Beyond Myths: Unpacking Thailand’s Soft Balancing in Foreign Policy toward China
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Abstract
Amid intensifying great power rivalry between the United States and China, how does Thailand navigate its foreign policy direction? Since the coup in 2014, Thailand has often been portrayed as bandwagoning with China. Through documentary analysis, empirical data, and case study methods, this article challenges that myth by arguing that elements of balancing exist, albeit in a soft form. This “soft balancing” is driven by Thailand’s prerequisite conditions to restrain China’s power through institutions without resorting to hard military measures. The strategy spans three dimensions: security, economy, and diplomacy. Evidence suggests that Thailand employs soft balancing by capitalizing on its alliance with the United States, imposing conditions on infrastructure investments as well as diversifying partnerships, and leveraging ASEAN institutional mechanisms. By unpacking Thailand’s soft balancing in practice, this article contributes to debates on secondary state alignments, particularly regarding how secondary states respond to great power competition and China’s growing influence, and offers policy lessons for other smaller states on deftly maneuvering toward greater powers.
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