The Evolution and Current State of Research on Pork-Barrel Politics (1970–2024)
Keywords:
Earmarking, Electoral Support, Logrolling, Pork-Barrel, Public SpendingAbstract
This review examines scholarly research on pork-barrel politics from August 1970 to June 2024, utilizing a dataset of 279 documents in the Scopus database. It holistically elaborates on the prominent debates in research on pork-barrel politics that cover issues such as the effectiveness of budget distribution and the controversial practices of logrolling and earmarking. These debates revolve around the impact of pork on economic efficiency, resource equity, and potential corruption. The statistical analysis results through Bibliometrix RStudio software confirm a dynamic developmental trajectory from Pennock's seminal work in 1970 to recent contributions by Belmar et al. (2024). The annual growth rate of 3.93% reflects a steady increase in research on pork-barrel politics annually, indicating growing interest and attention from researchers over time. Peter Spáč emerges as a leading contributor with eight articles, both as a sole author and co-author, while Weingast et al. (1981) stand out with the highest citation count of 934. This bibliometric analysis provides a global overview of research trends in pork-barrel politics, covering topics such as country-based issues, antecedents and consequences, benefits, logrolling and earmarking mechanisms, and the intensified application of these practices before elections. Ninety-six future research questions identified from thirty-nine articles aim to deepen understanding of legislative dynamics and the relationship between legislators and their constituents in pork-barrel politics.
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