Continuity under Sanctions: Transactional Reconfiguration and the Reproduction of Russian Oil Exports
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บทคัดย่อ
Why do sanctions that increase transport, insurance, financial, and market-access costs not necessarily interrupt an energy-export system? Conventional indicators such as prices, revenues, and trade volumes identify economic damage but do not explain whether a constrained material-commercial function can be reproduced.
This article distinguishes operational pressure, value compression, and functional interruption and examines Russian petroleum exports from December 2022 to 20 September 2026. Using structured event-configuration analysis, it traces constraint–response episodes affecting the recurring circuit of extraction, loading, transport, delivery, settlement, and renewed shipment. It develops the concept of transactional reconfiguration: the timely recombination of operational rights, accessible assets, guarantees, counterparties, jurisdictions, and settlement arrangements through which a constrained function is reproduced. Fiscal receipts are treated as downstream evidence of monetisation rather than as direct measures of physical continuity. The evidence demonstrates substantial operational pressure, periods of value compression, and interruption at particular nodes and corridors, but not sustained interruption of the aggregate export circuit. Continuity was state-enabled but relationally co-produced through Russian coordination and external acceptance by buyers, ports, insurers, banks, and intermediary jurisdictions. Node removal becomes system-level interruption only when no operationally sufficient substitute is constituted before the viable adjustment interval expires.
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วารสารวิชาการผลประโยชน์แห่งชาติ ภายใต้ Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License วารสารอนุญาตให้มีการเข้าถึงหรือเผยแพร่งานทางวิชาการได้โดยไม่มีค่าใช้จ่ายหรือมีการลงทะเบียน เพื่อเป็นการสนับสนุนการแลกเปลี่ยนความรู้ ขอบข่ายครอบคลุมงานวิชาการด้านภูมิรัฐศาสตร์ ภูมิเศรษฐศาสตร์ และนวัตกรรมผู้ใช้สามารถแบ่งปัน คัดลอก และกระจายข้อมูลทั้งหมดที่ตีพิมพ์ใน วารสารวิชาการผลประโยชน์แห่งชาติ ในรูปแบบหรือสื่อใดก็ตามตามเงื่อนไขต่อไปนี้:
การอ้างอิง — อนุญาตให้นำผลงานไปใช้ ทำซ้ำ แจกจ่าย หรือดัดแปลงงานนั้นได้ แต่ต้องให้เครดิตที่มาของเจ้าของผลงานนั้น ซึ่งถ้ามีการใช้ผลงานนั้นโดยไม่มีเครดิตชื่อเจ้าของผลงานกำกับ จะต้องทำการขอนุญาตเจ้าของผลงานก่อน
ไม่ใช้เพื่อการค้า — อนุญาตให้นำผลงานไปใช้ ทำซ้ำ แจกจ่าย หรือดัดแปลงงานนั้นได้ แต่ไม่สามารถใช้ผลงานหรือบทความเพื่อวัตถุประสงค์ทางการค้าได้
ไม่สามารถดัดแปลง — อนุญาตให้นำผลงานไปใช้ ทำซ้ำ แจกจ่าย ผลงานชิ้นนั้นได้ แต่ห้ามดัดแปลงงาน เว้นแต่ว่าจะได้รับการอนุญาตจากเจ้าของผลงานก่อน
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