives to bring us the truth about war, as journalism is a tool that can help people learn the truth about war, protect human rights, and make the world more just.

Journalism plays an important role in the modern world, serving as a source of information, a tool for power control, and a platform for dialogue. In the context of modern wars, the role of journalism multiplies, as journalists must be prepared for new challenges and work to ensure that society receives accurate and objective information. Journalism before a war can help prevent conflicts if it actively seeks peaceful solutions. The study of communication strategies during wartime helps to understand how public sentiments are formed and change, which is particularly important for politicians, military personnel, and sociologists.

KEYWORDS: shaping modern war narratives, personality, media, communication strategies, manipulating public opinion

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Formulation of the problem. The formation of contemporary narratives during the Russian–Ukrainian war is an important topic for research—modern media often use enemy images that can influence the perception of events and the formation of public opinion. For example, research shows that Russian media often use terms and images that emphasize Ukraine’s “aggression” and “hostility” – this may include the use of words like “nationalists” or “Banderites” to describe Ukrainian forces, while Ukrainian media may use images of “occupiers” and “terrorists” to describe Russian troops. These communicative reflections can cause an aberration of public opinion and sustain enmity between nations, while it is particularly important to be aware of how media can shape our perceptions and how we can critically approach the information we receive (Udupa , 2020).

On June 11, 2024, the 18th edition of the Global Peace Index (GPI), prepared by the international analytical center Institute for Economics and Peace, was presented in London, showing that the world is at a crossroads. Without coordinated efforts, there is a risk of a surge in serious conflicts. Peacefulness in 97 countries deteriorated more than in any year since the Global Peace Index was created in 2008. Conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine were the main causes of the global decline in peacefulness, as the number of battle-related deaths reached 162,000 in 2023.

The global economic impact of violence increased to \$19.1 trillion in 2023, accounting for 13.5% of the world’s GDP. Militarization recorded the largest annual deterioration since the establishment of the GPI, with 108 countries becoming more militarized. 110 million people are refugees or internally displaced persons due to violent conflict, and 16 countries are currently hosting over half a million refugees. There are currently 56 conflicts, the highest number since World War II. They have become more international, with 92 countries involved in conflicts beyond their borders, the highest number since the GPI was established. The increase in the number of minor conflicts raises the likelihood of more serious conflicts in the future. For example, in 2019, Ethiopia, Ukraine, and the Gaza Strip were identified as minor conflicts (Global Peace Index, 2024).

In 2024, the world witnessed a staggering surge in conflicts. It is estimated that in 2024, at least 233,000 people died in conflicts. The number of people who died in conflicts in 2024 increased by 30 percent compared to the previous year: from 179,099 deaths in 2023 to 233,597 in 2024. The war in Ukraine was the deadliest in 2024: 67,000 deaths were recorded, while 35,000 deaths were recorded in the Palestinian territories of Gaza and the West Bank (Taylor, 2024).

For the first time since World War II, a full-scale conventional war has been ongoing in Europe for over 2.5 years, involving all types of weapons except nuclear ones. In particular, Russia is using chemical weapons against the Ukrainian Defense Forces. For the first time in human history, Russia has occupied a nuclear power plant in the Ukrainian city of Enerhodar, and since October 2022, it has carried out over 1000 strikes on Ukraine’s energy facilities, putting other Ukrainian nuclear power plants at risk of accidents. For the first time in human history, Russian military are hunting civilians in frontline areas of Ukraine using FPV drones.

Naturally, all these wars have different causes, but the 21st century has clearly demonstrated the role of mass media both in inciting military events and in seeking their resolution. It is precisely in the 21st century that the so-called hybrid warfare emerges, takes shape, and is implemented. It is hybrid in part because the media play a significant role in it – in this sense, the journalist becomes not just someone

who attempts to objectively cover military conflicts and wars, but a direct participant in the military confrontation – according to the well-known Ukrainian proverb, “The pen is mightier than the sword.” In addition to the above, it is important to note that journalism is not just a profession, but also a right to freedom of speech and access to information, which are among the fundamental and essential human rights, and in the context of modern wars, this right becomes even more important. It is also important to consider that journalists are not just people who tell the story – they are also its witnesses and play an undeniable role in documenting events (Torok ,2024).

The creation of an enemy image has deep historical roots: in different eras and cultures, leaders and media have used this technique to mobilize the population and strengthen their power: in ancient times, neighbors were declared barbarians, in the Middle Ages – heretics and witches, in the 20th century – political opponents and ideological adversaries. The media often choose and emphasize those facts that confirm their point of view and help create a negative image of the enemy – this may include ignoring positive aspects or distorting real events. The use of vivid and emotionally charged words and images helps to enhance the negative perception of the enemy: words such as “terrorists,” “aggressors,” or “barbarians” evoke strong emotional reactions in the audience and contribute to the formation of the enemy’s image. The image of the enemy is present in various media formats, including news publications, television, cinema, literature, and social networks, and each of these formats has its own characteristics and ways of presenting the image of the enemy (Black , 2021).

Television actively uses visual techniques to create the image of the enemy: caricatures, documentaries, and news reports play an important role in shaping the negative perception of the opponent, and television programs often use dramatic effects and emotionally charged images to enhance their impact on the viewer. Cinema and literature also contribute to the creation of the enemy’s image: films and books can portray the enemy as a villain or antagonist, whose actions and motives evoke condemnation and hatred in the audience—these works of art help shape cultural and social stereotypes about enemies (Vuorinen, 2012).

Social networks have become a tool for creating and spreading the image of the enemy, as users actively share information—fear and hatred, despair and hope intertwine in people’s communication, creating complex emotional patterns. With the development of digital technologies and social networks, communication during wartime has taken on a new character—they allow for the instant dissemination of information, organizing actions and demonstrations, as well as expressing public opinion; however, they also become a platform for spreading propaganda, which intensifies communicative reflections. In wartime, interpersonal communication undergoes significant changes—people begin to value personal contacts and communication with loved ones more, yet military conflicts can also destroy social bonds, as users actively share information, photos, and videos that support or enhance the negative perception of the opponent. Virtual communities and groups can form around a common goal—the fight against the enemy (Marín, 2024).

110 million people are refugees or internally displaced persons due to violent conflict, and 16 countries are currently hosting over half a million refugees. There are currently 56 conflicts, the highest number since World War II. They have become more international, with 92 countries involved in conflicts beyond their borders, the highest number since the GPI was established. The increase in the number of

minor conflicts raises the likelihood of more serious conflicts in the future. For example, in 2019, Ethiopia, Ukraine, and the Gaza Strip were identified as minor conflicts (Global Peace, 2024).

Analysis of recent research and publications. Many works have been dedicated to the study of the contextual relationship between war and media, often emphasizing the functional use of media for the purpose of war propaganda. For example, J. Kril and H. Lasswell described how media channels were used by the Allies during World War I. H. S. Joquet, W. O'Donnell, and F. Taylor researched the manipulative potential of media during the era of Nazi Germany. E. des Forges, M. Price, and M. Thompson analyzed media abuses during the Rwandan and Yugoslav civil wars. The features of media use in hybrid wars have been highlighted in numerous publications by scholars, including H. Z. Parvar and K. Payne, V. Bratik and H. Pocheptsov, V. Luts and V. Horbulin, V. Gulai and S. Dubov, B. Parakhonsky and H. Yavorska, O. Yizhak and Yu. Merzlyuk, S. Plokhii and M. Bouromensky, and others.

The purpose of the article. The purpose of the article is to study the Shaping Modern War Narratives and the image of the enemy in modern media.

Presentation of the main material. The creation of an enemy image has deep historical roots: in different eras and cultures, leaders and media have used this technique to mobilize the population and strengthen their power: in ancient times, neighbors were declared barbarians, in the Middle Ages – heretics and witches, in the 20th century – political opponents and ideological adversaries. The media often choose and emphasize those facts that confirm their point of view and help create a negative image of the enemy – this may include ignoring positive aspects or distorting real events. The use of vivid and emotionally charged words and images helps to strengthen.

The image of the enemy in modern media during wartime is a powerful tool for manipulating public opinion and mobilizing support – let us present several striking facts that illustrate how this image is formed and used: selective presentation of information and emotionally charged words and images, visual techniques and data falsification, social media as a weapon and psychological influence, the use of memes and humor, mobilization through digital platforms and emotional loading, the evolution of media and the speed of information dissemination, fake news, disinformation, and the “echo chamber” effect. These facts underscore the importance of critically approaching information, analyzing sources, and understanding the motives of those behind media messages—only in this way can one resist manipulation and form an objective perception of what is happening (Maheo, 2020).

During wartime, communication is often accompanied by high emotional intensity—fear and hatred, despair and hope intertwine in people’s interactions, creating complex emotional patterns. With the development of digital technologies and social networks, communication during the war has taken on a new character—social networks allow for the instant dissemination of information, the organization of events and demonstrations, as well as the expression of public opinion; however, they also become a platform for spreading propaganda, which intensifies communicative reflections. In the context of war, interpersonal communication undergoes significant changes – people begin to value personal contacts and communication with loved ones more, and seek support and empathy within their circle of friends and family (Sugihartono , 2024)

Communicative reflections during wartime include mechanisms of psychological defense, and people use an arsenal of strategies to cope with the stress caused by war—this may include rationalization and

denial, projection, and other mechanisms that help maintain psychological balance. Understanding these reflections helps to gain a deeper awareness of the impact of military conflicts on public consciousness and interpersonal relationships, as well as to find ways to improve communication and overcome barriers caused by war. Fear and hatred are among the most powerful emotions that influence communication during war: fear for one's life and the lives of loved ones drives people to seek information and support, which can increase dependence on media and official sources of information, while hatred for the enemy, fueled by propaganda and media, contributes to the intensification of aggressive sentiments and rhetoric. Despair and hope are opposite emotions that also affect communication: despair can lead to apathy and a loss of interest in communication, while hope promotes mobilization and active seeking of support. Communication strategies in wartime are often aimed at maintaining hope and strengthening the spirit of resistance ("Communication", 2020).

Communication in such conditions is often aimed at creating an image of the enemy, justifying military actions, and strengthening national identity. Through media and official channels, information is presented in a way that enhances patriotic sentiments and justifies aggression. With the development of digital technologies and social networks, communication during wartime has taken on a new character—generally speaking, social networks play an important role in wartime communication, providing a platform for sharing information and opinions, allowing citizens to participate in the information space, share their experiences, and mobilize for support or protest. Rationalization involves seeking logical explanations and justifications for what is happening, while denial and projection are other important mechanisms of psychological defense: denial allows ignoring unpleasant and traumatic aspects of reality, and projection involves attributing one's own negative emotions and qualities to other people or groups. Maintaining the image of the enemy allows directing public attention to an external threat, distracting it from internal problems and uniting the population around a common goal.

Focusing on external threats and the image of the enemy distracts attention from internal problems and conflicts, hindering constructive dialogue and the search for solutions, as society's resources and attention are directed towards fighting the external enemy. It is important to critically approach information, analyze sources, and understand the motives of those behind media messages, as only in this way can an objective perception of the current situation be formed. The Russian-Ukrainian war has become a catalyst for deep changes in the communicative practices of both countries—media on both sides actively create and maintain images of the enemy: in the Russian press, Ukrainians are depicted as fascists and radicals, while Ukrainian media portray Russians as aggressors and occupiers. Propaganda plays a key role in shaping public opinion, dividing people into "us" and "them," and social networks have become a platform for the instant spread of information and disinformation, creating an atmosphere of distrust and fear.

In times of war, the information space becomes a battleground for the minds and hearts of people—social networks play an important role in organizing events and demonstrations. Hostile rhetoric intensifies aggressive sentiments in society, while disinformation undermines trust in official sources of information. Information warfare is becoming an integral part of military conflict, people seek information that confirms their beliefs and views, and political leaders use the media to strengthen their power, while patriotism and nationalism are heightened during the war (Lahmann , 2020).

War intensifies social tension, and communication strategies are aimed at maintaining psychological balance. Patriotic sentiments are heightened in conditions of military conflict, and the image of the enemy helps mobilize the population for struggle. Caricatures and posters are used to demonize the opponent, and political leaders use media to justify their actions—Ukrainians are often depicted as fascists, radicals, and extremists in Russian media, which evokes strong negative emotions in the audience. Ukrainian media, in turn, portray Russians as aggressors, occupiers, and bearers of hostile ideology. Media focus on facts that support their viewpoint, ignoring or distorting other aspects. Emotionally charged words and phrases, such as “terrorists,” “aggressors,” or “fascists,” enhance the negative perception of the opponent. Visual images, such as caricatures and photographs, play an important role in forming memorable and grotesque images of the enemy.

The image of the enemy helps divert attention from internal problems and consolidate society around an external threat, strengthening patriotic sentiments and reinforcing national identity. Information warfare becomes an integral part of military conflict, media manipulation is used to create desired images and perceptions, justifying military actions and violence. Ukrainophobia, as a phenomenon of social life, has deep historical roots and is often used for political and propaganda purposes. It has a long history that goes back to periods when Ukrainian culture and identity were subjected to repression and marginalization. During the Soviet era, the Ukrainian language and culture were often suppressed, and any manifestations of national identity were perceived as a threat to the unity of the state (Ononiwu, 2023).

Ukrainophobia can create distrust between different groups – this can lead to discrimination and violence against Ukrainians, as well as hinder constructive dialogue and the search for solutions. Modern warfare has an informational component, where all these processes are most clearly manifested today. From the perspective of individual propagandists, this activity aimed at devaluing humanity is carried out to the fullest extent – fear and hatred, despair and hope intertwine in people’s communication, creating complex emotional patterns. With the development of digital technologies and social networks, communication during the war has taken on a new character—social networks allow for the instant dissemination of information, the organization of events and demonstrations, as well as the expression of public opinion; however, they also become a platform for the spread of propaganda, which intensifies communicative reflections. The sacralization of the Russian people and their command is carried out by asserting that the Russian people are heralds, saviors of the world, and guardians of traditional values, and that if there is Putin, there is Russia (Plokhy , 2023).

In the modern information war, the demonization of the enemy is particularly pronounced in Russian propaganda: enemies are depicted as soulless and cruel beings that threaten the security and well-being of the country. This allows for justifying aggressive actions and mobilizing the population to fight against an external threat. The phenomenon of dehumanization is largely associated with military traditions that trace their origins back to World War I, when the enemy was depicted in a caricatured manner. The image of the enemy has ancient traditions, including in journalism, and it can be associated with many areas of human activity, including racial, Semitic, gender, and so on, although the main context and trigger here are undoubtedly military (Skladanowski & Smuniewski,2022).

The media play an important role in creating and promoting images of heroes – journalism during wartime not only informs society about ongoing events but also brings to the forefront the stories of

people who demonstrate exceptional courage and selflessness. Stories about heroes have a strong psychological impact on society – they help people cope with the anxiety and fear caused by war, instill hope, and help maintain morale and inspire others to acts of bravery. Heroes become symbols of resilience and strength, inspiring others to take action and provide support. It should also be noted that in wartime, propaganda often uses images of heroes to mobilize the population and strengthen patriotic sentiments. State and independent media spread stories about military personnel and civilians who perform feats to support the fighting spirit and strengthen national identity. Journalists play a key role in documenting heroic deeds – they record and convey information about events, which helps preserve the memory of heroism for future generations, and it also helps prevent the distortion of history and maintain truthful coverage of the war (Ishchuk et al., 2024).

Probably, the Russian–Ukrainian war can activate disintegration processes and bring to the fore the articulation of projects for the collapse and disintegration of the Russian Federation into separate national–state formations, starting with the most depressed regions – Yakutia and Sokha, Tuva and Buryatia, Kalmykia and Sakhalin, the Far East, etc. The dehumanization of the Russian Federation may lead to the possibility of a civil war, considering the recent attempt at a coup in the Russian Federation, the unexpected seizure of Voronezh and Rostov, as well as the increase in xenophobia within Russia. Xenophobic motives are also involved here, considering the presence of anti–Semitic, anti–Caucasian, and anti–elite expectations and sentiments. As is known, the traditional Russian rebellion was initiated and inspired by ethnic non–Russians – among them Kindrat Bulavin, Felix Yusupov, Grigory Rasputin, the October Revolution was also carried out by individuals of Hungarian, Latvian, and Czech descent, the majority of the Politburo consisted of citizens of Jewish descent, including, and probably, Yevgeny Prigozhin. The antisemitic sentiment and periodic escalation of the modern global community are also hard to overlook, especially in the context of the Israeli–Lebanese wars (Levi Hana, 2023).

Among the examples of the humanization of modern society is the unprecedented humanitarian aid provided to more than 6 million Ukrainian refugees in Europe. At the latest PACE meeting on October 13, 2024, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted a resolution recognizing the Russian regime as terrorist and called on the world to provide our country with weapons for defense. It is worth mentioning the extensive secular, as well as charitable, philanthropic, and volunteer activities of the Catholic organization Caritas and many other church and religious organizations – these are examples of the humanization of the modern international agenda (Sutch, 2023).

Most likely, Samuel Huntington turned out to be largely right in his famous historical–philosophical treatise “The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order,” especially in the chapter “Russia and its near abroad,” where he proposed three possible scenarios for Russian–Ukrainian relations, including the direct armed conflict between the countries that actually occurred. In the case of the Russian–Ukrainian war, one predominantly Orthodox Slavic country attacked another predominantly similar country, and the ferocity, boundless hatred, and aggression of geopolitical neighbors who have become fierce and deadly enemies is astonishing.

Conclusions. In the face of modern warfare, journalists play an important role in providing information about upcoming conflicts, and their task is to convey objective and accurate data about the political situation, escalation between countries, and potential threats to the audience. Journalists must be prepared to take risks while remaining true to their professional principles; their work helps society

understand complex events and the impact of war on the world. It is important to support the independence of journalism and respect those who risk their lives to bring us the truth about war, as journalism is a tool that can help people learn the truth about war, protect human rights, and make the world a fairer place.

Journalism plays an important role in the modern world, serving as a source of information, a tool for power control, and a platform for dialogue. In the context of modern wars, the role of journalism increases manifold, as journalists must be prepared for new challenges and work to ensure that society receives accurate and objective information. An important role of journalism is conflict prevention: journalism before war can help prevent conflicts if it actively seeks peaceful solutions.

The study of communication strategies during wartime helps to understand how public sentiments are formed and changed, which is particularly important for politicians, military personnel, and sociologists. For successful information warfare, it is necessary to develop effective communication strategies based on the study of existing practices and methods—understanding the emotional aspects of communication during war allows for the development of psychological support programs for the affected. In the context of information warfare, it is important to raise the level of media literacy among the population so that people can critically evaluate the information they receive. An important aspect is the study of ethical norms and the responsibility of the media and social media users for the dissemination of information in wartime. Communication reflections during war have global significance, as information about conflicts spreads rapidly around the world, influencing international relations and public opinion. The topic of the influence of personality and media on the formation of contemporary war narratives is extremely interesting and relevant for further research. Here are a few perspectives that may be useful for expanding this field:

social networks and their impact on public opinion (for this, it would be possible to investigate how social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram contribute to the formation and dissemination of war narratives and apply an analysis of the algorithms used by these platforms to spread content),

the role of personal bloggers and influencers (it is advisable to research the impact of individuals on shaping public opinion regarding conflicts and military actions and to study which specific topics are covered by bloggers and how their personal opinions influence narratives),

traditional media vs. digital media (one can compare the ways of presenting information about wars in traditional media (newspapers, television) and digital media (online news, social networks) and analyze how the perception of events changes depending on the source of information),

fakes and misinformation (it seems possible to explore how fake news and misinformation affect the perception of war and develop strategies to detect and counter fake news)

Psychological impact on society (it seems appropriate to study how the constant flow of information about the war affects people's mental state and to explore ways that can help society adapt to the psychological burden).

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**Digital transformation of education: challenges, opportunities, and development strategies
in the context of global crises**

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ABSTRACT

The author examines the digital transformation of education in the context of global crises, including the COVID-19 pandemic and military conflicts, which accelerate the introduction of digital technologies into the educational process. The main challenges of digitalization, including the digital divide, technical support of educational institutions, the level of digital literacy of teachers and students, and the preservation of the humanitarian aspect of education, are explored.

The article analyzes the opportunities offered by digital transformation to improve the quality of education. The author explores the role of cloud technologies, artificial intelligence, virtual and augmented reality, and adaptive learning platforms in personalizing the educational process. The international experience of digital transformation, in particular European approaches to the introduction of innovative educational technologies, is considered.

The author substantiates the need to create a comprehensive strategy for the digital transformation of education, which includes improving the regulatory framework, providing teachers with methodological support, raising the level of digital competence, and developing common standards for assessing the effectiveness of digital learning. Recommendations are offered to overcome the main barriers to digitalization and ensure the availability of quality education in times of crisis.

Thus, the study demonstrates the importance of integrating digital technologies into the educational process, taking into account both technological and socio-psychological aspects. The strategic directions for the development of digital education that contribute to its sustainability and efficiency are identified.

KEYWORDS: digital transformation, education, global crises, digital literacy, adaptive learning, artificial intelligence, educational technologies, innovations.

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1. Formulation of the problem.The modern education system is facing the need for a profound transformation driven by the rapid development of digital technologies and global challenges such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the full-scale war in Ukraine. Although digitalisation of education is recognised as a key tool for improving the quality and accessibility of education, its implementation is accompanied by a number of contradictions. On the one hand, digital technologies open up new opportunities for personalising learning, developing critical thinking, and making the educational process more flexible (Hudzenko, 2024). On the other hand, there are serious challenges associated with the digital divide, insufficient technical equipment of educational institutions and low levels of digital literacy among teachers.

One of the key problems is the lack of a unified digital transformation strategy that would take into account the specifics of the Ukrainian education system. Research shows that many educational institutions implement digital tools in a fragmented manner, without a clear understanding of their place in the educational process. This leads to the fact that innovations often remain superficial and do not have the expected effect. In addition, there is a gap between theoretical developments in the field of digital education and their practical application, due to a lack of methodological support and insufficient funding.

Another important problem is the psychological readiness of participants in the educational process to change. Studies show that many teachers and students are not ready for a full transition to digital formats due to fear of new technologies, lack of motivation, or insufficient digital skills. This creates additional barriers to the effective integration of digital tools into the learning process.

Another significant challenge is preserving the humanitarian component of education in the context of digitalisation. The active introduction of technology can lead to a loss of personal contact between teachers and students, a diminished role for socialisation in the educational process, and excessive technocratisation of learning. At the same time, modern challenges, such as distance learning during the war, require rapid adaptation to digital formats, which makes this problem particularly relevant.

In addition, there is a need to develop effective mechanisms for assessing the quality of digital education. Currently, there are no uniform standards that would allow measuring the real impact of digital technologies on learning outcomes. This complicates the process of making informed decisions on the further development of digitalisation in education.

Therefore, the main problematic area of the study is to find an optimal balance between innovative digital approaches and traditional values of education, as well as to develop a comprehensive strategy that takes into account the technological, pedagogical, psychological and organisational aspects of digital transformation. Solving these problems will help create an effective model of digital education that can meet the requirements of the present and provide quality training for future professionals.

2. Analysis of recent research and publications. Recent research on the digital transformation of education highlights both its transformative potential and the multifaceted challenges it presents. Scholars such as McCarthy et al. (2023) emphasize that successful digital transformation requires systemic changes in organizational culture and leadership, rather than mere technological adoption. Their framework identifies four critical components: leadership, people, technology, and experience, underscoring the need for holistic strategies that align with the specific needs of educational environments. Similarly, Dushchenko (2021) argues that digitalization in Ukraine must go beyond technical upgrades to encompass a paradigm shift in educational approaches, preparing students and teachers for the demands of a digital society. These studies collectively stress the importance of integrating digital tools with pedagogical and psychological support to ensure meaningful and sustainable change.

The challenges of digitalization are further explored in works by Verbowskyi (2024) and Petryshyn et al. (2023), who highlight issues such as the digital divide, insufficient infrastructure, and the psychological readiness of educators and students. Verbowskyi points to disparities between urban and rural schools, while Petryshyn et al. focus on the psychological aspects, noting that motivation, adaptability, and emotional resilience are crucial for effective digital integration. The COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine have accelerated the need for digital solutions, as noted by Martynenko (2023), who discusses the role of platforms like Zoom and Google Meet in maintaining educational continuity. However, these rapid changes have also exposed gaps in digital literacy and resource availability, calling for targeted investments and policy support.

Comparative studies, such as those by Virotschenko (2024) and Stoika (2021), provide valuable insights into international approaches to digitalization. Virotschenko contrasts Ukrainian and Baltic strategies, noting the latter's focus on individualized learning and alignment with European standards. Stoika examines

teacher training in Poland, Hungary, and Ukraine, advocating for the adoption of best practices from more advanced systems. These studies suggest that while Ukraine has made progress in digital education, further collaboration with international partners and adaptation of global frameworks could enhance its effectiveness. Overall, the literature underscores the need for balanced, context-sensitive strategies that address technological, pedagogical, and human factors to realize the full potential of digital transformation in education.

3. The purpose of the article. The purpose of this article is to examine the challenges and opportunities of digital transformation in Ukraine's education system, focusing on issues such as the digital divide, teacher preparedness, and maintaining educational quality. It aims to analyze international best practices and propose strategies for developing a balanced, effective approach to digitalization in education. Ultimately, the article seeks to contribute to the creation of a sustainable digital education model that combines innovation with traditional pedagogical values.

4. Presenting main material. A. McCarthy, D. Maor, A. McConney, & C. Cavanaugh emphasise that true digital transformation in education requires changes in attitudes and organisational culture, not just the introduction of the latest technologies. Based on a thorough analysis of 20 international digital transformation frameworks from different sectors, the researchers identified four interrelated key components that are crucial for the successful transformation of education systems. The first and most important component is leadership, which includes developing a clear strategy, building a culture of trust among all stakeholders in the educational process, and communicating changes effectively. The second component, people, emphasises the need for comprehensive support for teachers, development of their professional skills and adaptation to new conditions. The third pillar relates to technology, in particular its role in personalising learning and ensuring data security. The fourth component, experience, is focused on creating an educational environment that takes into account the needs of students to the fullest extent possible. The researchers also emphasise the importance of developing teachers' professional skills, using data to personalise learning, and creating secure digital ecosystems. They give examples of highly effective education systems, such as Finland and Singapore, which have already implemented transformational changes (McCarthy et al.,2023).

The main conclusion of the study is that without fundamental changes in thinking and approaches to the organisation of the educational process, no technological innovations, even the most advanced ones, will have the desired effect. Scholars emphasise that the transformation process should not begin with the mechanical introduction of new technological solutions, but with the development of a holistic strategy that takes into account the specifics of the educational environment and the needs of all its participants (McCarthy et al., 2023). Therefore, we propose a framework for digital transformation in education aimed at overcoming barriers, improving the quality of learning and preparing students for future challenges in the digital world.

O. Dushchenko examines in detail the process of digital transformation of the educational sector in Ukraine, focusing on its necessity in the face of modern challenges. The scientist notes that the digitalisation of education is not just a fashion trend, but an objective requirement of the times, driven by global informatisation processes, technological development and the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The researcher believes that the transition to a digital learning format involves not only technical upgrades, but also a radical change in the educational paradigm. It is emphasised that modern education should prepare specialists who are able to work effectively with information, use the latest technologies and adapt to rapid changes. Particular attention is paid to the development of future teachers' digital competence, which includes not only the ability to use technical means, but also the ability to integrate them into the learning process to achieve better results (Dushchenko, 2021).

According to O. Dushchenko, the key aspects of digitalisation are the creation of a modern digital educational environment, the development of high-quality e-content, and the updating of the regulatory framework. The scientist gives examples of successful tools, such as interactive platforms (Padlet, Mindomo, PearDeck), which can already significantly improve learning efficiency. However, it is emphasised that in order to fully realise these opportunities, a number of obstacles need to be overcome, including the insufficient level of digital literacy of teachers, lack of technical support, and the need to further improve the legislative framework (Dushchenko, 2021).

Thus, the digitalisation of education is an inevitable need of our time that requires a comprehensive approach. Its successful implementation depends on a harmonious combination of state support, the activity of the teaching community, and the continuous improvement of technological solutions. Only under such conditions can digitalisation become a real catalyst for qualitative changes in the education system, helping to prepare competitive specialists for the future.

C. Virotschenko notes that the digitalisation of education is a key tool for creating an innovative learning environment that increases the competitiveness of educational systems and promotes the individual development of participants in the educational process. The scientist believes that this process covers a wide range of technological, pedagogical and socio-cultural aspects, including the use of digital platforms, interactive teaching methods and the development of digital competence. In particular, in Ukraine, the digitalisation of education has become particularly relevant due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the armed conflict, which has stimulated the development of distance learning and digital educational resources. It is noteworthy that digitalisation not only improves the quality of education, but also ensures flexibility, accessibility and adaptation to the needs of modern society. In the Baltic States, digitalisation is seen as a tool for creating individualised learning, increasing student motivation and meeting European standards. Baltic researchers focus on practical aspects, such as the use of digital tools for assessment and the development of skills needed for the labour market (Virotschenko, 2024).

Thus, the digitalisation of education in Ukraine and the Baltic States is a strategic direction aimed at modernising the educational space, improving its quality and competitiveness. Despite the differences in approaches, both regions consider digital technologies as a means to achieve stability, innovation and openness of education in the face of global challenges.

The digitalisation of teacher training is a key element of the current educational transformation that is taking place in Poland, Hungary and Ukraine. This process requires a thorough analysis, taking into account the different socio-cultural, technological and regulatory conditions of each country. O. Stoyka emphasises that the digitalisation of education promotes innovative forms of education, such as virtual and network

universities, and improves the quality of teacher training adapted to the requirements of the modern digital world. The researcher notes that Ukraine, despite the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic and other crises, is actively introducing digital technologies into education, but needs to learn from the experience of European countries, such as Poland and Hungary, which have made significant progress in this area. They also emphasise the need to develop the digital competence of teachers, as research shows that most Ukrainians have insufficient digital skills (Stoyka, 2021).

Therefore, the digitalisation of teacher training is an integral part of the modernisation of education in the context of globalisation and technological progress. For Ukraine, it is important to study and adapt European experience, especially that of Poland and Hungary, to ensure the competitiveness of the national education system. This will create effective mechanisms for training teachers who can use modern digital tools to improve the quality of education.

Ukrainian scientists summarise the results of research by the Institute of Digitalisation of Education of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine on the introduction of innovative technologies in the educational process. Particular attention is paid to cloud services such as Google Workspace for Education, virtual and augmented reality technologies, and gamification. The research covers the development of teachers' digital competence, in particular through self-assessment tools, and analyses the actual practice of using ICT in teachers' professional activities based on large-scale surveys. A separate section is devoted to the use of virtual reality in the training of specialists. The collection also discusses the Ukrainian Electronic Encyclopedia of Education project aimed at systematising pedagogical knowledge and innovative approaches to gamification, especially in teaching IT students. All materials emphasise the importance of adapting educational technologies to the needs of students and teachers. The publication contains up-to-date data from 2021-2023, reflecting the challenges of distance and blended learning in Ukraine (Pinchuk, 2023).

Thus, the researchers conclude that digitalisation of education is a powerful tool for transforming the educational process that requires systematic implementation. They prove that the use of cloud technologies, virtual and augmented reality significantly increases learning efficiency and student motivation. An important aspect is the need to develop teachers' digital competence, which is confirmed by the results of large-scale studies. The researchers emphasise that the successful integration of digital tools into education requires not only technical support but also methodological support and adaptation to the needs of specific educational institutions. The researchers see particular promise in the development of gamified learning environments and interactive platforms that promote active learning. At the same time, they note that the digitalisation process should be gradual and take into account the real conditions of the Ukrainian education system.

Digital transformation in education covers a wide range of concepts, such as virtual reality, cloud computing, and other technologies that change traditional teaching methods. According to Trinh Thi Phuong et al.(2023), this process opens up new opportunities for online learning, blended learning, and data analytics to help make informed decisions in education. The authors emphasise that research in this area remains fragmented, despite the rapid growth of publications in recent years, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic.

According to the researchers, digital transformation in education is developing in four main areas: the impact of the pandemic on higher education, the integration of the technologies of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, the development of digital competence, and the use of innovative forms of learning, such as e-learning and blended learning. They also note that researchers from countries such as Indonesia and Thailand demonstrate high citation performance. The researchers analyse the digital transformation in education through a bibliometric approach, identifying four key areas: the impact of COVID-19, Industry 4.0 technologies, digital competence, and innovative forms of learning. They note the rapid growth of research in recent years, especially in developed countries, but also note the activity of researchers from developing countries. However, a significant number of publications remain little known due to low citation rates (Trinh Thi et al., 2023). Thus, digital transformation in education is a dynamic area that requires further study, international cooperation and integration of modern technologies for the effective development of educational systems.

C. Martynenko notes that the digitalisation of the educational process in higher education institutions is an integral part of modern transformations that contribute to the renewal of content and technological support for learning and improve its quality. The scientist believes that digital technologies play a key role in creating a flexible, personalised and accessible educational space, especially in the context of martial law and global challenges such as the COVID-19 pandemic. The scientist notes that digitalisation is not only the technical introduction of new tools, but also the deep convergence of digital technologies with pedagogical and social practices. Among the main conditions for successful digitalisation, she identifies: the presence of a digital generation of students with specific socio-psychological characteristics; a developed legislative framework; resource support (digital platforms, Internet access); training of teachers with digital competencies (Martynenko, 2023).

According to S. Martynenko, digital technologies such as Zoom, Google Meet, Canva, and Genially significantly expand the possibilities of the educational process, making it interactive, mobile, and adaptive. However, she also draws attention to the challenges faced by educational institutions: insufficient digital literacy, outdated technical facilities, lack of quality content, and bureaucracy. The researcher emphasises that the digitalisation of education is a complex but necessary process that requires a systematic approach, investment in infrastructure and training. Therefore, successful transformation of the educational space is only possible if the needs of all participants in the process are taken into account, modern technologies are integrated with traditional teaching methods, and digital competencies are continuously developed. This will allow higher education institutions not only to meet modern challenges, but also to form future professionals ready to work in the digital economy (Boychuk et al., 2024).

L. Petryshyn, O. Pochuieva, M. Lemeshchuk, and V. Zvozdetska note that the digital transformation of education today is not only a technological challenge, but also a complex psychological and pedagogical phenomenon. The authors believe that the success of this process depends primarily on the psychological readiness of all participants in the educational process to change. The researchers emphasise five key psychological aspects that determine the effectiveness of digitalisation: motivational (awareness of the need for digital competences), self-organisational (active learning of new skills), adaptive (ability to change),

stabilising (finding a balance between traditional and innovative methods) and regulatory (prevention of digital stress) (Petryshyn et al.,2023).

According to L. Petryshyn and her colleagues, the COVID-19 pandemic has become a powerful catalyst for digital transformation, while revealing both the advantages of new learning formats (flexibility, accessibility) and their weaknesses (psychological stress, technical limitations). The authors emphasise that digital tools alone do not guarantee quality education – the key role is played by the psychological readiness of teachers and students to use them

Thus, researchers argue that the digital transformation of education requires an integrated approach that combines technological innovations with psychological and pedagogical support. They suggest developing a synergistic model that integrates digital competencies with the development of emotional intelligence and social skills. They also emphasise that without taking into account psychological factors, any technological changes in education risk remaining superficial and ineffective.

P.Prima, O. Goncharuk, D. Prima, and R. Roslavets offer a multifaceted analysis of the digitalisation process in education, which combines theoretical generalisations with practically oriented conclusions. The originality of the study lies primarily in its thorough adaptation of global trends to the Ukrainian educational context. The researchers not only state general trends, but also carefully analyse the legal framework of Ukraine and the orders of the Ministry of Education and Science, which allows them to clearly define the place of national education in the European space. An important scientific contribution is the conceptual understanding of digitalisation not just as a technical upgrade, but as the formation of a new ‘cyber-physical space’ where virtual and real educational processes are closely intertwined. Scientists emphasise that digital technologies create a fundamentally new environment for education, which requires a rethinking of traditional approaches to learning. In this context, special attention is paid to the analysis of such innovative areas as artificial intelligence, robotics, virtualisation of learning and the development of digital competence of all participants in the educational process (Prima et al.,2023).

The practical value of the study lies in the clear definition of strategic tasks for Ukrainian education, including the integration of digital technologies into curricula, infrastructure modernisation, and professional development of teaching staff. Therefore, it is important that R. Prima, O. Honcharuk, D. Prima, and R. Roslavets do not idealise the process of digitalisation, but point to its contradictions, in particular, the risks of losing the humanistic component of education and the need for a balanced approach to innovation.

I. Verbovskiy thoroughly explores the transformational potential of digital technologies in modern education. He notes that digitalisation has become an integral part of the educational process, especially in the face of global challenges such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the full-scale war in Ukraine. The scientist believes that digital tools are fundamentally changing traditional approaches to learning, making education more accessible, flexible and personalised. Particular attention is paid to the analysis of such innovative areas as cloud technologies, virtual reality, massive open online courses (MOOCs), which open up new opportunities for learning. According to the scientist, these technologies not only change the form

of education but also affect its content, contributing to the development of critical thinking and digital literacy (Verbowskyi, 2024).

The originality of this study lies in a comprehensive approach to analyzing the digitalization of education in times of crisis. The researcher not only states the benefits of digital technologies, but also identifies significant challenges faced by Ukrainian education. Among them are the digital divide between urban and rural schools, insufficient technical equipment of institutions, and the need to improve the skills of teachers. An important scientific contribution is the development of practical recommendations for the implementation of digital technologies in the educational process. Specific steps are proposed, in particular: development of digital learning infrastructure; creation of a national educational platform; introduction of blended learning formats; development of digital competencies among teachers and students. Particular attention should be paid to the analysis of the impact of digitalization on the changing role of the teacher. The author emphasizes that in the context of digital transformation, a teacher turns from a knowledge carrier into a moderator of the educational process, which requires fundamentally new approaches to teacher training (Verbowskyi, 2024).

Thus, the digitalization of education is an objective process that opens up new prospects for the development of the educational system. However, to realize its potential, a number of challenges need to be overcome, including ensuring equal access to digital technologies, developing effective mechanisms for assessing the quality of digital education, and preserving the humanitarian component of the educational process.

5. Conclusions. Current research on digital transformation in education shows that a successful transition to new forms of education requires a comprehensive systematic approach that goes far beyond simple technical upgrades. Based on the analysis of international experience and research, a number of important conclusions can be drawn.

First of all, the digital transformation of education involves a holistic rethinking of all aspects of the learning process. Studies clearly show that individual technological innovations without parallel changes in pedagogical approaches, organizational culture, and teacher training do not have the expected effect. Particular attention is needed to develop clear strategies that take into account both national peculiarities and the specifics of individual educational institutions.

The analysis reveals several key challenges faced by education systems. Technical barriers include unequal access to the Internet and digital devices in different regions, which creates the so-called “digital divide.” Human resources problems are manifested in the insufficient level of digital competence among teaching staff, while methodological difficulties are related to the lack of unified tools for assessing the quality of digital learning. Psychological factors, such as natural resistance to change among participants in the educational process, are also worth noting.

The experience of leading countries in digital education, such as Finland and Singapore, shows that successful digitalization never means a complete abandonment of traditional methods. The most effective models of education of the future are based on a harmonious combination of innovative digital tools (virtual

laboratories, gamified platforms, artificial intelligence for personalized learning) with classical forms of learning, such as live discussions and group projects. Of particular importance is the development of the so-called “soft” skills, such as critical thinking, creativity, and emotional intelligence, which remain relevant regardless of technological progress.

Based on the analysis of scientific works, we can identify clear stages of successful digital transformation of educational institutions. The preparatory stage includes a thorough assessment of the existing infrastructure and comprehensive training of the teaching staff. The adaptation period involves the gradual implementation of pilot projects with further analysis of their effectiveness. The full integration stage involves the large-scale implementation of digital solutions in all areas of the educational process. The optimization phase involves continuous monitoring of results and process adjustments based on the data obtained.

Promising areas for further research include studying the impact of artificial intelligence on the personalization of learning, developing unified standards for digital pedagogy, analyzing the long-term impact of digitalization on the quality of education, and improving blended learning models. Studies of the psychological aspects of digital education, in particular the impact of technology on students’ motivation and socialization, are of particular relevance.

Thus, the digital transformation of education is a complex, multi-level process that requires concerted action by all participants, from government agencies to individual teachers. The most effective results are achieved when technological innovations are combined with a deep understanding of pedagogical principles and psychological characteristics of the learning process. The future of education lies not in full digitalization, but in the intelligent integration of technologies that complement and expand, but do not replace, traditional values and methods of education. Successful implementation of digital transformation will create a flexible, adaptive education system capable of preparing specialists for the challenges of the rapidly changing digital world, while maintaining the fundamental principles of quality education.

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รายนามผู้ทรงคุณวุฒิพิจารณาบทความ(Peer Review)

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บทความทุกเรื่องที่ตีพิมพ์เผยแพร่ได้ผ่านการพิจารณาทางวิชาการโดยผู้ทรงคุณวุฒิในสาขาวิชา (Peer review) ในรูปแบบไม่มีชื่อผู้เขียน (Double-blind peer review) 3ท่าน

บทความที่ตีพิมพ์เป็นข้อค้นพบ ข้อคิดเห็นและความรับผิดชอบของผู้เขียนเจ้าของผลงาน และผู้เขียนเจ้าของผลงาน ต้องรับผิดชอบต่อผลที่อาจเกิดขึ้นจากบทความและงานวิจัยนั้นต้นฉบับที่ตีพิมพ์ได้ผ่านการตรวจสอบคำพิมพ์และเครื่องหมายต่าง ๆ โดยผู้เขียนเจ้าของบทความก่อนการรวมเล่ม

